Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

279. Minutes of a Meeting of the Special Situation Group¹

Washington, May 20, 1982, 9:50–10:40 a.m.

SUBJECT

• The Falkland Islands

PARTICIPANTS

• The Vice President

• State

  • Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
  • Mr. Thomas O. Enders

• Defense

  • Secretary Weinberger
  • Mr. Fred Ikle

• CIA

  • Mr. William Casey

• USUN

  • Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

• JCS

  • General David C. Jones

• White House

  • Mr. Edwin Meese, III
  • Mr. Michael K. Deaver
  • Mr. William P. Clark
  • Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

• NSC

  • Mr. Roger W. Fontaine
  • Mr. James M. Rentschler

Minutes

The Vice President called the Special Situation Group to order at 9:50 a.m. He stated the purpose of the meeting was to get opinions on next steps regarding the Falkland crisis and to develop agreement, if it exists, among the group and let the President know where the current situation stands. He then asked the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to open the meeting.

Judge Clark stated the President had suggested a review of the problem by the SSG and that today’s meeting would begin with an intelligence update by the Director of Central Intelligence.

Director Casey said that [less than 1 line not declassified] the British were ready to go into East Falkland Island. [4 lines not declassified] the Argentine troops are ready to fight but they are not good quality. The Director believes the British intend to helicopter-drop troops at several points on East Falkland. The British are worried about Argentine air attacks but believe the Harriers and SAMs will fight them off. The British will fight but they are ready to talk at the same time. [less than 1 line not declassified] the Argentines believe the strike is ready and there are plans for a massive naval and air retaliation. [1 line not declassified] In the meantime, Moscow continues to play it cautiously. [5½ lines not declassified] In South America there is a rising feeling of support for Argentina, except in Chile. [1 line not declassified] the Hondurans are uptight regarding our posture, but the Argentines have let them know that it was business as usual in Honduras.

The Vice President then called for questions. There were none and Judge Clark said that Ambassador Kirkpatrick was scheduled to give at this time an update on the UN but that she was at the moment on the phone with the UN Secretary General.

After a brief pause Secretary Haig gave an intelligence update which consisted of the following: Last night General Pinochet (Chile) called General Vernon Walters and said the Soviets were providing military equipment indirectly to Argentina.² Secretary Haig could not confirm this; he remained somewhat skeptical until we assessed the motives of President Pinochet.

Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders observed that Peru on its own had already supplied materiel to Argentina.

At this point, Ambassador Kirkpatrick reviewed the situation at the UN. She said three things had occurred: First, the British had given to the Secretary General their final proposal on May 17, establishing a May 19 noon deadline. The Argentines had responded before noon and the response was negative. Ambassador Kirkpatrick characterized that response as “ridiculous.” The British, in turn, had rejected the Argentine response. Consequently, the Secretary General was working hard on his own three-point resolution. In passing, Ambassador Kirkpatrick believed that the last British proposal was “not unresponsible.” It was Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s belief that the Argentines should accept the British proposal and consider themselves the winner of this dispute. She believes that it may be helpful to pass along a list of concessions the British have already made. It should impress the Argentines.

The Ambassador to the UN also said there was a lot of evidence to show that the Argentine Foreign Office is now taking a harder, even sillier, line than the junta. The Foreign Office is spinning out silly, legalistic formula. Enrique Ros (Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister for Multilateral Affairs) has been arguing, for example, that without mention of all the relevant UN resolutions in the final agreement it would mean Argentina and the Foreign Office would have little to show for seventeen years of negotiations.

Regarding the Secretary General’s messages to President Galtieri and Prime Minister Thatcher, there was no response as yet. The Secretary General was at first encouraged by Thatcher’s willingness to accept a fresh Argentine proposal. The Secretary General also believed that Thatcher might agree to his own three-point solution. Those three points include the geographical scope of the agreement, the role of the local councils and the question of termination, i.e., what happens after December 31, 1982, if there is no agreement? There is no longer a question regarding sovereignty. There is no real problem on withdrawal. We are left with the above three problems.

