Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

72. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 14, 1983

SUBJECT

• Treating Build-Down as a Friend

On July 9, the START IG completed and forwarded to the NSC its technical assessment of alternative build-down proposals (Executive Summary attached).²

The original Cohen build-down concept³ involves the reduction of two warheads for every new one added. Bomber weapons would be lumped with missile warheads, without distinction, in a total aggregate, along the lines of the current Soviet START proposal. The objective is a separate interim agreement, on the assumption that conclusion of START is far in the future. The IG examined the Cohen approach as well as several more modest proposals:

• a 2-for-1 build-down covering missile warheads and bomber aircraft;

• a 2-for-1 build-down on ICBM warheads, 3-for-2 on SLBM warheads, and 3-for-2 on bomber aircraft;

• a 3-for-2 build-down on missile warheads and bomber aircraft;

• a 1-for-1 cap on missile warheads and bomber aircraft; and

• a percentage annual reduction (5–7%) that is not linked to modernization.

The President and others have made supportive comments about the build-down concept and Congressional proponents believe they have an Administration commitment to make a build-down proposal in some form to the Soviets. Nevertheless, there was little interagency enthusiasm for any of the options, either as a part of START or as an interim approach to START. The IG is concerned that a build-down proposal would divert negotiating attention from the reductions and other important measures called for in START and could result in reductions without the protections and guarantees that would come with a full treaty.

The IG paper also reports that while the original 2-for-1 concept is unworkable, several of the more modest options would fit within the existing START proposal. However, as part of a START agreement the build-down approach does not appear to offer any military or negotiating advantages over the schedule of reductions the U.S. has proposed in Geneva.

A Possible Compromise

Despite the possible START diversions that could result from a build-down proposal and specific problems associated with most options, build-down has become an important issue in the current strategic debate. Its supporters allege that MX support will evaporate unless there is a build-down, some other alternative, or prospects of a near term agreement in START. While there is strong support for build-down in the Senate, a careful analysis of attitudes is needed to better determine our degree of latitude on this issue.

Although we may have room for maneuver, we should consider trying to craft a workable but scaled-back version of the build-down, wrapping it in the spirit of compromise. To reject a build-down outright risks the defeat of MX, the adoption of an unfavorable arms control resolution in the Senate, and the loss of the bipartisan consensus on arms control that we have been trying to construct.

One possible compromise would incorporate the build-down concept both within START and as a precursor to START. The precursor could be a cap on the number of missile warheads and bomber aircraft—permitting a 1-for-1 replacement of older systems with modernized systems. While not a build-down per se, a cap could halt the growth in number of warheads on both sides and could be seen as a positive initiative as we continue with START and the modernization of strategic systems.

A cap on missile warheads and bombers would have minimal impact on our force structure and would allow deployment of MX (by withdrawing older weapons). However, a cap may be difficult for some to accept since it has some features in common with the nuclear freeze. The important distinction is that modernization is permitted. There is also some risk that if parallels are drawn to the Soviets’ proposed INF moratorium, adopting a cap could undercut our INF position. Nevertheless, of the alternatives available to us, a cap could offer a meaningful limitation on warhead growth and be a strong signal of our commitment to move forward with arms reductions. It is not clear, however, that such a minimal step would appease build-down advocates.

Since a cap is significantly less than what the build-down advocates hoped for and does not itself result in reductions, we could at the same time embrace a build-down proposal within the START framework. One option would be for a mutual, annual percentage reduction in missile warheads. While the precise figures and time period for the reductions require detailed analyses, reductions of 5–7% per year for eight years would essentially match the reduction schedule now envisioned in our START proposal. Although percentage decreases do not explicitly link reductions with modernization (and thus some would claim they are not a build down), in practice we would both modernize and substantially reduce our forces.

A variation, currently being studied, would be a smaller percentage reduction over a shorter period of time (for example 2% per year for three years). This could have merit as a precursor (before START). The reductions are small and the time period short enough to minimize the risk associated with build-down without a full START agreement. Since these reductions would be more modest than START, this approach would not necessarily reduce incentives to reach a full agreement.

In sum, one approach might be:

—cap on missile warheads and bomber aircraft

—1-for-1 replacement to accommodate modernization

—small percentage reduction (2%) while START being negotiated (maximum of 3 years)

—acceptance of the build-down concept in any START agreement with the Soviets. (The optimal would be equal percentage reductions of 5–7% per year to an agreed floor, although more explicit build-downs such as the 3-for-2 approach would be feasible.)

Another alternative would be to consider these or similar interim concepts if a year-end assessment indicated the Soviets were unwilling to move in START. This would allow time for testing Soviet reactions to our latest START initiatives, would follow initial INF deployments, and could possibly buy some time for MX.

It should be recognized, however, that these minimal approaches are unlikely to satisfy either strong advocates of build-down on the Hill or critics in the interagency community.

Next Steps

In proposing a minimal alternative to the Cohen concept, we must avoid being disingenuous with build-down supporters by suggesting that a cap (as a precursor) plus a percentage reduction has met their concerns. On the other hand, with sufficient Presidential support, such a compromise may be acceptable to advocates of some interim initiative, not necessarily build-down in a pure form. If we pursue this approach, we should be up front with Senator Cohen and others on why the 2-for-1 outside a START framework is not feasible in our view but be prepared to give them public credit for the development of the concept.

As Senators Cohen, Nunn, and Percy told you,⁴ they believe there is need to show some positive movement fairly soon and have our policy decisions made before September. Senator Percy hoped their staffs would have a chance to study our counter proposal during the August recess. The MX Commission has been given access to the IG paper. Therefore, there should be internal high-level discussions in the near future of how to approach build-down. An NSPG might be an appropriate forum to vet the issue without forcing the President’s hand. The IG needs some guidance on whether its relatively unfriendly treatment of “build-down” fits other objectives. We also need to develop a coordinated gameplan (including MX Commission activities) on consultations with the Senators and their staff.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1983 Arms and Arms Control. Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Eagleburger, who did not initial the memorandum.
2. Attached but not printed is the Executive Summary of a paper prepared by the START IG, “Technical Assessment of the Build-Down Concept.”
3. See Document 66.
4. Not further identified.