In the attached letter (Tab A) from Ambassador Ed Rowny, Rowny provides a
report on the fifth round of START,
which ended on December 8 without a new date being set for resumption of
the negotiations.
Rowny reports that while the US elaborated on the build-down concept and
explored means of narrowing differences remaining between the US and the
Soviet Union on such issues as destructive capability of bombers and
missiles, “the Soviets essentially marked time and added virtually
nothing new, probably because they wanted to wait and see how INF came out.” The only new development
was
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Soviet agreement to form a
working group on Confidence-Building Measures, but here Soviet views are
very narrow.
Rowny recommends that you and other officials speak out on the merits of
our START proposals so as to gain
credit for an effort that is serious, energetic, flexible and patient,
and ready to resume negotiations as soon as the Soviets are ready to
resume. We agree with this recommendation, and we will be developing
more such statements. Following the holiday period, we will schedule a
brief visit with you for Ambassador Rowny so that you can review these
and other perspectives directly with him.
Tab A
Letter From the Chairman of the Delegation to
the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (Rowny) to President
Reagan2
Geneva, December 12,
1983
Dear Mr. President,
My efforts in Round V of START
were devoted chiefly to laying down the build-down concept you
announced in the Rose Garden on October 4 and to further fleshing
out and explaining our START
proposal.
The Soviets marked time and added virtually nothing new, probably
because they wanted to wait and see how INF came out. During the round, they made more
references to the impact that US PII and GLCM deployments would have on START. Thus, they have laid the
groundwork for keeping their options open for including US so-called
FBS in START should they finally decide not
to return to the INF
negotiations.3
We made repeated attempts, both in formal and informal sessions, to
get the Soviets to explore how we might narrow the differences that
remain between our two positions. In particular, we said we could
relate the destructive capacity of our heavy bombers and the
destructive capability of their ballistic missiles in some
appropriate manner. How
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ever, the Soviets gave no indication that they were interested in
moving ahead at this time.
The only new development was Soviet agreement to form a working group
on confidence-building measures (CBMs). However, they have focused on their CBMs, which they would include only in
a final treaty, and have made it clear they will resist entering
into a separate agreement even on those CBMs where theirs and ours are similar.
Now that INF deployments have begun,
and the NATO ministers have stayed
firm, it may be that the Soviets will agree to resume START so as to show their
seriousness and commitment to arms control. On the other hand, it
may take them some time to sort out how to proceed, especially if
Andropov’s health
affects their decision-making process. We need to resist the
pressures that will inevitably develop to make substantive
concessions simply in order to bring the Soviets back to the
table.
In any event, with INF
“discontinued,” and START
resumption not agreed, public attention will inevitably shift to
START. Accordingly, I
recommend that the President and other high officials speak out more
often on START. Our proposal,
which calls for reductions of ballistic missile warheads to an equal
level of 5000 and for reductions in heavy bombers and ALCMs well below levels allowed by
SALT II, has stood the test of
time. Further, we should stress the flexibility we showed in meeting
the main Soviet concerns and their lack of willingness to address
our concerns.
The Soviets will continue to claim publicly that the US proposal is
not a suitable framework and that our flexibility is in words and
not deeds. Our best response is to insist that the US had an
even-handed position on the table and is willing to continue to be
flexible by examining carefully any serious Soviet proposals. We are
asking the Soviets to reduce their ballistic missile warheads by a
third but we, too, would reduce ours by a third. By reducing their
3-to-1 advantage in ballistic missile destructive capability, the
Soviets would reduce their forces capable of a first-strike and
thereby enhance stability. This is in both nations’ interest. Soviet
attempts to lump all nuclear weapons in a total aggregate is a
disingenuous and unsupportable effort to claim that all weapons are
equal. In no way can a bomb on a heavy bomber be equated to an SS–18
warhead.
In short, we should portray to the public a President and an
Administration which is seriously, energetically, flexibly and
patiently pursuing the goal of reaching an agreement on strategic
offensive arms. It is the Soviet leaders who must bear the onus for
failing to set a date for the resumption of START. In contrast, we are ready to
resume as soon as the Soviet reassessment is completed.
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For my part, I have a START
delegation which is a highly professional, responsible, hard-working
and dedicated team. We are leaving no stone unturned in trying to
reach an equitable and verifiable agreement.
Respectfully yours,
Edward L.
Rowny4
Chairman
US START Delegation
