In addition to my airborne thoughts on where we now stand with the
Falklands crisis (attached), you might want to review the talking points
(Tab 1) which Tom Enders
prepared for the Secretary’s use when the latter briefs the President
(perhaps today).2 Tom, in his
usual magisterial fashion, did not see fit to share these with his
fellow delegates before they were done up in final. As they stand, I
fear they suggest a far too leisurely, even laid-back U.S. posture given
the impasse we face at this point in the intermediary process (I am not
at all certain, for example, that Pym will want to fly over here,3 particularly
at this delicate juncture in the evolution of events). Whether or not
the Secretary follows these points (his instincts are pretty good, and
he may take his own tack), I think a number of key questions must now be
asked:
—What are the criteria we are using to determine each party’s bottom-line
and how will we know when we have reached it?
—Don’t we need to put some clear (and preferably early) time limit on how
long we are willing to continue this process, particularly if both sides
maintain the rigidity they have so far displayed?
—Is this exercise really doable now? Can we, in other words, meet each
party’s minimum requirements (withdrawal of forces and restoration of
UK administration for the Brits,
some understanding of eventual sovereignty over the islands for the
Argies) and at the same time enable Thatcher to persuade her Parliament (and our own public)
that we have not rewarded Argentine use of force?
Incidentally, Tom seems to be in some doubt concerning the location of
both the Brit and Argie bottom lines; I am in no such uncertainty myself
. . .
Attachment
Memorandum From James M. Rentschler of the National Security
Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Clark)4
Washington, April 20, 1982
SUBJECT
- The Guns of April?—Where we now stand with Argentina, the
UK, and Ourselves
The suspension of our peace shuttle and the likely imminence of armed
conflict between the UK and
Argentina require a very hard look at our next course. En route home
from the dispiriting frustrations of Buenos Aires, I offer the
following personal thoughts:
—We promised both parties our best shot at assisting them to find a
peaceful settlement; we gave them that shot—for the time being, at
least, there is nothing more to give.
—Implicit and explicit in our promise was the determination to
practice even-handedness so long as the process continued; that
stage has now ended.
Tilting toward either of the parties at this moment will undoubtedly
damage our relations with the non-tiltee; yet tilting toward
neither—i.e., attempting to prolong an appearance of
“even-handedness” or even worse, passivity—could put larger US strategic interests at risk.
[Page 338]
—The greatest of all such risks may lie in the psychology of
leadership: at what point does the US no longer appear “constructively concerned” but
instead is perceived by the British and our own public as
irresolute, ungrateful, and evasive?
—The bilateral question for us thus boils down, in both policy terms
and public perceptions, to pro-UK
or pro-Argentina; the larger strategic
question boils down to Pan-America vs. NATO.
There will be arguments that the choices set out above are, in
reality, neither so stark nor simplistic, and that a US policy course which is both prudent
and proper will aim to preserve the best of both worlds.
I believe such a course will prove illusory. It is a circle that
cannot be squared; both sides of the conflict have too much invested
in emotional, geopolitical, and historical capital to allow us a
safe passage between them. More important, the moves we make—or fail
to make—with respect to one or the other disputant will have a
long-term ripple effect throughout our national security
environment.
We need, therefore, to decide—on an extremely urgent basis—in which
set of relationships (Hemispheric or Atlantic) we are prepared to
sustain the most immediate (but perhaps less costly) casualties,
recognizing that we cannot escape some significant damage in either
case, and could well incur far worse.
This is properly the subject of an early NSC which would carefully weigh a detailed set of
options and the consequences likely to flow from each. Meanwhile, in
a spirit of total prejudice and partiality, I advance these
views:
—It is essential to back Britain, and for reasons which transcend the
already compelling ties of history, language, and formal
alliance.
—Our strategic imperatives in the East-West context and the stakes we
have in asserting the primacy of our Western leadership require
it.
—Enforcement and credibility of the UN system—particularly our strong backing for UNSC Resolution 502—justify it.
—Moreover, our support for the UK
must be seen as convincingly generous and resolute (this means
something far beyond rhetoric in both the military supply and
economic sanctions areas).
—Failure to back our most important and forthcoming ally at this
critical juncture—to reenact, in effect, a 1980s version of Suez or
Skybolt—will have a profoundly adverse effect on an already shaky
alliance and at a time when we can least afford such turbulence (we
must understand that an Anglo-Argentine war will be bad for NATO and our own East-West interests,
but that this unhappy state of affairs will be infinitely worse
should we alienate Britain into the bargain).
