Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

166. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 23, 1982, 7–7:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Falkland Islands Framework²

PARTICIPANTS

• United States

  • The Secretary
  • Lt General Vernon Walters
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Stephen W. Bosworth
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert L. Funseth
  • Deputy to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs David Gompert
  • L/ARA—Scott Gudgeon
  • EUR/NE—Keith C. Smith (Notetaker)

• United Kingdom

  • Foreign Secretary Francis Pym
  • Deputy to the Permanent Under Secretary, Julian Bullard
  • Ambassador Sir Nicholas Henderson
  • Ian Sinclair, Legal Adviser
  • John Ure, FCO
  • Brian Fall, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary
  • Francis Richards, Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary
  • Nicholas Fenn, FCO News Department
  • Stephen Wall, UK Embassy
  • Christopher Crabbe, UK Embassy

Foreign Secretary Pym opened the meeting by stating that he saw serious difficulties with the draft given to him by the American side.³ He remarked that Mrs. Thatcher would not accept the appointment of two Argentines to the Falkland’s interim administration. The Secretary replied that the language represented our best assessment of what is necessary to achieve an agreement, and that it was his desire that we all be in a position, so that no one can question whether we went the last mile in our quest for peace. The Secretary observed that the draft contained a commitment to reestablish local British authority in the islands; that we were not trying to leave the aggressor in place. Everyone can argue that fact credibly. He pointed out that some cosmetic changes had been made for the sake of peace and to secure the withdrawal of Argentine forces. The Secretary remarked that although there was a 99% chance that the draft would not be accepted by the Argentine authorities, we need to convince everyone in Washington and in London that the failure to reach agreement lies elsewhere.

Pym repeated that the Prime Minister would have great difficulty getting support in Parliament for the draft, and he thought that even her most ardent supporters in the Conservative Party would not support it. The Secretary replied that it was not up to the US to decide whether Britain could accept it, but history must reflect that he had been in contact with both sides and that he had not been excessively supportive of either side. He asked the UK to endorse the proposal as a package.

Pym stated that Mrs. Thatcher would ask whether the President endorses the US draft, and she would say that, “He told me already that I have come as far as I could go in accommodating the Argentines.” The Secretary said that he had talked to the President about the proposal, although they had not gone through the text. The Secretary added that he wanted to be able to say that the US supported its British friends; that we are together, and if the Argentines do not accept this package, the consequences are on their head.

Ambassador Henderson then asked whether the Foreign Secretary would send back immediately an analysis of the US text. Pym indicated that he would. The Secretary stated that he hoped the British would then be in a position to say that the text is acceptable to the Argentines. Pym asked whether the Secretary would be stating that he was putting the draft to both sides. The Secretary replied that he hoped to present it on Sunday⁴ to Costa Mendez, and that he would tell the Minister it is a fair proposition and it is all the US can do. Pym then asked whether it was the Secretary’s intention to give the Argentines a time limit to respond—something like 48 hours (Tuesday afternoon).⁵ The Secretary indicated that this could be done. Brian Fall remarked that the Argentines might want to leak the text to OAS members, such as the Venezuelans. The Secretary agreed that it could happen, but that there might not be any benefit to Buenos Aires in doing so.

Pym said the other sticking point was that of security assurances, and he wanted to give the Secretary a paper with some British ideas on the subject.⁶ He added that US acceptance would help him with the Prime Minister who is quite concerned about the security aspects of any agreement. The Secretary said at first glance, the British text appeared to have possibilities, but he would have to consider carefully whether he would be exceeding the authority delegated to him by the President if he agreed to it. He promised to have the lawyers look the text over and flash a US response back to London. In an aside, the Secretary said that the US also has a detailed paper to give the British on voting rights and other technical aspects.⁷

Pym asked the Secretary for his views on dealing with the press after the meeting, adding that he would not want anything described as “the Haig plan.” The Secretary agreed and said that he would prefer to describe the latest draft as a composite of views emanating from his discussions in London and in Buenos Aires, along with his interpretation of those views. Pym remarked that for now, we would say that the draft is the current state of the Secretary’s ideas and those of the British. The Secretary then asked Mr. Gompert to get for Pym a draft statement that the President would use in addressing the Falkland crisis.⁸ The Secretary also said that he would give the British a copy of the protocol drafted by the US side.⁹ He remarked that, although we have received no substantive comments on the protocol from the Argentine side, we are very interested in securing HMG’s views on the paper. Mr. Gudgeon said we would have a new draft of the protocol by early next week and would send it immediately to London.

Pym then asked whether President Reagan would say anything at this point about the US sending a draft agreement to London. The Secretary answered that we would have to go to the press formally at some point, but the timing would depend on whether or not it would put helpful pressure on the Argentine Government. He said that he did not, however, want to put the press onto President Galtieri at this time. The Secretary then remarked that we would have to say that we believe the draft to be just and fair. Pym then asked what would happen if the Argentines accepted after considering it for two days. The Secretary responded that he didn’t believe it had a prayer of a chance with Buenos Aires. Henderson then remarked that it was possible the Argentines would simply come back with a great many amendments, and asked whether the Secretary would still go to Buenos Aires. The Secretary said he would not go unless he could carry something favorable enough to submit to the Prime Minister. He remarked that it appeared as if the US had subtly shifted from mediation to arbitration. He then added that knowing the Argentines, he was sure they would ask for more time since desperate men will resort to any tactic.

At that point, Pym said that although the Secretary had tried very hard, the Prime Minister would certainly have great problems with the US draft. Nevertheless, he would face that problem tomorrow. The Secretary said although there is no reaction [reason?] to raise expectations, the British have been managing brilliantly this nightmarish situation. Pym then produced a copy of a note which HMG had asked the Swiss Embassy to convey to the Argentine Government, concerning additional measures in the exclusion zone. He said his government was still considering whether or not to go public with the new measures. The Secretary answered that from his reading of the note he did not see any inconsistency with the British force posture; that if the Argentines don’t know now where they are headed, it won’t be for lack of an explanation.

The Foreign Secretary ended by stating that he wanted to thank the Secretary for all of his time and effort and to say the same for the Secretary’s staff. The Secretary answered by stating, “We are with you. God bless you all.”

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Smith. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Conference Room at the Department of State.
2. In the space next to the subject line, Goldberg added: “—Haig/Pym meeting w/staff.”
3. Presumably the draft discussed at the afternoon meeting. See Document 165.
4. April 25.
5. April 27.
6. Not found.
7. Not found.
8. No draft statement has been found.
9. Reference is to a draft protocol on the special interim authority. No copy has been found in Department of State or White House files.