437. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane) to President
Reagan
1
Washington, December 2, 1983
SUBJECT
Issue
Whether to certify to Congress that Argentina has made significant
improvements in human rights.
Facts
With the recent elections, Argentina’s human rights situation has
improved dramatically and certification will signal our strong support
for the return of democracy. Certification would be effective upon
installation of the Alfonsin government on December 10. The U.K. and
Chile will be especially concerned about the Argentine certification. A
memo from George Shultz (Tab A)
provides a recommended certification scenario. The first step would be a
letter (Tab B) from you to Mrs. Thatcher. Cap
Weinberger opposes certification (Tab C).
Discussion
Cap Weinberger’s concerns focus
on the reaction in the U.K. On balance, the strategy outlined by
George Shultz, in my view,
adequately addresses Cap’s concerns. Moreover, the question is not
whether but when we will certify Argentina. The game plan includes, inter alia, Congressional consultation in
advance, and dispatching Dick
Walters to explain our position
to President Pinochet.2 I recommend approval, and OMB concurs.
Recommendation
That you approve the strategy for Argentine certification (Tab A) and
sign the proposed letter to Mrs. Thatcher (Tab B).3
[Page 892]
Tab A
Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan
4
Washington, November 28, 1983
SUBJECT
I believe you should certify to Congress that Argentina has made
significant improvements in human rights upon installation of the
Alfonsin government on December 10, with public announcement of our
intention December 7. The human rights situation there has improved
dramatically, and certification will signal our strong support for
the return of democracy in Argentina. The Argentine Armed Forces
would prefer that certification take place while they are still in
power. Our assessment is that, considering all the factors involved,
certification should take effect upon installation of the new
government. In our announcement of this decision, we will note the
contribution of the Bignone
government on successfully carrying out the return to democracy.
The UK and Chile are concerned about
the political repercussions of certification, but their biggest fear
is that subsequent arms sales to Argentina will threaten peace in
the region. While certification makes US arms sales to Argentina once again possible it would
not result in large, immediate weapons sales. The Argentines have
bought heavily in Europe and are short of funds. In addition,
President-elect Alfonsin is committed to slashing the military
budget. We would handle any new requests on a case-by-case basis
with particular attention to the effect of each sale on regional
stability.
Mrs. Thatcher has spoken out
very strongly against arms sales to Argentina. Until the government
of Argentina announces an end to hostilities over the Falklands, we
would consult closely with the British on arms sales requests. In
her November 14 Guildhall speech, Thatcher stressed that the US is the ultimate guarantor of UK security and that [Page 893] occasional differences cannot obscure our
shared values.5 This
is a retreat from her earlier tough rhetoric and should not be
ignored.
As a first step I have attached a letter from you to Mrs. Thatcher informing her of our
scenario for certification. General Pinochet of Chile will also be disturbed. We plan to
take steps to reassure him of our desire for close relations, even
though we cannot now justify certification of Chile. If you approve
we will send the letter to Mrs. Thatcher, begin consultations with Congress and
shortly send you letters for President Pinochet, President Bignone and the actual certification document for
your signature. Thatcher has
asked that we delay certification, at least until the inauguration,
to help her deal with domestic political pressures.
Tab B
Letter From President Reagan to British Prime Minister Thatcher
6
Washington, December 2, 1983
Dear Margaret:
As you know, Argentina has made steady progress in strengthening its
protection of human rights. The fair, open and honest elections on
October 30 are the latest manifestation of this progress. When
President-elect Alfonsin takes office on December 10, Argentina will
have completed its return to democracy.
In view of this and other relevant factors, I will be certifying to
the U.S. Congress that Argentina has made significant progress in
human rights and that making Argentina eligible for arms transfers
is in the U.S. national interest. Our announcement will be made on
December 7, just before the U.S. delegation arrives in Buenos Aires
for the [Page 894] inauguration.
Certification will be effective upon installation of the new
government.
I know this announcement will be a delicate question in Great
Britain. However, as I suggested when we last met, and as subsequent
consultations between our two governments have indicated, it is now
appropriate and accurate to certify that Argentina has made
significant progress in human rights.
We will be informing U.S. Congressional leaders and Presidents
Bignone and Pinochet of our decision on
December 6. Because of our special relationship and the importance
you personally place on this question, I am notifying you first of
our decision.
The decision was based on the following considerations. During the
past year, the Government of Argentina has made significant progress
in complying with internationally recognized principles of human
rights. Argentina’s human rights performance now meets the test for
certification required by U.S. law.
Certification is not equivalent to arms sales. We will evaluate each
request very carefully on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
any threat that may be posed to peace in the region. We would
consult closely with your government on any major sales.
Significant sales are not expected. Argentina has replaced most of
its losses from a variety of sources and President-elect Alfonsin is
committed to a significant reduction of the military budget.
Moreover, Argentina’s difficult economic situation will not support
major arms acquisitions. In any event, should Argentina so desire,
arms are readily available from other sources, including the Soviet
Union.
In my view, our normalization of relations with Argentina will be in
the interests of the United States and Great Britain. Certification
will help strengthen U.S. influence with Argentina and enable us to
work more effectively to assure regional stability. The climate for
dialogue and negotiation will be improved.
I sincerely appreciate your eloquent and timely statement at the
Guildhall. I wholeheartedly agree with your assessment of the
special relationship between our two nations and the importance of
our shared interests and purposes.
Margaret, be assured that I continue to place the highest value on
your personal advice, counsel and friendship.
With warm wishes,
Sincerely,
[Page 895]
Tab C
Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)7
Washington, November 28, 1983
SUBJECT
- Argentine Certification (U)
(C) I do not believe we should issue the certification at this time
for a number of reasons:
(1) As you know, Prime Minister Thatcher has repeatedly expressed her concern about
certification and arms sales, insisting that US arms for Argentina would be “the single most
difficult thing for me.” Despite our careful and academic
explanations, in the minds of the British general public,
certification is considered to be a license for unrestricted US arms sales to the Argentine
military. Mrs. Thatcher
firmly believes that even a short delay of a few months after the
new civilian government takes control in Argentina would be helpful
in gaining UK public acceptance of
Argentine certification.
(2) None of us know whether the new government in Argentina will show
any marked improvement in either human rights or in its attitude to
a new invasion of the Falklands. This government has not yet even
taken office.
(3) With the INF deployments
underway in the UK, this is a time
of increased sensitivity in US/UK relations and has far-reaching
consequences for the NATO
Alliance.
(4) I also fear that certification will add fuel to the smouldering
unhappiness that the British have (quite erroneously) about our
invasion of Grenada. We need to be sensitive to the fact that in the
present politico-military environment, Argentine certification puts
an unnecessary strain on an already troubled relationship.
(5) Nor would certification, without arms sales, help our
relationship with Argentina.
(6) Finally, there are other countries who have helped us more, such
as Chile, with far greater claim to certification now than
Argentina.
(C) I understand Secretary Shultz has sent a memorandum to the President
recommending that he certify to Congress that Argentina [Page 896] has made progress in human
rights and deserves to be certified. Argentina may make some
progress in human rights, but they haven’t yet. Indeed there are
even reports that their military will not permit the new government
to take office. Our need for continued UK cooperation in both the INF deployments and the reconstruction of a viable
Grenada, and on many other matters, far outweigh the US interest in such an early
certification of Argentina.
(U) Request you convey my concerns to the President before he makes
his decision on Argentine certification.
