Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

233. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Brussels, May 6, 1982, 8–8:30 a.m.

ATTENDEES

• U.S.

  • Secretary Weinberger
  • Ambassador Bennett
  • Defense Advisor Legere
  • General Smith
  • General Lasater

• BRITISH

  • MOD Nott
  • Ambassador Graham
  • Mr. Hastie-Smith

MOD Nott briefly commented on the Falkland situation, indicating that he had no fresh news as of this morning, but that the situation was fluid and progressing on a minute-to-minute basis. He indicated that his letter to Secretary Weinberger² should have been delivered this morning and he wanted to briefly reiterate some of its contents. The United Kingdom is most grateful to the United States for undertaking to respond positively to a request for materiel support for British forces in the current crisis. Britain is now considering separately her needs for intelligence and logistic help and is preparing a list of items of weapons and equipment³ and will be making special arrangements both in London and in the Embassy Washington for processing their needs. It is not clear now whether or not Britain will need or use all the items listed. It would greatly simplify the administration and accelerate the action if the United States could agree at the outset that such items as the US does provide be supplied on the basis that the UK pay only for those items which it uses or retains. An alternative would be for the UK to pay the US on a “sale and return” basis. By way of illustration, the two immediate requests which the UK has in mind are for 300 AIM 9L sidewinder missiles and 2 Vulcan/Phalanx guns.

Secretary Weinberger said he saw no problem with the UK request. Our overall aim was to be helpful and to make that assistance available as quickly as possible.

Secretary Weinberger and MOD Nott then discussed in general terms current diplomatic initiatives ongoing to try and settle the crisis with Argentina. Both were uncertain about the status of the Peruvian recommendations. MOD Nott indicated that the latest Haig proposals were acceptable to the United Kingdom but did not see how Argentina could accept them. However, the UK took some heart in the fact that the US State Department had sent the proposals to the UK and would not have done so had they not felt them to be somewhat acceptable to Argentina.

Secretary Weinberger asked Nott if he had other matters to discuss and Nott responded with his gratitude for DoD support and for the very successful discussions on the Trident matter. Secretary Weinberger agreed that the subcontractor arrangements appeared to be promising and the talks in London in mid-May should help considerably.

MOD Nott said that timely intelligence from the South Atlantic was particularly critical. ELINT information was satisfactory but [less than 1 line not declassified] left much to be desired. SecDef alluded to press reports that SR–71 coverage was being obtained on the Falkland Islands every half hour. This is, of course, ridiculous. He indicated that [3½ lines not declassified].

MOD Nott said that one area where the UK needed some practical assistance very quickly was in air-to-air refueling between Europe and the Ascension Island; Britain has only nineteen Victor tankers and was strapped for refueling capability. This was a serious need and one which they needed quickly. He wanted to reiterate that the UK does not want direct military assistance from the United States in theater because that would invite others into the conflict, but refueling assistance between Europe and the Ascension Island was being requested from the United States.

SecDef raised the issue of out-of-area threats to NATO’s interest and the requirement for NATO committed forces to be utilized for contingencies in other parts of the world. The Falklands crisis was indeed just such an example and he asked MOD Nott’s views on using the current crisis to underscore that need. MOD Nott responded that he had no objections but would caution against the United States making the case that Europe was more dependent on mid-East oil than was the United States. Ambassador Graham added that one must keep in mind when making a case for Southwest Asia as a threat to NATO that we bear in mind that we also open the doors to the European nations demanding the right to be consulted and to approve of all deployments outside the NATO area. ASD Perle inquired whether or not in the British view it would not be possible to draft a simple and straightforward statement recognizing threats to NATO’s interest and the need to plan to meet those threats. The British side did not respond.

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the crisis in the South Atlantic.]

John R. Lasater
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Europe/NATO Policy (Acting)

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0042, UK 1982. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Lasater. The meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to NATO. Copies of the memorandum of conversation were sent to the ISP Desk Officer and the ASD/ISD Special Assistant. Weinberger sent a summary of the meeting, held before the opening session of a meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee, as well as the text of Nott’s May 5 letter to Weinberger (see footnote 2 below), to Clark, Carlucci, and Haig in telegram 279 from Brussels, May 6. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0004, UK (May) 1982)
2. A signed copy of Nott’s May 5 letter to Weinberger, the substance of which is summarized in the memorandum of conversation, is ibid.
3. For a summary list of U.K. defense requests, May 6–7, along with the status of Department of Defense action taken, see Document 245.