Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

111. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

4495.

Algiers, December 16, 1981, 1630Z

Paris please pass General Walters. Dept pass S/AL. Subject: General Walters’ Discussion With Algerian Officials.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary. General Walters had wide-ranging, worthwhile exchange with Acting Foreign Minister Dembri Dec. 15 which covered C–130’s, Western Sahara, Libya, Chad, Golan Heights and Abu Ain. Dembri revealed bilateral talks with Morocco were going on which could result in Hassan-Bendjedid summit. On Chad, Algeria would send observer detachment. Exchanges were frank but friendly. General Walters later covered much of same ground with the Director of the National Security Council. President Bendjedid, who was tied up,² sent word he hoped to meet with General Walters on his next visit. End summary.

3. Acting FonMin Dembri opened the conversation by warmly welcoming General Walters on his third visit to Algeria. Dembri said that visits like his, along with recent fruitful discussions that were held with DAS Constable,³ are indispensable for genuine mutual understanding between Algeria and the U.S. Dembri remarked that he hoped the dialogue would continue and become more intense.

4. Dembri raised the question of Israel’s reported decision annexing the Golan Heights.⁴ General Walters asked if he had read the State Department’s statement declaring any such move a violation of international law, and Dembri said he had. Algeria, he added, was very satisfied with the position the U.S. had taken, and believed this position would be helpful at the imminent Security Council consideration of the issue. General Walters remarked that the Israeli action was of deep concern to the U.S. since our view remains that any unilateral change in the status of the Golan Heights would be contrary to Security Council Resolutions 242,⁵ and 338,⁶ on which the Middle East peace negotiations since 1967 have been based. He observed that GOA allegations of US complicity were false.

5. Dembri said that one reason for Algeria’s great concern over Israel’s move was that it came at a particularly bad time in Arab eyes—following hard on U.S. extradition of Abu Eain to Israel.⁷ General Walters responded that Abu Eain’s extradition came after the case had been considered at every level of the U.S. judicial system, including the Supreme Court which was completely independent, and that legal rather than political considerations governed the extradition decision.

6. Dembri replied that his government was not taking issue with U.S. internal legal procedures, but was worried about the political consequences, in particular the inevitable deterioration of America’s image and influence in the Arab world. He noted Algeria and other Arab ambassadors had made démarches on the case but their views were apparently not given much weight.⁸

7. On the Western Sahara, Dembri noted that Algeria and the U.S. have used much the same language in their support of OAU decisions supporting a referendum.⁹ The principal Algerian objective is stability in the Maghreb. In this context, “we consider U.S. arms assistance to Morocco to be destabilizing and to contain a real threat of escalation.”

8. Dembri said that he wanted to reiterate what Foreign Minister Benyahia had said to DAS Constable after Guelta Zemmour¹⁰—that Algerian territory had not been and would not be used by foreign troops for the purpose of supplying arms to the Polisario. The present situation was unstable and dangerous; it was important for the OAU to move as soon as possible to resume the negotiating process and fill the present vacuum. Dembri stressed Algeria’s desire for improved relations with Morocco, for economic and commercial as well as political reasons. He added that his government was disturbed about the deteriorating economic situation in Morocco and its implications for internal political stability. “We are the greatest defenders of the Moroccan monarchy”, Dembri said. He revealed bilateral talks with Morocco were taking place. If they were successful, a Hassan-Bendjedid summit would take place.

9. Concerning a settlement, Dembri remarked that the problem of direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario remained a difficult problem. He understood the U.S. view that the OAU decision did not call for direct negotiations between the two parties. On the other hand, there was no question but that the UN General Assembly had called for direct negotiations. General Walters interjected that it seemed to him there was no possible way that a body comprising 150 nations could make a well-considered decision regarding the negotiating modalities in a complicated regional dispute. As for the U.S., the General continued, America would certainly take no action toward escalating the Sahara dispute. Our arms assistance to Morocco was directly proportionate to the provocation—the introduction of SAM–6 missiles and their use by the Polisario.¹¹ General Walters added that the U.S. hoped for improved relations between Algeria and Morocco, and was pleased that high-level bilateral contacts had been taking place.

