Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

202. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State¹

Lima, May 2, 1982, 0629Z

4507. Subject: South Atlantic Peace Proposal: Peruvian Text. Ref: Lima 4506.²

1. Secret entire text.

2. Following are texts in Engish and Spanish languages prepared by Peruvian President Belaunde and Prime Minister Ullua based upon conversation with the Secretary evening May 1.³ These texts conveyed to Argentine President Galtieri, who had them recorded as they were read to him. Reftel reports upon Belaunde/Galtieri conversatiton.

3. Begin text: South Atlantic Peace Proposal

1) An immediate cease fire.

2) Mutual withdrawal of forces.

3) Introduction of third parties to govern the Islands.

4) The two governments acknowledge the existence of conflicting views with respect to the Islands.

5) The two governments acknowledge the need to take into account the views and the interests of the Islanders in the final solution.

6) The third parties—or contact group—would be composed of Brazil, Peru, West Germany, and the United States.

7) A final solution will be reached not later than April 30th, 1983, under the guarantee of the contact group. End text.

4. Begin Spanish text: Propuesta de Paz en el Atlantico Sur.

1) Cesacion inmediata de hostilidades;

2) Retiro mutuo de fuerzas;

3) Presencia de representantes ajenos a las partes involucradas en el conflicto para gobernar temporalmente las Islas;

4) Los dos gobiernos reconocen la existencia de reclamaciones discrepantes y conflictivas sobre la situacion de las Islas;

5) Los dos gobiernos reconocen que los puntos de vista y los intereses de los habitantes locales tienen que ser tomados en cuenta en la solucion definitiva del problema;

6) El grupo de contactu que intervendria de inmediato en las negociaciones para implementar este acuerdo estaria compuesto por Brasil, Peru, Republica Federal de Alemania y los Estados Unidos de America; y,

7) Antes del 30 de Abril de 1983 se habra llegado a un acuerdo definitivo, bajo la responsabilidad del grupo de paises antes mencionado. End text

Ortiz

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/02/1982. Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. In telegram 4506 from Lima, May 2, Ortiz reported that Belaúnde called him to the Palace for a meeting during which Belaúnde telephoned Galtieri in order to present the terms of the Peruvian peace proposal, which he had earlier discussed with Haig (see footnote 3 below). Belaúnde noted that the “events in the South Atlantic” had caused “alarm and dismay” in Peru and that the “seriousness of the situation was also of profound concern to the US.” In the course of their conversation, “Belaunde asked Galtieri to meditate on these proposals and if it was possible for him to accept these points Belaunde was standing by to convey the Argentine acceptance to Secretary Haig.” (Ibid.) Shortly before his meeting with Belaúnde, Ortiz had transmitted to the Department an earlier version of the Peruvian proposal, which Arias Stella had conveyed to him. (Telegram 4505 from Lima, May 2; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820229–0309)
3. No memorandum of conversation of this telephone conversation has been found. Although he recalled the conversation as having occurred on May 2, likely conflating the May 1 call with a follow-up call the following day (see Document 207 and footnote 3 thereto), Haig wrote in his memoirs that Belaúnde telephoned him with “the proposal that one final attempt be made to stop the fighting and find a peaceful solution.” “Speaking over an open line,” Haig remembered, “we worked all day on a new draft.” (Haig, Caveat, p. 293) Belaúnde recalled that his May 1 conversation with Haig lasted for three-quarters of an hour and that he asked Haig “to please dictate to me the essential points from Britain’s viewpoint. Haig read them over to me, and I for my part told him what word was unsatisfactory and what conditions unacceptable for Argentina. We finally agreed on a plan which covered seven points, and I left it that I should call President Galtieri at once to put that formula to him.” (Freedman, Official History, vol. II, p. 316)