67. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- NSC Meeting on START—Tuesday, June 7, 1983
Issue
To what degree should the US negotiation position on START be changed at this time in view of the Scowcroft Commission report and the Cohen-Nunn “mutual build-down” concept? With regard to the Scowcroft Commission, should the US retain, raise, or delete the current 850 limit on deployed missiles, and should we retain, alter, or drop indirect and/or direct limits on throw-weight? Concerning a build-down, what possible alternative options could be implemented or rejected now, which require further study, and what stance should the Administration take with the Congress on this subject until a suitable option can be developed?
Facts
The Administration needs to address the above issues prior to the resumption of the START negotiations on June 8 and prior to the MX- [Page 241] related Senate vote on the 1984 Authorization Bill during the week of June 13. Following the last NSC meeting on START, on May 7,2 you indicated to the appropriate members of Congress that the Administration’s START position would reflect the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission and would seek to develop a flexible approach to the “build-down” concept for START (letter at Tab H).3 Subsequently, the START Interdepartmental Group (IG) undertook an intensive work program on these issues and has produced two papers on Scowcroft Commission implications and options (Tab D)4 and on mutual build-down implications (Tab G).5
In addition to the IG’s work to be considered at the June 7 NSC meeting, the meeting will also provide an opportunity to hear directly from General Scowcroft (arms control recommendations at Tab E)6 and from the Chairman of the General Advisory Committee Arms Control and Disarmament, Dr. William Graham, who has forwarded a separate proposal for a START package (Tab F).7
Discussion
We believe the most useful means of framing the discussion of the Scowcroft Commission issues relating to the number of deployed missiles and the issue of direct or indirect limits on throw-weight, would be through a focus on the two charts on: (1) the Agenda and (2) alternative START “packages,” as briefed to you by NSC staff on June 1.
On the deployed missile number, the current 850 missile limit would permit the US to deploy MX and Trident missiles as planned and still field some 300 new small ICBMs or Midgetmen. We feel that it may be prudent to raise the 850 number at this time, but that we should probably not eliminate the number entirely at this time. A number remains an understandable counting and verification principle (although similar to SALT), offers some protection against direct limits on US bomber weapons, and may be necessary if, as is likely, we cannot agree now on the nature of a substitute approach focused entirely on warheads and direct throw-weight limits.
[Page 242]Concerning throw-weight, we believe further discussion and study are probably required before a major shift should be undertaken. In this regard, special consideration should also be given to verification and build-down factors.
Concerning build-down, we do not believe it is possible at this time to define any one or two clear options for our START position. However, the IG believes that, with a comprehensive IG work program currently underway, we will be in a position to brief appropriate members of Congress on possible alternative approaches before the August recess.
NSC Package
For your use at the NSC meeting and for background information, we have prepared the comprehensive package attached with the following items:
Tab A—Agenda;8
Tab B—My suggested Talking Points at the NSC meeting inviting discussion of the agenda issues; copies of two IG charts;9
Tab C—The Scowcroft Commission-related Talking Points that we provided for your information earlier for your June 1 briefing;10
Tab D—The IG paper on the Scowcroft Commission issues;
Tab E—GAC Chairman William Graham’s letter to you proposing a specific START package related to the Scowcroft Commission;
Tab F—The Scowcroft Commission recommendations on Arms Control;
Tab G—The IG paper on Mutual Build-Down;
Tab H—Your letter to Senators, Cohen, Nunn, and Percy on a build-down; and
Tab I—The proposed draft text of a START treaty, to be updated on the basis of decisions to be made.11
Following the NSC meeting in the morning, you are scheduled to have consultations with appropriate Senate and House members later, in the afternoon, to be followed by a meeting the next morning with the Congressional leadership. Based on the NSC meeting discussion, we will prepare recommendations and alternative decision memoranda for your consideration prior to your meeting with the leadership.
[Page 243]Recommendation
OK | NO | |
_________ | _________ | That you review the attached package, particularly the summary Talking Points and charts for the NSC meeting at Tab B, the comprehensive Talking Points prepared for your June 1 briefing by NSC staff at Tab C, and the START IG papers on Scowcroft Commission at Tab D and on the “Build-Down” at Tab G.12 |
_________ | _________ | That you not announce any decisions at the NSC meeting, pending consideration of the afternoon’s Congressional consultations and of alternative decision directives to be prepared by NSC staff.13 |
- Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–103, NSC 00081 07Jun1983. Secret. Copied to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum.↩
- Apparent reference to NSC meeting on May 10. See Document 66.↩
- Attached but not printed, at Tab H, is Reagan’s letter to Senators Cohen, Nunn, and Percy.↩
- Attached but not printed, at Tab D, is the IG paper on the Scowcroft Commission issues.↩
- Attached but not printed, at Tab G, is the IG paper on Mutual Build-Down.↩
- Apparent reference to Tab F. Attached but not printed, at Tab F, is the Scowcroft Commission recommendations on Arms Control.↩
- Apparent reference to Tab E.↩
- Attached but not printed, at Tab A, is the agenda.↩
- Attached but not printed, at Tab B, are suggested talking points and copies of two IG charts.↩
- Attached but not printed, at Tab C, are Scowcroft-related Talking Points.↩
- Attached but not printed, at Tab I, is a proposed draft text of a START treaty.↩
- Reagan did not indicate a preference.↩
- Reagan did not indicate a preference.↩
- Secret.↩