Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

262. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig in Ankara¹

Washington, May 14, 1982, 1817Z

Tosec 70069/132007. For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary. Subject: Meeting With Henderson.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. As you requested,² Larry and I met with Henderson this morning. We began by expressing our concern that yesterday’s events³ not be seen as anything more than an attempt by the President to stay in touch at the highest levels with the British Government. Henderson said he understood but once again repeated he thought it had been a mistake to have made the phone call. I said in light of situation you had asked me to say that you would be happy to change your plans in Athens Saturday⁴ to enable you to meet earlier in the day with Pym in Luxembourg for an intense exchange of views on the situation if Pym wanted that. Henderson told me that he was very grateful for the offer. He said there will be an important Cabinet meeting at Chequers Sunday morning⁵ to which he and Tony Parsons are returning tonight. He did not know how long the meeting would go and, additionally, there was the complication of the EC meeting Sunday afternoon. He said he would get back to us quickly with Pym’s answer.

3. At the Cabinet meeting he said he would be asked to give his view on the US Government’s position on the crisis now. He said he was somewhat concerned that there might be a shift both in US public opinion and a possible tilt within certain parts of the administration (he was referring to yesterday’s events and the President’s letters to Latin Americans⁶ as well as to some high-level administration statements.) Henderson noted this came when there was a “considerable stiffening” in British opinion. Here he cited the Times editorial Wednesday⁷ which attacked the US-Peruvian plan as a “sell out”. He was concerned that the idea was being allowed to develop in the US press that the Argentines had been forthcoming on the issue of sovereignty and therefore now it was time for the British to compromise. We reassured him that there had been no change whatsoever in US policy and encouraged him to remember what we are doing in the way of materiel support for the British. We stated we thought the British were okay in US public opinion as long as there was no US direct military involvement and as long as the British still look to be trying to resolve the issue peacefully.

4. As you asked, I then took him through your specific suggestions per reftel. During the course of our conversation it became clear that in London the key stumbling block remains the interim administration on the Island. On this issue, Nicko said even the left wing would attack Mrs. Thatcher if she gave in. He noted that she had already moved back considerably from her initial insistence on returning the British Governor to the Island. While it was true that the Argentines had come forward with a reasonable compromise on sovereignty, they were trying to take back everything on the interim administration. (At the same time, he noted that Galtieri’s statements to the press Thursday had been contrary to the Argentine position on sovereignty presented in New York Tuesday.)⁸ Henderson stated that the key concern in Parliament is over the role of the Islanders in any eventual outcome. The present Argentine position, he asserted, would in effect allow them de facto control over the Islands. He again referred to an idea which apparently is circulating at the UN Secretariat for the UN administration to consult “equal numbers of British and Argentines” on the Island. This, given the disproportion in numbers, would be entirely unacceptable.

5. Henderson was interested in your formula (para 5B reftel)⁹ on the pragmatic issues of freedom of movement. He took them down carefully and thought they might be acceptable to the British but doubted very much the Argentines could accept it. He also noted that the Falkland Islands Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of another British company whose stock is publicly held and traded in London so that anybody can presumably buy stock at least in the parent company.

6. On withdrawal, Henderson again said he did not think this would be a problem if there was in place a mechanism to prevent the reintroduction of forces onto the Island.

7. This brings us to the other main concern which, not surprisingly, Henderson stressed—the issue of guarantees. What happens, he asked, if the Argentines decide to send their navy back and on the Island there are only UN technocrats or what if, as in 1967, there is a UN presence but they are withdrawn as the Argentine armed forces were reintroduced onto the Island. Finally, he noted the same problem arises if there is no agreement by January 1.

8. On the question of guarantees, Henderson’s clear emphasis was on the need for some kind of US involvement on the Island as the only guarantee which in the end would be acceptable to HMG. However, he stressed that this issue has not yet really been addressed by London where, as noted above, the primary sticking point is interim administration.

9. On next steps, the British expect PDC to put forward his ideas to both parties on Saturday and ask them to respond within 72 hours. At the end of that time, if there is no agreement, he will consider his mission to have failed. There will be an informal Security Council meeting Friday afternoon¹⁰ called by the Chinese Security Council President whose activities are making the British somewhat uneasy. Henderson is concerned that there could be a call for a Security Council session early next week though he agreed that it was not likely before the SYG’s efforts had failed. He stressed again that the British will be counting on US support if there is an unbalanced Security Council resolution and we reassured him on this count.

10. At the end of the meeting, Henderson came back again to the problems over the interim administration and stated that he was confident that if we could get around that problem we could resolve the issue. But he stressed that Mrs. Thatcher has given a lot already on this issue and has significant pressures on it from both right and left.

11. Walters. Your call¹¹ came through at this point in our conversation. Larry will be going over Dick’s conversations this afternoon with the British DCM.¹²

12. PDC. Right after our meeting, I called Perez as you requested to tell him that there was no truth in the London Times story about our deciding to embark on a new peace initiative. Although Perez had not seen the article (and I assumed Henderson had not either), the SYG was grateful for my call. He said he thinks he needs a few more days to work and considers it a good sign that Parsons and Henderson are going back to London this weekend. He expressed the hope that the decision taken by the Cabinet there will be constructive and added that the Argentines were showing “some signs of wisdom” though he did not specify what these were. The SYG said he would be back in touch if there was anything else he wanted us to do and I expressed again our willingness to help him in any way possible.

Stoessel

1. Source: Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Stadis.
2. In telegram Secto 7024 from Ankara, May 14, Haig instructed Eagleburger to meet with Henderson “as soon as possible” to “clear the air” in the aftermath of the Reagan-Thatcher telephone conversation (see Document 257) and “review the bidding on substance and procedure.” On the first objective, Haig told Eagleburger: “you should explain that the sole purpose of yesterday’s call was simply to stay in touch at the highest level, as the President and Prime Minister have done throughout the crisis.” On the second, Haig provided a list of talking points, adding that Eagleburger “should engage Henderson” in “a manner that contains no hint that we are pressing new formulae on the British.” (Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]) The instructions followed the outline prescribed by Haig in his handwritten note on telegram Tosec 7005. See footnote 1, Document 261.
3. A reference to the May 13 telephone conversation between Reagan and Thatcher. See Document 257.
4. May 15. Haig was scheduled to be in Athens for talks with Greek officials.
5. May 16.
6. See Document 204.
7. May 12.
8. In a television interview on May 13, Galtieri said of the sovereignty issue: “We are not going to renounce this objective.” (Leonard Downie Jr., “British Plan No Halt in Hostilities,” Washington Post, May 14, p. A1)
9. The paragraph in telegram Secto 7024 reads as follows: “With regard to terms of reference for negotiations, we believe the current neutral formulation is best and should be preserved. Indeed, we should try to lock this up while it is on the table. However, as is surely clear by now to HMG, this will require tradeoffs with other provisions, especially interim administration and freedom of movement.” (See footnote 2 above.)
10. Stoessel summarized the day’s Security Council meeting in his May 14 Evening Reading Report to Reagan, “The UN Security Council, meeting this afternoon in informal consultations, heard a perfunctory report from Secretary General Perez de Cuellar on his mediation efforts, and encouraged him to continue.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Very Sensitive Correspondence Files of Alexander M. Haig, 1981–1982, Lot 83D288, Evening Reading—May 1982)
11. No memorandum of conversation of this telephone call has been found.
12. No memorandum of conversation of a meeting between Eagleburger and Thomas has been found.