Attached is the executive summary and observations sections of the longer
paper for your review.
As indicated by the executive summary and observations sections, the
paper provided is not a comprehensive evaluation of
all aspects of the build-down concept. As I mentioned earlier,
it is intended to supplement and extend the work of the broader paper
previously submitted in early June 3 to support NSC discussion of this issue at that time. It does not
address the generic problems associated with the build-down concept.
Rather it attempts to see if a set of specific options (out of an almost
infinite range of possible options) could be made to work in a manner
supportive of US interests.
It does provide a technical assessment of a range of build-down options.
It also provides an evaluation of the merit of these selected options as
both precursors to a START agreement
and as integral parts of such an agreement. I think that you will find
the discussion of this last point most useful.
We are continuing to staff the full paper.
Attachment
Excerpts From a Paper Prepared by the Strategic
Arms Reduction Talks5
[Omitted here are the title page and table of contents]
I. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This paper extends the work of the previous IG build-down study of June 3 and examines the problems
and issues associated with developing a build-down proposal. A large
number of options were reviewed; this paper assesses and makes
observations on six of them. Additional work is needed to resolve
some of the problems identified in the paper.
A. Introduction (Section II)
In response to Presidential direction, the START
IG has intensively studied the
guaranteed mutual build-down concept over the last three months. In
the IG paper sent to the NSC on June 3, the following
characteristics were identified as minimum requirements for any
acceptable build-down approach: a missile warhead floor; approximate
equality during the build-down process; verifiability; consistency
with START ceilings, counting
rules, and treatment of bombers only on a platform basis; inclusion
of bombers currently in storage; and required reductions even if no
modernization takes place. These are reflected in this paper’s
conclusions.
B. Problems Associated With the
Build-Down (Section III)
The earlier interagency paper pointed out the problems of linking
modernization with reductions in a manner that is not inherently
linked to our concept of stability or military requirements.
Implementation of a build-down would require, inter alia, resolution
of the following problems:
—Modernization. Implementation of the
build-down concept would require definitions for new or modernized
types of missile warheads, bomber weapons (if included), and
strategic delivery vehicles. There would be many problems associated
with defining a new warhead and new types of missiles. While a
build-down would clearly mandate reductions in U.S. force levels,
there would be no guarantee that the
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Soviets would be similarly affected. Some
modernization would not be constrained by this approach, such as
guidance system improvements and increases in warhead yield. Soviet
upgrades of their existing ICBMs
(e.g., significant accuracy improvements in or new variants of the
SS–18) could be difficult to verify and therefore the build-down
requirement might not be triggered. This paper assumed that a
build-down would be required when: an existing warhead was replaced
on an existing missile by a detectably different new type of
warhead; a new or modernized missile was deployed; or when old or
new missiles were deployed in or on new launchers.
—Weapons Counting Rules. Counting rules are
needed to credit each type of missile or bomber with the proper
number of weapons. In general, missiles were assumed to carry the
maximum number of warheads ever flight-tested on that missile. A
variation on most options was run where Poseidon SLBMs were counted at 10 warheads
rather than 14. Both Soviet Strategic Air Force Backfires and U.S.
B–52’s in storage were counted as bomber platforms. Bombers were
assigned nominal loadings where bomber weapons were counted.
—Monitoring Considerations. The Intelligence
Community’s monitoring capability for a build-down is estimated to
be best for fixed launchers, less for airframes and mobile
launchers, and weakest for the warheads and bombs themselves.
Cooperative
measures and agreed counting rules (e.g., a specific number of
warheads per missile type) would help ameliorate such problems. The
Intelligence Community would have very low confidence in detecting
removal and replacement of warheads on existing missiles, or bomber
weapons on deployed bombers, unless such changes involved visible
launcher/aircraft modifications. The Intelligence Community would
have high confidence in monitoring the destruction of fixed
land-based launchers and submarines, and of mobile missile
launchers, aircraft, and missiles themselves with agreed destruction
procedures and open display periods. While the actual destruction of
the warheads themselves would be difficult to monitor, the
destruction of the delivery vehicles would permit moderate
Intelligence Community confidence that the warheads or weapons were
no longer part of the normal deployed Soviet strategic forces.
Because of the uncertainty at present in the determination of a
build-down requirement, there is a potential significant risk of
Soviet efforts to cheat, i.e., to upgrade significantly portions of
their deployed forces without triggering a build-down
requirement.
