Several days ago when the Falklands matter arose, I tasked my staff to
answer a number of questions. Their answers are attached.
The most recent development was the request this afternoon from Prime
Minister Thatcher2 that we:
1. Ban all military assistance to Argentina;
2. Impose restrictions on all imports from Argentina;
3. Discontinue export credit guarantees for Argentina.
These rather extreme proposals which we cannot agree to, make clear the
near hysterical pitch to which the UK
has propelled the political debate in London.
You may wish to scan the highlighted portions of the attached in
preparation for Wednesday morning’s NSPG.3
Attachment
Memorandum From James M. Rentschler, Dennis C. Blair, and Roger Fontaine of the National
Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Clark)4
Washington, April 6, 1982
SUBJECT
SUMMARY: Provides in-house answers to the
questions we raised concerning middle- and longer-term implications
of the Falklands crisis; supplements these with a summary of the
meeting Secretary Haig
chaired on the same general subject this morning;5 and recommends that you use the information
we have provided as a discussion basis during the time you will
spend with the President and Haig in the Caribbean.6
END SUMMARY
You asked for staff thinking on the package of questions we raised
vis-à-vis the Falklands crisis and our belief that an SSG would be a useful forum in which
to address the middle- and longer-term (as opposed to the immediate
and operational) implications of the crisis in the Southern
Atlantic.
At Tab A you will find a summary of in-house responses to those
questions. We have carried these as far as we can, with the
information and background to which we now have access, but there
remain issues which clearly require much broader inter-agency
consideration, particularly those involving the extent to which we
should or must support the UK in the
event of hostilities. This is a major policy
decision with far-reaching potential, and it may need
determination relatively soon (a matter of days).
Meanwhile, in addition to the material appended we summarize as
follows the main points of consensus emerging from the meeting
Secretary Haig chaired this
morning in which we participated along with Walt Stoessel, Larry Eagleburger, Tom Enders, Bill Middendorf, and a number of
others:
[Page 132]
—We do not have the luxury of either side-stepping this crisis or
attempting to wait it out;
—To the extent that third-party activity may be effective in averting
hostilities, the U.S. must be the one to initiate it (no other
likely candidates are in view); moreover, we will have more
flexibility moving early (i.e. now) rather than later;
—The Thatcher government is
at great risk and could well fall over this crisis; it will be
important for us to avoid a Suez- or Skybolt-type situation where we
are perceived to have thwarted the one lever (military threat
against Argentina) capable of turning the crisis around in Britain’s
favor;
—The above consideration, in turn, requires a basic policy
determination concerning the extent of support we will be willing to
provide the British, particularly in the context of hostilities
involving British naval units (we have already agreed to be
responsive to the first series of specific items of military
assistance which the Brits have requested);7
—Three elements in particular would serve U.S. interests in the
crisis: withdrawal of Argentine troops from the islands, turn-around
of the British fleet, and establishment of some
negotiating/arbitration mechanism or formula agreeable to both the
Brits and the Argentines;
—The most promising avenue at present may be a U.S.-sponsored OAS initiative which would result in
an MFO-type authority in the
islands, possibly composed of U.S. and Canadian elements, plus
elements from two Latin American countries (trying for this would be
contingent on earlier bilateral soundings with both the Brits and
the Argentines, which the Secretary is beginning this
afternoon);
—The bottom-line issue—ultimate sovereignty over the islands—will
have to be addressed at a far later stage in the process and should
be allowed to remain murky at present (as one participant put it,
“we have to resolve the Sinai before we resolve Jerusalem”);
—State will develop a specific game-plan incorporating the above
essentials, including a press line and an early start on some U.S.
diplomatic movement which does not leave the President looking
exposed and impotent while he is in Barbados.
Since the President, you, and the Secretary will be travelling
together to the Caribbean tomorrow, you may wish, in the course of
that trip, to use this memo as the basis for a discussion on where
and how we proceed from here on out.
Tab A
Paper Prepared by the National Security Council
Staff8
PRELIMINARY NSC
STAFF VIEWS ON QUESTIONS/ISSUES WHICH WE NEED TO ADDRESS IN THE
CONTEXT OF MIDDLE- AND LONGER-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF UK-ARGENTINE DISPUTE OVER THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS
I. INTELLIGENCE AREA
Q. [1½ lines not declassified]
A. [3½ lines not declassified]
Q. What is the situation of the small number of American citizens
known to be residing in the islands?
A. Under control. Embassy Buenos Aires is keeping a careful watching
brief on their whereabouts and safety, and is impressing upon the
Argentine authorities our interest in this matter.
Q. What are U.K. deployment plans, assets and capabilities?
A. U.K. force now underway has capability of sinking Argentine
surface ships, blockading of Falklands, and hit-and-run attacks on
Argentinian mainland; successful amphibious operation to retake the
Falklands is difficult, but probably within U.K. capability;
—Primary shortcoming of present U.K. force is lack of fixed-wing
aircraft. Argentina has one old aircraft carrier with fixed-wing
aircraft, and can operate from shore bases on Falklands and
mainland;
—U.K. plans unknown, but statements of leaders and thoroughness of
preparations suggest intentions at least to retake Falklands by
force if necessary. This aspect should not be
underestimated.
