295. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State1
4334. Subject: Demarche on Falklands. Ref: (A) State 142593.2
1. (Secret–Entire text)
2. I secured a private audience with President Figueiredo at 0900 May 25 as instructed reftel. I made all the points in the reftel with following preliminary additions: President Reagan’s pleasure at news of excellent bill of health that President Figueiredo received at Cleveland Clinic, and our interest in the most recent Brazilian initiative at the UN regarding a negotiated settlement. Figueiredo would interrupt and comment as we proceeded in the discussion.
3. Figueiredo concurred in our assessment of British posture and intransigence of both parties but he felt that once the British control the Islands the tables would be turned and the main challenge to the British would be to resupply and maintain a large garrison on the Islands. He felt that realization of this major problem might lead Britain to want to negotiate.
4. President Figueiredo responded positively to suggestion that Brazil join with US in any manner possible to achieve a negotiated solution. He said, quote I’ll do whatever President Reagan feels needs [Page 619] to be done. I’ll send emissaries. I’ll talk to Galtieri. I’ll even go to the border at Uruguaiana to meet him. I’ll work within normal channels and outside normal channels.3 Unquote.
5. Figueiredo said that he did not believe Argentina would welcome the presence of Brazilian troops on Falklands. He feels longstanding Argentine suspicion and fear that Brazilians have designs on Antarctica and the age-old rivalry between the two countries as dominant forces on the continent would lead Argentines to reject this aspect of the plan. In fact, he said, it could inhibit Brazil’s influence in other aspects of helping in the negotiated settlement. Figueiredo proposed a four-nation force: two countries picked by each side; and he suggested that Argentina would probably feel more comfortable with forces from either Paraguay, Ecuador, Colombia or Bolivia. He felt that Venezuela had tilted too much in Argentina’s favor and that Peru was joining those ranks.
6. He forecast that either Argentina or Great Britain might pick South Africa, and he thought this selection would be very important. He said that his Foreign Office was always shying away from relations with South Africa because this was the quote price charged unquote by Black Africa for good relations with Brazil. Nevertheless, Figueiredo felt that any South Atlantic solution must draw South Africa into the deal, because he considers South Africa a key to the security of the South Atlantic in the long term, especially now that we have seen that things can get out of hand in this region.
7. When I brought up the OAS meeting and the possibility of Figueiredo’s talking to the Argentines, he reacted quickly and positively. He said GOB posture for that meeting was to concentrate on solidarity and a minimum of sanctions necessary to placate the Argentines. When I reiterated our concern that an OAS meeting could block a negotiated settlement, he volunteered that he would call Galtieri and ask him quote not to put any more wood on the fire. Unquote.
8. Comment: Figueiredo saw me on short (40 minutes) notice, squeezing me in between presentation of Ambassadorial credentials and his regularly scheduled staff meeting at 0900 with Leitao, Venturini, Delfim and Medeiros. He sent a GOB car to pick me up at the Embassy to take me to the private Presidential entrance to avoid any public knowledge of the visit. Figueiredo was alert, interested and decisive. I did not have to prompt him, nor did he seem to cogitate on any of the actions that he proposed or volunteered. He spoke at length on the dilemma facing the British once they had established themselves on the Islands and also on the reaction of Galtieri and the Argentines [Page 620] regarding the possibility of Brazilian troops on the Falklands. He also addressed at length the thinking of the Argentines at this moment and the necessity of leaving them with the impression that they had achieved a principal goal, to wit: deny the Islands to the British (in the case of simultaneous withdrawal). He emphasized that this denial was the quote public-relations-out unquote for Galtieri with the Argentine people when he had to explain to them a simultaneous Argentine withdrawal. At the conclusion of the meeting I asked him if it would be useful for me to talk with Foreign Minister Guerreiro. He replied yes, and that he would tell Guerreiro that I would brief him on our conversation. On my departure Figueiredo reiterated how pleased he was with his state visit and especially with the warmth, candor, and personal courtesies of President Reagan. He also said that he was very impressed with Vice President Bush and Secretary Haig, and jokingly asked if he could borrow one or both of them as he needed people of that calibre.
9. As I was shown out I was the recipient of some good-natured kidding by the nine o’clock staff meeting group for having delayed the important business of state for 30 minutes.4
- Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (05/27/1982). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Clark wrote “President has seen” at the top of the telegram. In a May 26 memorandum to Reagan, Haig stated that the démarche decision was reached during a May 24 discussion between the two; see Document 298.↩
- In telegram 142593 to Brasilia, May 25, Haig instructed Motley to contact Figueiredo, following on the exchange between Figueiredo and Reagan in Washington concerning the “possibility of joint action to end the South Atlantic crisis,” and provided the Ambassador with a list of talking points. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/25/1982) Regarding Figueiredo’s visit, see Document 255.↩
- Clark underlined the quotation.↩
- In telegram 4372 from Brasilia, May 25, Motley reported on his meetings with other Brazilian officials: “On the basis of separate meetings with Ministers Medeiros (Intelligence) and Venturini (Military Household) on the one hand and with FonMin Guerreiro on the other, it appears that President Figuiredo may pursue a two-track course on the Falklands crisis. FonMin Guerreiro is to take a normal diplomatic track; Medeiros and Venturini are proposing that they personally pursue a face-to-face with Galtieri.” (Reagan Library Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/25/1982)↩