Office of the Historian

316. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)1

Washington, June 1, 1982

SUBJECT

  • Takacs Call

Argentine Ambassador Takacs met with Tom Enders late last night, to float the attached proposal,2 which he said was fathered by Air Force Chief Lami Dozo.

The proposal is like the “Peruvian” plan of May 5, except that it does not allow for a role for the local councils.

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Enders told Takacs that he did not believe that London would accept simultaneous withdrawal, although it might accept sequential withdrawal, and that the restoration of the councils appeared essential to Britain.

Takacs, reflecting Lami Dozo, continues to have unrealistic news of the military situation. He believes the carrier was in fact seriously damaged, that Argentine troops on the islands can hold out for 3 or 4 weeks, and that “15 or 20” British ships more will be sunk. He is talking about continuing the war after the British win in the Falklands.

Takacs had learned (through a Senate staff source) that the President had called Prime Minister Thatcher, and that the call “had not gone well.”

L. Paul Bremer, III

Executive Secretary

the person of an Administrator, designated by the United Nations Secretary General, for the government of the islands during the negotiations;” mutual withdrawal of British and Argentine forces “an equal distance under the conditions established by the Administrator;” agreement from both parties “not to reintroduce any armed forces in the demilitarized zone;” the creation of a group of four countries (the United States, Peru, and two other countries, “one to be named by each of the two parties”) to ensure the withdrawal; agreement by the two parties to cease the “economic measures they have taken against the other party on their own initiative or through third countries;” and the beginning of negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary General with the “assistance” of representatives of the four countries referred to above.

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Latin American Affairs Directorate Files, Falklands/Malvinas: NSC & State Memos, 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Blair forwarded the memorandum and attached proposal to McFarlane under a June 3 covering memorandum, commenting: “Al Sapia-Bosch believes the proposal is worth a try, but doubts that it will work.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Argentina (05/21/1982–06/15/1982)↩
  2. Attached but not printed is a Department of State translation of the Argentine proposal which included a ceasefire; “immediate installation of an interim authority in↩