Q. What are Argentine capabilities, vulnerabilities and
intentions?
A. Argentine Navy would be unable to prevent U.K. sea blockade of
Falklands.
—By time of British arrival, Argentine force on Falklands will be
well garrisoned, provisioned, and an airlift could bring essential
supplies for period of weeks even if U.K. sea blockade were in
place;
[Page 134]
—Argentine Navy and air force would not be able to lift a British sea
blockade of either Falklands or mainland ports (negligible
capability against British nuclear submarines).
—Argentine intentions are to dig in on the Falklands, raising the
cost of a British attempt to recapture the islands.
Q. What are realistic U.K. options, with best estimate of future
actions, both military and political?
A. British options are limited, given the domestic political
considerations driving the crisis in both the U.K. and Argentina,
and given the logistical constraints on a purely military British
response;
—The British hope for a peaceful settlement but are quite prepared to
use force;
—Political options have already been embarked on to bring pressure on
Argentina, (severance of diplomatic relations, freezing of Argentine
assets) but in and of themselves such measures will not be enough to
change the situation in the U.K.’s favor;
—Unless third-party activity (i.e. U.S. initiative) proves effective,
the prospect is for armed conflict via naval engagements in the very
near future; realistically, that is the only option the present
British government has absent face-saving intervention.
II. POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC AREA
Q. What is the recommended U.S. role in private and public
diplomacy?
A. This is a major policy decision, to a significant degree already
considered by the President’s stated willingness to offer U.S. good
offices;9
—In the short-term we should, following
bilateral soundings with both parties, attempt an initiative under
OAS auspices which seeks
replacement of the Argentine military presence with an MFO-type authority (U.S., Canada, plus
two Latin America elements from two Latin American countries), in
concert with the turn-around of British naval units and agreement by
both sides to some impartial negotiating mechanism;
—In the longer-term we must at some point
address the fundamental issue, which is the question of ultimate
sovereignty over the islands;
Q. What should be the extent of U.S. support for the British?
A. This is a major policy decision, to a certain extent conditioned
by our formal alliance relationship with the U.K., our positive
feelings about the present U.K. government, our need to avoid a
Suez-type
[Page 135]
perception of
U.S. unhelpfulness, our recognition of the support Mrs. Thatcher’s government has given us
on many issues; and the fact that we are already favorably
responding to a first series of British requests for specific items
of military and logistical assistance.
—The NSC’s West Europe office
recommends a strong pro-British tilt, even at the risk of damaging
some relationships in the hemisphere (which we judge to be less
serious than our larger strategic interests in the
NATO/transatlantic context).
Q. What is our assessment of U.S. public opinion and Congressional
opinion re extent of U.S. role?
A. Public interest currently low to moderate, and bemused by the
whole affair;
—If military conflict breaks out, U.S. opinion would probably be on
side of U.K.
Q. What are the middle- and longer-term implications for other key
U.S. policy areas (UK/NATO credibility and capability? Impact on
US/UK bilateral relations? Effects on U.S. regional interests, e.g.,
Middle East?)
A. In the short-term, serious degradation of
U.K. commitments/capability in NATO Europe and other regions of the world;
—In the longer-term, assuming British success
in thwarting Argentina, psychological enhancement of Western
capabilities (nothing succeeds like success), with possible
favorable implications for regional areas, including Middle
East;
—In the longer-term, assuming further British
humiliation or outright failure (particularly in a military
context), serious damage to the image of Western strength,
accompanied by a likely deterioration in the US/UK bilateral
relationship (particularly if a Labour government assumes power in
the wake of a Tory debacle).
Q. What are the middle- and longer-term implications of the crisis
for U.S. Hemispheric policy?
A. Middle-term implications. The destruction
of a currently promising U.S.-Argentine relationship which has yet
to be achieved in the history of our two countries.
—Longer-term implications. The straining and
perhaps collapse of the OAS and its
security aspects embedded in the Rio Treaty.
III. MILITARY/LOGISTICAL AREA
Q. What will be likely U.K. support requests?
A. These are likely to reflect (and keep pace with) the extent of
U.K. military involvement; the more committed the British become
militarily, the greater the number and frequency of requests for
specific assistance (we have already received a number of requests
in both the political and military areas);
[Page 136]
—The initial focus will be on communications assistance, resupply,
and overflight facilitation;
—A later phase, assuming expanded military action, would entail an
intensification of requests in the above area and the U.K. pressing
for a generally higher profile of U.S. assistance across the
board.
Q. What will be the impact on other U.S. assets and commitments in
event of support to British?
A. In the short-term, no significant
impairment of our assets militarily;
—In the longer-term, and assuming sustained
military operations, drawdowns on available assets transferred from
other areas could have a range of adverse consequences from moderate
to serious, particularly in some technical areas ([less than 1 line not declassified], communications
gear).