—Soviet Reactions. The Soviets would be
skeptical, if not hostile, to a U.S. build-down proposal. However,
they would likely neither accept nor reject a U.S. build-down
proposal outright. A more probable Soviet reaction would be to try
to exploit the general concept within START and the larger political arena to promote their
START negotiating posi
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tion and strategic
objectives more generally. They would agree to a U.S. build-down
proposal only after a lengthy negotiating process, and even then
only in return for appropriate U.S. concessions. Possible specific
responses would be to propose: build-down of bomber weapons as well
as missile warheads; a build-down ratio higher than we would want;
exclusion of our B–52’s currently in storage; and their old freeze
proposal, possibly in modified form.
—Implications for INF. Changes in the conceptual basis for our
approach to limits on strategic arms could well lead to demands from
various segments of European opinion (and some governments) that we
undertake a similar re-examination of our approach to INF. In particular, changes to our
START position in the
direction of a precursor agreement could prompt our Allies to press
for comparable changes in our INF
position, e.g., postponement of Pershing II and GLCM deployments in exchange for
limited SS–20 reductions, or other quick fix ideas that could
undercut our insistence on U.S.-Soviet equality in LRINF missile warheads. The Soviets
could make similar proposals in INF.
—Negotiating Problems. Many of the same
factors responsible for the deliberate pace of negotiating any
comprehensive arms control treaty such as START would still be present in a build-down proposal.
The differences with the Soviets on such fundamental issues as the
separate treatment of missile warheads and bomber platforms,
inclusion of Backfire, verification, and others make it unlikely
that progress on a precursor agreement consistent with our START approach would be any more
rapid than in START itself. In
addition, an acceptable build-down ratio itself would not be easy to
negotiate because it is closely linked to other factors, including:
a build-down floor, starting warhead levels, projected modernization
requirements, and definitions and counting rules for warheads.
C. Build-Down Issues (Section IV)
—Modalities. This paper addresses two
conceptual ways of presenting a build-down proposal in view of the
ongoing START negotiations: a
build-down in a START context
only, or an interim precursor agreement.
The argument for a precursor agreement assumes that a START agreement will take several
years to negotiate, while a precursor could be negotiated more
quickly. As described above, this assumption is questionable. A
build-down in a START agreement
would probably not appreciably delay the current negotiations and
would be compatible with our proposed reductions schedule. However,
this approach would not satisfy pressures for a precursor agreement.
If it could be quickly negotiated, the precursor approach could
strengthen our
[Page 263]
interim
restraints regime and prevent the current Soviet warhead lead from
increasing. However, it could also delay and even undermine both our
past arms control achievements (e.g., tighter constraints on
ballistic missiles than on bombers) as well as our current START efforts, particularly our
requirement to achieve equal limits on ballistic missile
throw-weight.
—Intermediate Ceilings. Any build-down
approach which included a build-down ratio other than 1 for 1 must
have a mechanism for requiring mutual reductions even in the absence
of modernization. With newer systems now deployed, the Soviets would
be better able than the U.S. to slow their modernization plans to
draw out their reductions and thus to increase their warhead lead
over the U.S. They would, however, forego the advantages they would
otherwise gain from modernizing. To prevent the Soviets from drawing
out their reductions, some form of equal intermediate ceilings
should be incorporated into any build-down approach.
—SLCM. Including nuclear SLCMs in a build-down would require
us to dismantle SIOP-committed
weapons as non-SIOP
SLCMs are deployed. Furthermore,
it is nearly impossible to distinguish nuclear from conventional
SLCMs. Therefore, until the
U.S. develops a START position on
SLCM, we should not include
SLCM in any build-down. We
nevertheless would not rule out the possibility of later
constraining Soviet SLCM’s in a
build-down regime if they are also limited in START.
D. Options (Section V)
Six major options were studied in detail by the IG, as shown in Figure 1. The first
four explicitly link modernization and reductions in the general
manner prescribed by S. Res. 57. Option 5 specifies an equal warhead
and bomber platform ceiling which offsets modernization by required
reductions on a one-for-one basis. Option 6 (percentage annual
build-down) requires reductions independent of modernization. This
option closely parallels the reductions schedule we have tabled in
START when a five percent
annual reduction is used and Poseidon C–3 is counted at 10 warheads,
or with seven percent and the C–3 counted at 14.
E. Conclusions6
(Section VI)
A brief qualitative assessment of the options is presented in Figure
2.
[Page 264]
It is important that any build-down proposal supplement, and not
replace, our basic START
position, making consistency with START essential. To be acceptable as part of a START agreement, an option must be
capable of achieving the reductions we seek in START. To be considered as a
precursor, an option should be simple enough not to interfere with
the negotiating process or undercut our fundamental START objectives, such as reductions
in throw-weight and our focus on destabilizing systems and
verifiability. At the same time precursor agreements are not
substitutes for the kind of results that are only available through
the careful negotiation of a full treaty containing appropriate
verification and other safeguards.
