You have discussed with the President the concept of tradeoffs which take
into account U.S. advantages in bombers and Soviet advantages in large
missiles. The President has now publicly endorsed this idea, and
included it in the recent START
NSDD.2
Now we need to follow up with a way to implement this approach that is
simple, practical, and builds on our present proposal. The approach3 suggested by
General Kent is too complex to
be the basis for an agreement.
The attached paper outlines a logical way to proceed. It implements the
guidance in the recent START NSDD,
and does so in a way that emphasizes simplicity. Additional features
could be added, for example, to further discourage land-based MIRV missiles, at a cost of additional
complexity.
Larry Eagleburger has reviewed this approach and believes it makes sense.
We would like a meeting with you to discuss these ideas.4
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State5
FRAMEWORK FOR START
The President has recently decided that the United States is prepared
to:
—make tradeoffs that take into account U.S. advantages and
interests and Soviet advantages and interests, providing each
side maximum flexibility consistent with movement toward a more
stable balance of forces;
—explore ways to further limit the size and capability of ALCM forces; and
—address the destructive capacity of bombers as well as
missiles.
This memorandum outlines a framework for a START agreement that implements these concepts. It
would require substantial reductions to equal levels of forces, and
discourage destabilizing systems such as large, MIRVed
ICBMs. It is based on the current
U.S. proposal, but also adopts features of the Soviet proposal.
Consideration of equitable tradeoffs between missile and bomber
forces is complicated by substantial differences in speed, in the
defenses they face, and in their potential for a first strike. The
challenge is to find a formula that allows considerable flexibility
in structuring forces, but recognizes these differences and
discourages destabilizing systems such as large, MIRVed
ICBMs.
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Elements of a START Agreement
—Limit on the total number of missile warheads plus ALCMs.
—Sublimit on missile warheads (e.g., 5,000).
—Constrain destructive capability by limits on the number of
heavy and medium missiles and bombers.
—Limit on the total number of strategic missiles and bombers
(e.g., 1800).
The combined limit on missile RVs and ALCMs excludes other bomber weapons
(short-range missiles and bombs) as part of the compensation for
air-defenses and other factors. To ensure that ALCMs are treated in a different
manner than missile warheads, there would be a sublimit on missile
warheads, and ALCMs would be
counted on a two-for-one basis. Such a constraint on ALCM numbers would permit our planned
ALCM deployments, and would be
consistent with the President’s decision to explore ways to further
limit the size and capability of ALCM forces.
The sublimit on missile warheads recognizes
the differences between missile warheads and ALCMs, and would prevent Soviet
allocation of all of their total to missile warheads. Additional
sublimits could be added (e.g. on MIRVed
ICBM warheads) to further
constrain destabilizing systems, at a cost of increased
complexity.
Since equality in warhead numbers does not result in equality in
strategic forces if there are gross disparities in warhead size,
there must also be constraints on destructive
capability. In addition, the President has directed that we
consider constraints that address the destructive capacity of
bombers. One way to accomplish these objectives would be to expand
our collateral constraints on large missiles to include bombers as
well. The 110/210 limits in our current position could be raised
(e.g., to 150 heavy ICBMs and 400
heavy and medium ICBMs), and a
third category added that included bombers (e.g., 550 heavy and
medium ICBMs and bombers).
Inclusion of bombers would recognize the destructive capability of
bombers, and give some flexibility to choose between large missiles
and bombers. The U.S. could have a large bomber force and 100 or
more M–X missiles; the Soviets could
have 400 SS–17/18/19/24 ICBMs
(about half their current total) and a smaller bomber force. In
order to place meaningful constraints on destructive capability,
such indirect limits need to be supplemented with modernization
constraints such as the limits in our present position on the
warhead weight of new missiles.
The limits on destructive capability will be controversial both
within the U.S. Government and with the Soviets. Other alternatives
for accomplishing this objective can be explored, such as limits on
warhead weight, as well as complex formulas for measuring the
destructive capacity of missiles and bombers.
[Page 297]
Finally, while limits on the number of missiles and
bombers would add little to the constraints on warheads and
destructive capability, and the Scowcroft Commission recommended
against low limits, both sides have proposed such limits. The Soviet
proposal for a total of 1,800 missiles and bombers is consistent
with the approach outlined here, and U.S. acceptance could be a
quid-pro-quo for Soviet acceptance of other elements of our
proposal.
The approach suggested here would give both sides freedom to
choose—within limits—the mix of missile and bomber forces, with
additional constraints on destabilizing systems. There is no magic
formula. Definition of equitable tradeoffs between missiles and
bombers is somewhat arbitrary, and agreement on such tradeoffs will
be difficult to achieve both within the U.S. and with the Soviets.
As the President has directed, this is a necessary step toward the
achievement of significant reductions. There is no prospect that
either side will agree to mirror image the other’s forces.