To the positive factors which dictate a pro-British tilt, I would add
a number of negative observations based on our direct and highly [Page 339] unpleasant experience with
the Argentines over the past few days (in connection with which I
invite the views of Roger
Fontaine, who is a far better informed student of the
gaucho psyche than I):
—The talks in Buenos Aires demonstrated, more than anything else, the
emptiness of our bilateral “Relationship” with the Argies.
(Ambassador Shlaudeman
voiced this same view, heartily seconded by every one of us who had
to deal with them);
—Even if we achieved a responsible agreement with the Argentines on a
politically workable text, there is no assurance that the present
junta—quite possibly an ephemeral expression of leadership—could or
would deliver;
—None of us ever had the certainty that the Argentine side was
negotiating in good faith; indeed, the evidence indicated that we
were being strung along (a risk we recognized and were willing to
take in the larger interests of averting bloodshed);
—We were deliberately treated to a series of petty but cumulatively
significant, not to say contemptuous, derogatives from simple
courtesy (manipulated crowd boos, squalid “holding” conditions for
delegation members in the Presidential Palace, excessive rudeness on
the part of Security and administrative personnel) which called into
further question the seriousness and good faith of Argentine
negotiating tactics;
—On the larger question of what the South Atlantic crisis will do to
the inter-American “system” I favor a fatalistic stance, believing
as I do that those who are minded to back us would likely do so in
any event, while traditional anti-gringo sentiment would line up a
number of states against us no matter what role we played in the
peace process (again, however, I would defer to Roger Fontaine).
The Argentines with whom we dealt were not, in sum, nice people; in
this sense Mrs. Thatcher and
her colleagues may from the start have read Argentine intentions and
operating style more accurately than we. That fact simply reinforces
my view that the time of even-handedness, indispensable during a
period when we were actively engaged in a peace-shuttling effort,
may now be past. We must not lose sight of the assertions with which
the President addressed his very first message to Mrs. Thatcher in this crisis: “I told
Galtieri that initiating
military action against the Falkland Islands would seriously
compromise relations between the United States and Argentina” and
“while we have a policy of neutrality on the sovereignty issue, we
would not be neutral on the issue of Argentine use of force.”5
[Page 340]
Just so. Secretary Haig has
undertaken a gallant and gruelling marathon effort to make the
Argentines see reason, an effort which I for one strongly supported.
But the Argentines have not yet seen reason, and frankly I don’t
think they ever will—they may, indeed, be incapable of reasonable
compromise in the sense that we understand that concept.
Assuming that a miracle rabbit or two will not pop out of our hat
(Pym visit to the U.S.,
etc.), all of this argues for the earliest possible expression of
support for the Brits in ways that are politically unambiguous for
them. Unless such practical expression is soon forthcoming—and
absent the kind of Argentine give which now seems unlikely—I can’t
imagine that the President would have a comfortable stay in Windsor
Castle come early June.
Tab 1
Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders) to Secretary of State
Haig
6
SUBJECT
- Your meeting with the President, April 20
CHECKLIST
• Argentine position both very tough and very hard to establish. Some
50 military, including corps commanders, involved in decision
making. Military kept jerking diplomats back. Believe I have got as
close to Argentine bottom line as is possible this week.
• What we got:
—arrangements or language tilting towards Argentina on the two main
questions (future negotiations and local administration), but
—a British veto on both so that London could control the pace of
future change.
• As expected, London can’t and won’t go that far, and we shouldn’t
in any way push them at this point. As you saw, my message to
Pym was neutral.7
• Now comes the delicate part of the problem.
[Page 341]
—military pressures are rising (Britain may debark on South Georgia
tomorrow);
—British will step up pressure on us to back them openly;
—Argentina will start Rio Treaty gambit and try (probably
successfully) to get wide Latin support for its position (we doubt
that Argentina will try for sanctions under the Rio Treaty now—or
that it could get them).
• We need to identify the British bottom line, just as we are close
to Argentina’s. That is the reason for asking Pym to come over this week.
• Meanwhile, suggest we keep to a neutral press line: we’ve been
identifying respective positions but not characterizing.
• This game is excruciatingly difficult and may well be impossible to
win. But every time I recalculate the cost to us of war in the South
Atlantic, I cannot avoid concluding that we would be a major loser,
on both continents.