10. Dembri commented that the Algerians were disturbed as much by the symbolic effect of all the American visits to Morocco as by the arms assistance itself. He added that his government simply did not understand the need of all the U.S. military advisors in Morocco. To this General Walters responded that the U.S. for its part did not understand why sophisticated materiel, which represented a qualitative change in the military balance, had been introduced into the Western Sahara. General Walters said he well understood the problem of foreign military advisors. For example, the U.S. had some 150 advisors in all Latin America while the Soviets had over 300 in Peru alone. (Dembri got [garble] indirect reference to Soviet military advisors here.)

11. Dembri noted that there would soon be a meeting of the OAU Implementation Committee in Nigeria to consider next steps in the negotiating process. Both the Polisario and Morocco had reservations regarding the original Nairobi decisions, and it would be important at this next meeting to prevent any backsliding. He stated that if the military escalation continues and there is no progress in the negotiations, it will be catastrophic for the region.

12. Dembri reiterated Algeria’s wish to intensify consultations with the U.S. The purchase of C–130s was a clear indication of Algeria’s desire for improved relations. He stressed that when the planes were formally turned over to the Algerians, it would be useful to make clear that the C–130 sale was in no way related to the Algerian role in the release of the American hostages. We do not want to become professional mediators, he said. General Walters said he understood Algeria’s sensitivities on this point, and would make certain no such linkage was made.

13. Dembri turned to the current friction between Libya and the U.S., noting that this deteriorating relationship was very disquieting to Algeria. American rhetoric seemed to be mounting, the press dramatized the situation and the result was a spiral of recriminations. General Walters stressed that the U.S. withdrawal of oil company employees from Libya was not frivolous, but was based on hard information. He noted that the U.S. has evidence that Qadhafi has dispatched two terrorist squads to the U.S. with the aim of assassinating President Reagan or other high American officials.¹² What concerns us most, the General remarked, is that Qadhafi is totally unpredictable; while there is no logic or Libyan interest in assassinating U.S. officials, Qadhafi’s pattern of irrationality makes it essential that we take the evidence seriously. The General continued that it was also necessary to keep in mind that Americans had been traumatized by the assassination of six Ambassadors in recent years. No American President could therefore afford to dismiss a terrorist threat from Libya. Still another consideration was that the Reagan administration is determined to cease projecting an appearance of U.S. weakness and to establish America’s international credibility. Dembri responded that Algeria was opposed to any kind of terrorism, but from an outsider’s point of view the whole U.S.-Libyan dispute appeared to be a mirage. When Dembri noted that there had been press reports of a possible U.S. assassination attempt against Qadhafi, General Walters said he wished to deny categorically that assassination was an option. President Reagan had not only ruled out any consideration of such action, but even discussion of it, as had his predecessors.

15. Turning to Chad, Dembri confirmed that Algeria had agreed to send a detachment of observers to assist the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad. He noted also that Algeria had provided considerable aid to the GUNT, principally in the form of medical equipment. Algerian aid, he stressed, was designated for use only by the government itself. He added that Algeria recently had made a demarche to the Sudan,¹³ asking that military assistance to Habre be terminated. General Walters responded that U.S. policy is very similar. We have made representations to both Sudan and Egypt asking them to stop supporting Habre.¹⁴

16. The discussion with Col. Belkeir took place at the Presidency immediately after the meeting with Dembri. General Walters covered many of the same points, essentially reviewing the preceding discussion. Belkheir’s main points were related to the Western Sahara. Like Dembri, he emphasized the need for stability in the Maghreb. At the same time he stressed that Algeria strongly believed that a national liberation movement like the Polisario must be supported. The FLN could not betray its own experience and ideals—especially that a liberation movement has the right to secure its independence by whatever means it can. Again repeating a point made by Dembri, Belkheir underlined Algerian concern that increased U.S. arms assistance to Morocco could lead to an escalation of the conflict. General Walters reiterated that our response has been proportionate to the escalation brought about by the introduction of SAM–6’s, and its purpose is to restore the military balance and prevent further escalation of the Western Sahara conflict while diplomatic efforts for a solution continue.