It was Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s opinion that the junta was ready to eliminate the South Georgia and Sandwich Islands from the agreement. We are now left with the question of interim administration. If we lived in a responsible world we would be close to a solution. The question regarding the interim administration is this: What is the role of the local governing council? Specifically, what is the role and composition of that local council? The British want the old council to continue as before, although they have agreed to add two Argentine advisers selected from the 50 Argentine residents on the Island to the heretofore six-man council. The Argentines do not accept this. Ambassador Kirkpatrick then observed that there was a sleeper in all of this. The question is, will the UN administration permit during the interim period free Argentine immigration to the islands? There is no immigration now and hasn’t been for one hundred years. This is one of the principal laws governing the islands. The Secretary General wants to finesse this question by considering it later.

In the last twenty-four hours, Ambassador Kirkpatrick stated the presidents of Venezuela and Peru will call Galtieri. The Air Force member of the Argentine junta seems to be agreeable to the Secretary General’s proposal but, according to Ambassador Kirkpatrick, chances are less than fifty-fifty the Argentines will accept it. At the moment, there will be no meeting of the UN Security Council. Meanwhile, among the delegations friendly to the British, there is growing impatience with the British position.

Secretary Weinberger then asked if Ambassador Kirkpatrick could outline the agreed upon portions.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick replied that she believed there was a consensual agreement though no formal agreement had been reached. There was, for example, agreement on parallel and simultaneous withdrawal. The British had quietly dropped an earlier insistence on a previous Argentine withdrawal. In the May 17 British proposal the plan was withdrawal of the Argentines to the mainland while the British withdrew to 150 nautical miles, followed by total British withdrawal within fourteen days. The Argentines want a withdrawal of 300 nautical miles and total withdrawal within thirty days. Ambassador Kirkpatrick insisted that the remaining differences were not a major issue.

Secretary Haig then outlined what he thought the prospects were for agreement. He believed the Secretary General had played it very well. He also noted the Secretary General’s proposal is basically our final position. The major thing he got was agreement on the sovereignty issue. As for the geographical scope, he is finessing the problem but leaving it for later negotiations. He is, by doing so, letting the British remain in the South Georgias, which is essential to the UK. Secretary Haig, however, is not as sanguine about the withdrawal question. The Argentines do not want to withdraw under British guns. As for the Security Council, we are back to where we were. Regarding termination, the Argentines do not want to negotiate another seventeen years, and the British want assurances they will not be subject to another invasion. Secretary Haig’s personal guess is that the Argentines will accept the Secretary General’s proposals today and put the onus on the British. Meanwhile, the British are convinced the Argentine Government cannot make and stick to a decision. The British may also come back today and inform the Secretary General there are too many unanswered questions. Therefore, they would like a detailed Argentine response. At the same time, the British will not change their own military plans because time has run out.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick stated that if the British attack the Falklands there would be an immediate call for a Security Council meeting and there would be a resolution calling for a cease-fire. The British would veto and the whole thing would come at a high cost to us. On the question of geographical scope, Ambassador Kirkpatrick said the Argentines have an installation on the Sandwich Islands, but if we finesse this right we will leave things as they are and this would be a reasonable situation. She also believes that if the Argentines accept the Secretary General’s proposal, there will be an immediate UN mission sent to the area.

Secretary Haig then outlined several basic questions we need to answer. First, if the Secretary General succeeds, how do we rebuild our relations with Argentina and in the Southern Cone? If the British attack we need scenarios for this because the UN effort will be discredited and we will need to go at it in another way. If the British succeed, Galtieri may well fall and Argentine Air Force Chief, General Lami Dozo, could move in. The Secretary also observed there is a problem with London now because they are nervous about our support. There was general questioning as to why the British should be nervous since we had given them materiel and diplomatic support, and Director Casey observed that nervousness had, in effect, been reflected by Prime Minister Fraser.³

Secretary Haig then said that if the British assault the Islands and there are no attacks on the mainland—we have assurances on this—we will issue a public statement reaffirming UN Security Council Resolution 502.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick then said a meeting of the Security Council would call for a cease-fire and simultaneous withdrawal. For us to veto that will be “interesting.”

