Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

91. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig to the Embassy in the United Kingdom and the Department of State¹

Buenos Aires, April 11, 1982, 0645Z

Secto 5041. Subj: Message to Prime Minister Thatcher From Secretary of State Haig.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. You should deliver the following message to Prime Minister Thatcher ASAP:²

3. Begin text:

Dear Madame Prime Minister,

I have had lengthy and intensive discussions here, and I now expect to arrive in London about 0630 a.m. Monday, April 12.

I will be prepared to talk to you whenever you wish about a draft proposal and some additional ideas that have come out of our 12 hours of meetings here.

In the meantime, I am sure you would agree that any military confrontation must be avoided at all costs until you have been able to consider this draft proposal.

Although it is clear serious problems remain; some progress has been made. With warm regards, Al Haig.³

End text.

Haig

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/11/1982–04/14/1982). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. Haig’s message was delivered to 10 Downing Street at 1055Z, April 11. (Telegram 7899 from London, April 11; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File (04/11/1982) (2))
3. In telegram 7902 from London, April 11, the Embassy transmitted Thatcher’s response to Haig’s message. She stated: “I look forward to seeing you in London again tomorrow and shall be glad to hold further discussions. I should certainly prefer to avoid military confrontation. But Argentina is the aggressor, and is still trying to build up the occupying force in the Falklands. The right way to prevent naval incidents is therefore for Argentina to remove all her naval vessels from the maritime exclusion zone. The Argentine Government has had plenty of warning. I am sure that you will have impressed this point upon the Argentine leaders. But if there is any doubt in your mind as to their intentions, you may wish to consider sending them a further immediate message.” (Ibid.)