17. Belkheir emphasized the importance of reinvigorating the OAU negotiating process as the only way of avoiding further military escalation. He said that Algeria, as a developing country, needs to use its resources for social and economic development, and its interest lies in a normal and stable relationship with Morocco. Finally Belkheir noted Algeria’s satisfaction that the C–130 sale had been completed. He remarked that this transaction was an earnest of Algeria’s desire for closer relations with the U.S.

Newlin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810388–0828. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Damascus, Lagos, Nairobi, Nouakchott, Rabat, Tunis, Tel Aviv, and USUN. Sent for information Immediate to Paris. The document is misnumbered in the original.
2. In telegram 556 from Algiers, February 7, 1982, the Embassy attributed Bendjedid’s absence to “GOA unhappiness over the large number of high-level U.S. officials and delegations visiting Morocco and the apparent neglect of Algeria.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820068–0014)
3. A record of Constable’s October 16–20 visit to Algeria is in telegram 3752 from Algiers, October 20. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810494–0656)
4. On December 14, 1981, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin successfully pushed a measure through the Israeli Parliament annexing the Golan Heights, which Israel had occupied since the June 1967 War. (David Shipler, “The Golan Heights Annexed by Israel in An Abrupt Move,” New York Times, December 15, 1981, pp. A1, A12) Documentation on the U.S. reaction to this decision is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.
5. No record of such a statement by the Department of State has been found. Walters was likely referring to the White House’s contention that the annexation seemed to “violate the United Nations Security Council document,” UN Resolution 242, “that has provided the framework for an overall peace settlement in the Middle East for more than 14 years.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “Israel’s Decision to Annex Golan Upsets U.S. Aides,” New York Times, December 16, 1981, pp. A1, A13) UN Resolution 242 was a November 22, 1967, UN Security Council Resolution that called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories captured during the June 1967 War, the right of all nations in the region to be sovereign, independent, and to live in peace free from the threat of war, freedom of navigation, “a just settlement of the refugee problem,” and the guaranteed “territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area.”
6. UN Security Council Resolution 338, October 22, 1973, called for a ceasefire in the October 1973 War, the implementation of all parts of UNSC Resolution 242, and negotiations among all parties to achieve “a just and durable peace in the Middle East.”
7. The Government of Israel accused Ziyad Abu Eain of setting off a bomb in Tiberias that exploded on May 14, 1979, killing 2 children and injuring more than 30 others. Eain later became a resident of Illinois. On February 20, 1981, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed his extradition to Israel.
8. The Algerian démarche is in telegram 3815 from Algiers, October 25. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810504–0802)
9. See footnote 8, Document 386.
10. In telegram 3743 from Algiers, October 19, the Embassy reported that “in response to King Hassan’s allegation of foreign involvement at Guelta Zemmour, Benyahia stated categorically that Algeria did not allow use of its territory by foreign elements in support of the Polisario and Beloucif asserted formally that no foreign elements were involved in that battle.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820513–0671)
11. For more on the arming of the Polisario with SAM–6 missiles, see footnote 3, Document 384, and Document 385.
12. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.
13. Not found.
14. In telegram 320522 to Khartoum, December 3, the Department informed the Embassy that during their November 18 meeting, Nimeiri agreed with Haig “that Habre must be induced to cease military activities until the situation in Chad and Libya’s intentions become clearer.” Egyptian Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal told Crocker that “Egypt shares this view.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810575–0623) Documentation on the Haig-Nimeiri conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXVII, Sub-Saharan Africa.