Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

35. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Holmes) to Secretary of State Haig¹

Washington, April 1, 1982

SUBJECT

• Falkland Islands/South Georgia Dispute Between Argentina and the UK

ISSUE

Argentina appears to be planning military action against the Falkland Islands. The British have asked for our urgent assistance to prevent any such action; their intelligence (and ours) indicates invasion plans for 0400 EST April 2. Ambassador Shlaudeman has instructions to obtain peaceful assurances from President Galtieri today.² If Galtieri will not give adequate assurances, what do we do next?³

ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND

Argentina and the UK dispute sovereignty over the islands. We do not take a position on that issue but recognize UK administration and control. UK/Argentine negotiations over the years have made very little progress on the basic sovereignty issue. The Galtieri Government wants to force the pace and appears to be using the incident on South Georgia Island as the handle.

Argentine naval forces have been deployed and are capable of taking the Falkland Islands. We doubt they could hold them against a British effort to retake. We cannot be sure that the GOA intends to follow through with its invasion plans. However, they only stopped a similar invasion order against Chilean-held islands at the very last minute in December 1978. In that case the Pope stepped in as mediator. Foreign Minister Costa Mendez has twice assured our Ambassador that there would be no confrontation unless the British tried to remove the Argentine working party from South Georgia, but it is not clear whether this also rules out an invasion of the Falklands.

The British seek a diplomatic resolution to the current crisis, and we do not expect them to escalate it by forcibly removing the Argentine workers from Leith Harbour. Nevertheless, if Argentina takes military action against British possessions, there will be a British military response. As long as the majority of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands prefer British citizenship, the British will not cede sovereignty to Argentina.

The GOA has serious internal problems and might see bold action on the Falklands as the best way to rally popular support. On the other hand, the Galtieri government has eagerly sought good relations with the U.S. as the best way of overcoming legitimization problems stemming from the excesses of the 1976–78 period. The GOA may see their support for our policy in Central America as reducing USG opposition to a forceful posture on the disputed islands.

WHAT NEXT?

Scenario A—Galtieri provides assurances that the GOA will not initiate military action.

This will resolve the immediate problem. While the Argentine ships might remain on station for a face-saving period, the action would return to the diplomatic plane.

We should:

—Urge the UK not to increase its own military and naval presence and at the same time ask Argentina to remove its own.

—Encourage UK to proceed with its plans to send a special emissary to Buenos Aires and urge the GOA to accept him.

—Maintain our offer of good offices with respect to the immediate problem at the South Georgias.

Scenario B—Galtieri does not give Ambassador Shlaudeman the necessary assurances that Argentina will not use force.

Given the shortness of our time horizon we should immediately:

—Ask President to place a direct call to Galtieri.

—Call in the Argentine Ambassador to see you.

In addition to pointing out the grave damage that would be done to US/Argentine relations by Argentine seizure of the disputed islands, we should tell them that in the event of Argentine military action in the Falklands, the U.S. would support politically the UK.

We could also consider the following:

1. US support for a UK appeal to the UN Security Council.

However, a UK initiative in the Security Council would probably not get very far. Argentina enjoys the support of most of the Third World for its sovereignty claims, could count on the Soviet Bloc, and probably also China.

2. Tell the GOA that we will reassess our current position of neutrality on its somewhat similar Beagle Channel dispute with Chile.

While the GOA can reasonably hope to gain sovereignty over the Falklands and southern dependencies through patience (the islands are increasingly dependent on the Argentine economy and assistance; many British realize that UK control is an anachronism, even though they are strongly opposed to abandoning British subjects), the same does not apply to areas disputed with Chile. The GOA needs international community support for a negotiated settlement.

WHAT IF THE ARGENTINES INVADE THE FALKLANDS?

We may have no good options at that point. Once in possession of the Falklands it is very unlikely the Argentines will leave voluntarily, regardless of what we do or threaten. They may assume that the UK will not attempt to retake the islands, and that international attention will soon shift elsewhere.

Nevertheless, we will have to:

—Voice our strongest opposition to this action and state that the United States cannot recognize a solution that has not been agreed upon by the two parties.

—Urge immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces.

—Hold up indefinitely on the certification that would permit renewed U.S. arms sales and assistance to Argentina.

—Support fully UK initiatives at the UN or elsewhere.

It is more likely at this point, given the pressures on the Thatcher Government, that the UK will order the marine garrison to resist an invasion and will attempt to retake the islands. It could bring in sufficient naval power in 3–4 weeks to effectively neutralize Argentina’s proximity advantage. There could well be armed conflict, both at sea and on land. U.S. efforts at that point should be directed toward a cease fire and withdrawal of the Argentines. In that context we could consider sending our own special emissary.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–1407. Secret. Drafted by Service; cleared by Smith, B. Willcox (P), and Bosworth. Bosworth initialed the memorandum on behalf of Enders. Service initialed for Smith and Wilcox.
2. See Document 31.
3. In the right-hand margin of this paragraph, a notation in an unknown hand reads: “British holding cabinet meeting at 5:30 (our time) WH stressing about possible call by Pres.”