251. Talking Points Prepared in the Department of State1
POINTS FOR GUERREIRO
1. Suggest you not go over the framework set with Figueiredo; Guerreiro’s attitudes on the Soviet and Peronista dangers are much more relaxed. Merely say we should start where the President left off.2
2. Put matrix forward as our understanding of where two parties are now (Promise copies of earlier US position but first address matrix). Cite as main problems:
—On geographic coverage, Argentines want the three groups included: Brits only one. Don’t see how the Argentines can prevail.
—On interim administration, Argentines want no role for the local elected representatives. British insist on it, although we have brought them to accept that the colonial administration cannot be reintroduced. Obvious compromise comes from our earlier proposals: add elected representatives proportional to the Argentine population but not less than one in each Council. “Respecting” the wishes of the inhabitants in some clear manner is a major Thatcher aim. This Argentine demand is tougher than in our discussions: BA should give.
—On freedom of movement and property purchase, Argentina wants a blanket commitment in the interim period, Brits want none. This is [Page 519] the “Sudetenland” question.3 Too controversial to be settled in the transitional agreement itself. Should be topic of negotiation.
—On withdrawal, Argentines want mainland vs. 2000 NM; Brits want parity in miles: We had thought of parity in redeployment time. This fencing reveals a radical lack of mutual confidence. A UN role in the agreement may not be enough. Should others in some form “guarantee” the agreement (that was the case in the Rio Protocol on the Peru/Ecuador dispute),4 e.g., by assisting in verification.
—On sovereignty and self-determination, each side wants a commitment. Compromise should acknowledge differing views of both.
—On length of the agreement: Argentines fear a new deadlock, and want assurance they will receive—or again act to claim—the islands. Brits don’t want to be put in a position in which, when time runs out, they either have to agree—or send a new task force. Our earlier solution was to go for decolonization, and give Argentina a veto on the future status of the islands—but to otherwise leave the negotiations unimpaired. Think we ought to reintroduce this position, with the notion that if the negotiations do not succeed, both parties would submit again to mediation or other measures consistent with Article 33 of the UN Charter, and Resolution 502 would continue to apply.
3. (Mr. Secretary: You may or may not want to go on, depending on what Guerreiro says.) Main point is this: Secretary General will now try his formulation to bridge the gap. We don’t know whether that will work or not.5 But odds seem against it. Shouldn’t the two of us, or maybe four (with say Peru and W. Germany), or six (with Venezuela and France) now tell both sides how concerned we are, and what we can support? Idea would not be to propose another plan, but rather to have approaches, you to BA, us to London, saying essentially the same thing, in private, with a view towards encouraging a deal. You would say what we are pushing in London; we would say what you are pushing in BA. Otherwise the conflict can get out of control and damage us all—needlessly. In other words, we should try to take control of events, rather than merely submit to them.
4. If you agree, we could try to work out ideas to promote while you are here, in a working group.
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 6–18 1982. Secret; Sensitive. The talking points, prepared for Haig for his scheduled May 12 meeting with Guerreiro, were forwarded to the Secretary by Enders under a May 11 briefing memorandum. No memorandum of conversation of Haig’s May 12 meeting with Guerreiro has been found.↩
- Reagan was scheduled to meet with Figueiredo. See Document 255.↩
- Reference is to the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia which was ceded to Germany under the 1938 Munich Agreement.↩
- Reference is to the 1942 agreement that ended the Peru-Ecuador conflict of 1941–1942.↩
- Haig drew a parallel line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and the previous two sentences. Next to the line, he wrote: “?”↩