Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

380. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 6, 1982

Mr. Secretary:

The Falklands and Lebanese crises have illuminated the need to have standard, though flexible, crisis management procedures in the Department. Improvising procedures as a crisis develops simply ensures that we all spend valuable time sorting out procedures instead of sorting out policy. It also leads to make-shift procedures, confusion, and bureaucratic turf-fighting.

Attached is an outline of what I think would make sense.² If you are interested, Jerry Bremer and my staff, in my absence, could work up a full-blown scheme for your final approval and promulgation in the Department.

You will see that this addresses crisis management within State and not on a government-wide basis. I wouldn’t advise you to tackle the latter issue head-on, as Al did—to his regret. Besides, sound State procedures that are put in place the moment a crisis erupts are the best safeguard against NSC over-management. The attached plan does, however, suggest how the State crisis management system should relate to other agencies, including the NSC.

Recommendation:

That you approve development of a detailed State crisis management system based on the attached outline.³

Lawrence S. Eagleburger⁴

1. Source: Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 25A, Official Memoranda 08/06/1982 (4). Confidential; Nodis.
2. Attached but not printed is an undated outline.
3. Shultz approved the recommendation on August 23.
4. Eagleburger initialed “LSE” above his typed signature.