66. Editorial Note
On May 9, 1983, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam held meetings on the Reagan Administration’s approach to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. Later that day, Dam dictated a personal note describing a meeting of his arms control discussion group on “the relationship between INF and START. The general opinion was quite hostile to any merger, at least until such time as the INF deployment schedule is essentially completed, of INF into START. One of the main disadvantages was that the problems of negotiating START would become unmanageable once Europeans had a direct stake in START outcomes, because it would be impossible to carry on the kinds of consultations on START that we have been carrying out on INF, especially in view of the complexity of the START issues. Kenneth Adelman was something of a supporter for merger, and Rick Burt was not present, but the rest of the group, including Larry Eagleburger, were very dubious about any benefits to be derived from such a merger. This was an interesting outcome of the discussion in view of the fact that there seems to be a strong, though abstract, interest in the arms control community in some merger of the two negotiations. It is, of course, true that except in political terms involving the linking of the United States to the defense of Europe, there is no special significance to any ‘Euro balance,’ and therefore, it does not make analytical sense to think of the two negotiations separately. But from the political point of view, including getting things done and having a position that could be explained publicly, there is not too much to be said for merging the two negotiations. That, at any rate, was the view held right across the spectrum of positions from Richard Perle on the one hand to Larry Eagleburger on the other.” Dam also described an hour-long meeting with Adelman “to discuss what changes we should be making in our START position, particularly in view of the Scowcroft Commission Report. Adelman was strongly for dropping launchers entirely and concentrating on warheads and throw-weight. This is also the position of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (especially Perle). It makes a lot of sense in terms of trying to move in the direction of single-warhead missiles, which is the current rage in the arms control community. On the other hand, it merely means that we would have to have extensive discussions about throw-weight, and such discussions would almost inevitably lead in the direction of making an agreement more difficult, because throw-weight would be very difficult to negotiate, and the Soviets have shown no interest in doing so. I also had a pre-brief on the same subject, in view of the fact that the question of dropping launcher limits or increasing them above the present 850 position will be up for discussion in the NSC meeting tomorrow morning.” (Depart[Page 239]ment of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)
On May 10, Dam dictated a personal note in which he recounted a National Security Council meeting that he attended that day on behalf of Secretary of State George Shultz, who was in Paris. The meeting considered “to what extent we should modify our START agreement in view of the Scowcroft Report. Defense has used the Scowcroft Report to come down hard on moving away from deployed missile limits toward throw-weight as the principal unit of account in the START negotiations. All sides agree that warheads should be the second unit of account. In fact, Scowcroft does not support the notion of moving out to throw-weight. I argued as persuasively as I could that moving to throw-weight now would be counterproductive. It would be very difficult to negotiate, not simply because the Soviets are not interested in throw-weight as a unit of account, but also because it is hard to define and harder to verify (with an error margin of 10 to 25 percent). Moreover, I said, I thought that a movement to throw-weight right now would simply confirm in the minds of critics of the President the view that he was not serious about arms control, because it would slow down or eliminate any possibility of agreement in the near term with the Soviet Union. Ken Adelman came down strongly on the side of OSD, and General Vessey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I were basically in agreement, although he would have held the limit on deployed missiles to 850, whereas I was willing to see them rise somewhat.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983) No formal minutes of the May 10 NSC meeting was found.
In identical May 12 letters to Senators Charles Percy, Samuel Nunn, and William Cohen responding to their joint letter of April 29 (see Document 60), President Ronald Reagan wrote: “The Scowcroft Commission’s recommendations on modernization and arms control are integrally related. Our action with respect to these recommendations must be equally comprehensive. That is why I am now reviewing our START proposal in order to develop such modifications as are necessary to reflect the Commission’s approach, which I share. To cite just one example, the Commission report recommended that the proposed limit on deployed ballistic missiles currently contained in the U.S. START position be reassessed since it is not compatible with a desirable evolution toward small, single-warhead ICBMs. There are a number of alternative approaches available to integrate this and the other Commission recommendations into our approach to arms reductions. As modifications are made to our START proposal, I will continue to seek [Page 240] stability at the lowest possible level of forces.” The president also addressed the Senators’ advocacy of “a ‘guaranteed build-down.’ The principle of a mutual build-down, if formulated and implemented flexibly, and negotiated within the context of our modified START proposal, would be a useful means to achieve the reductions that we all seek.” After discussing how such a build-down could work, Reagan wrote: “My Administration is currently examining the structure of a build-down proposal which would meet these criteria and would facilitate a START agreement embodying substantial reductions in nuclear forces. I will work with you and your colleagues to develop such a proposal.” (“Letter to Three Senators Concerning the Strategic Modernization Program and Nuclear Arms Reduction, May 12, Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, volume 1, pp. 696–697)