Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

106. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Haig and British Foreign Secretary Pym¹

London, April 13, 1982, 12:40 p.m.

P: Hello, Al.

H: Hello, Francis. I just got a call from Costa Mendez.² He would like to offer another compromise to the last point, in which they would, in effect, accept the formula in paragraph 5 and want some language that parallels the ’64 Declaration of the United Nations on decolonization. I think in that conjunction they are willing to accept autonomy for the Islands which gives them a local government—self-determination, in essence.

P: That is a move from their position this morning.

H: Clearly. It is a difficult problem for you here. You have a historical precedent. But we don’t want to reject it out of hand.

P: Do they want to add to paragraph 5?

H: To paragraph 7.

P: We will just have to see. Would they drop that list?

H: They would drop everything and buy paragraph 5. I think they know what we are talking about. A number of changes we made might make them uncomfortable, but I think all that is manageable if we can get decolonization.

P: And the wishes of the people. That is crucial. I will have to find out about the ’64 resolution.

H: In the meantime, I am going to get this proposal in specific terms through the Ambassador. I think we should stay put until we look at it. I told him I would return to Washington. Staying here makes it look like I am an agent. You start looking; we will start our looking.

P: We ought to have another talking maybe. And obviously you don’t want to stay too long. You presumably would do your thinking quickly.

H: The most important thing, very frankly, is that your position over the years has been eroded by other governments and you cannot now take a position which goes back and across that history. I think the Prime Minister would be vulnerable to criticism.

P: I’m sure—and not only for that reason.

H: At least we can keep the dialogue going through a structured framework.

P: All right.³

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Nodis. Haig was speaking from his suite at the Churchill Hotel.
2. See Document 105.
3. In his memoirs, Haig wrote that he spoke to Thatcher following this conversation with Pym, observing that her “wariness and reservations were as great as Pym’s; but she, too, believed that there was a basis for continuing the process.” (Haig, Caveat, p. 285) No memorandum of conversation of this exchange has been found.