Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

105. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Haig and Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez¹

April 13, 1982, 12:30–12:34 p.m.

H: Hello.

CM: Good morning. How are you?

H: I feel better rested.

CM: We have been working the whole night. I have a formula. What would you like me to do?

H: Can you give me an idea what it contains. I have been waiting until I spoke with you before I speak to the press.

CM: We will yield point 1 and 2 and add “both parties affirm absolute sovereignty on the Island, but the British will relinquish their claim in the UN.” The interim period would be by government along the lines we discussed.

H: The interim period would be along the lines we discussed?

CM: Provided Britain says she will decolonize the Islands as announced in the UN.

H: Along the lines of the 64 declaration?²

CM: If she could view them specifically as the Malvinas.

H: That offers some possibilities. What about in the context of self-determination—would that then come in?

CM: The General Assembly has ruled out self-determination in the case of the Malvinas. We can imagine some sort of minority status for the Islands in the meantime.

H: Let me consider this. Perhaps it would be helpful if you could give our Ambassador a more detailed indication of what you are thinking of. And I will hold in place. My intent was to go back to Washington. Perhaps that is the better thing to do and have him send it there.

CM: So you are flying to Washington?

H: I don’t want to just sit here in London as the advocate of one government. I want to avoid that appearance. Our only effort here is to find a solution.

CM: We will call your Ambassador.

H: I will probably leave here today and make an announcement that there are certain difficulties; we are not ending this effort and are hopeful of going to Buenos Aires shortly. Is that all right?

CM: Perfectly. But don’t attribute the difficulty to one side.

H: I am trying to be even-handed and as frank as I can. I don’t want to prejudice this.

CM: We will be in touch immediately with your Ambassador. In Washington, you will have all our options.

H: I think we can operate that way somewhat better.

CM: Thank you for calling. I won’t make a statement until you make your statement. Good-bye.

H: Good-bye.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis—1982. Secret; Nodis. Haig was speaking from his suite at the Churchill Hotel in London; Costa Mendez was in Buenos Aires.
2. In 1964 the report of the UN Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Committee of 24) confirmed that the provisions of the Declaration applied to the Falklands Islands and invited the United Kingdom and Argentina to enter into negotiations to determine sovereignty. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1964, pp. 431–432) For the text of the Declaration (General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), adopted on December 14, 1960), see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960, pp. 49–50.