Director Casey then asked, where does the Rio Treaty come in?

Secretary Haig replied, if the Argentine mainland is attacked, it certainly would come into play. Secretary Haig added that Jeane was right, if the British land then the shoe is on the other foot.

Secretary Weinberger added, if the British land and encounter serious problems and we pull back our support, we will have another Suez.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then said he believed Prime Minister Thatcher had given an O.K. to her forces, depending on the weather. The weather is now bad and will be so until Saturday.⁴ There are no safe predictions after that. The British are confident they will succeed but they don’t know how severe the losses will be. We have provided them tons and tons of equipment. One question remains controversial, about two replenishment ships.⁵

Judge Clark interjected and said the President has decided not to supply them.

Secretary Haig then said we need to check on the Pinochet story and added the British will have problems on any Security Council resolution.

The Vice President said it would be very hard to veto such a resolution. Would the British really do it? There was general agreement that they would.

Judge Clark then asked, are there contingency plans on post-invasion support for the British?

Secretary Haig said we will continue to support them but we will be very careful. We also have the War Powers Act to consider. He noted, too, that if the British succeed quickly they (the British) may welcome a cease-fire. We must move hard at the United Nations and while Galtieri may be gone, the Argentines may accept a UN order to cease-fire.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick then said that first there will be within hours of an attack on the Falklands a resolution calling for a cease-fire. It will be difficult for us to veto the first resolution and then later support the second resolution contingent on a successful British attack.

Secretary Haig said that the Soviets won’t veto anything and that at some point the British will want the U.S. to guarantee the agreement reached won’t be violated, and that may mean the use of American forces.

Secretary Weinberger then asked, what about a multilateral force?

Secretary Haig said that would soften the blow but it would still require a commitment from us.

The Vice President then asked, what happens if they hit the mainland?

Secretary Haig replied, it would make it a much more difficult situation.

Secretary Weinberger observed that hitting the mainland was, in fact, a logical extension in solving Britain’s military problem.

Secretary Haig said that it would give us enormous problems in the hemisphere and give us cause for concern for American citizens in Argentina.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick said, in Argentina and in the rest of Latin America as well. Ambassador Kirkpatrick added that Latin America has recently sided with the Argentines on this. Venezuelans are active; they sent a delegation to the European Economic Community. The Peruvians are involved and even the Chileans, who hate the Argentines, cannot take a public position opposed to the Argentines. Even the Nicaraguans are playing a pro-Argentine role. A war in that area involving the mainland would reorient the hemisphere against us for twenty or thirty years.

Judge Clark then asked for consideration for recommendations to the President. Should there be an IG working group chaired by State to pull together some of our options?

Secretary Haig replied, we have the elements, we need to pull them together.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick then said she had not seen the USUN strategy, nor had she been consulted on it.

Judge Clark then said we need to move on this.

Mr. Meese asked if there had been any threats to American citizens in Argentina and do we have contingency plans in case of a deteriorating situation?

Secretary Haig replied there were no threats as such, and that contingency plans have been worked out.

A general discussion of the problem ensued.

The Vice President then asked, do we want an IG process on the matter?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick said the most urgent question facing us was our next move once the Secretary General’s proposal had been responded to by both parties. She observed there was a feeling at the UN that we don’t really support the Secretary General.

Secretary Haig replied that that was not true, in fact, he said that it was hog wash and malicious hog wash at that.

There was then consideration of the question whether or not the President should publicly call on both sides to accept the Secretary General’s proposal.

Secretary Weinberger opposed a public appeal because that was an act of a neutral.

Secretary Haig said that it would depend on how the British responded, but in any case we cannot do so publicly.

The meeting then adjourned at 10:40 a.m.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Latin American Affairs Directorate Files, NSC, Falklands/Malvinas: Special Situation Group (SSG) Meeting on the Falklands, 5/20/1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes were forwarded to Clark by Fontaine under a covering memorandum, July 14. (Ibid.)
2. No memorandum of conversation of this telephone call has been found.
3. Fraser, on a private visit to the United States, met with Reagan on May 17. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)
4. May 22.
5. See Document 278.