Build-down options may be conveniently broken down into two
categories: those appropriate to our current START proposal and those that lend
themselves to an interim approach.
As either a precursor agreement or as part of START, Option 1 (2 for 1 missile
warhead and bomber weapon build-down) was found to undermine our
current START negotiating
position by aggregating missile warheads with bomber weapons.
Moreover, the floors that some seek under such an approach may not
meet our basic military requirements. Option 1 is therefore
unacceptable either as part of START or as a precursor and should be excluded from
further consideration.
Build-Down Options As Part of START. If a build-down is
to be included in a START
agreement, Option 6 (percentage annual build-down) would be
preferred. With five percent annual build-down, an eight year
build-down period, and the Poseidon C–3 counted at 10 warheads, this
option is most compatible with our START proposal, including our proposed reductions
schedule. However, analysis has revealed several difficult issues
associated with incorporating a build-down ratio into an acceptable
proposal. Since as of January 1984 the Soviets are expected to have
about 8990 START-accountable
missile warheads while the U.S. will have less than 7500, and it is
very unlikely that the U.S. and Soviet modernization schedules will
coincide, it would be difficult for the U.S. and USSR to agree on a mutually
acceptable build-down ratio. Thus we have determined that any
acceptable build-down must incorporate intermediate ceilings. Where
and how to establish these intermediate ceilings would undoubtedly
become the focus of the negotiations, since the intermediate
ceilings, and not a build-down ratio, would probably determine the
true rate of reductions.
The percentage annual build-down proposed in Option 6 would provide a
logical basis for establishing mutually acceptable intermediate
ceilings, and thus would avoid some of the difficulties associated
with Options 4 and 3. Although Option 6 does not explicitly link
modernization to reductions, a link would certainly exist because
the
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introduction of new
weapons would force the destruction of old ones. If a build-down
ratio of greater than 1 to 1 explicitly tied to modernization is
deemed essential, Option 4 (3 for 2 warhead build-down) and Option 3
(2 for 1 ICBM and 3 for 2 SLBM warhead build-down) are
preferred, in that order.
While Option 1 treated bombers on a weapons basis, the other options
built down bombers on a platform basis at a 2 for 1 ratio. As long
as stored as well as operational bombers are counted and a floor of
400 is used, many build-down ratios for bombers would be
acceptable.
Option 2 (2 for 1 missile warhead build-down) allows some negotiating
flexibility if the Poseidon C–3 is counted at 14 warheads. However,
counting the C–3 at 10 warheads (our current START approach) provides
insufficient negotiating flexibility. Until an intermediate ceilings
approach is identified that would have the effect of modifying the
effective rate of reduction, Option 2 is unacceptable.
As part of a START agreement, the
build-down approach does not appear to offer any technical
advantages over the schedule of reductions that the U.S. has
proposed in Geneva.
Build-Down Options As Separate Precursor Agreements
A build-down proposal in the context of START is clearly preferable to a precursor approach.
However, if a precursor is mandated, Option 5 (the 1 for 1 warhead
cap) would have the least impact on our force structure and would
fully accommodate MX deployment
within current warhead levels. While this option is not the same as
the Soviets’ INF moratorium offer,
there is the risk that adoption of Option 5 could undercut our
INF position.
Option 6 is more objectionable because it would give the Soviets an
incentive to prolong START
negotiations and thus avoid all our desired START constraints except the 5000
RV and 400 bomber limits, which
would be part of Option 6. Although time constraints precluded a
detailed evaluation in this study, it might be useful to examine an
excursion of Option 6 which applied a much lower percentage annual
build-down. Such an approach might lessen objections to this option
because it would greatly extend the time period required to reach
the 5000 warhead floor and thus continue Soviet incentives to
negotiate a full START agreement.
Full analysis and evaluation would be required before this excursion
could be seriously considered. The other options would not be
acceptable as precursors.
Negotiating an acceptable precursor agreement would present many of
the same obstacles as negotiating our START proposal and thus should not be viewed as
offering a quick and easy way to reach an interim agreement. Indeed,
the Soviets would likely respond to any U.S. precursor proposal by
seeking to include bomber weapons—a
[Page 266]
situation that would clearly contradict the
U.S. START position and thus be
unacceptable to the U.S.
Implementation. Implementing requirements,
such as the structure of intermediate ceilings, would need to be
developed before a specific build-down option could be proposed.
[Omitted here is the body of the paper]
