Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

70. Memorandum From Robert Linhard and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, June 10, 1983

SUBJECT

• Amb Rowny’s Comments on Draft NSDD

Late this morning we received a call from Amb Rowny’s staff who wished to pass on his comments on the draft NSDD² concerning changes to the U.S. START position. The changes suggested are as follows:

—Delete any reference to the retention of 2500 warhead subceiling on ICBMs.

—In discussing direct limits on throwweight delete any addition reference to a U.S. goal of achieving direct and equal levels below current U.S. levels.

—In describing the range of options that the U.S. negotiator may explore with the Soviets in an attempt to get a handle on throwweight, include an explicit reference to a direct limit at 2.5 mkg as one of those options.

The revised draft NSDD³ that we provided this morning does incorporate the 2nd of Amb Rowny’s two suggestions. We would recommend that we do not incorporate the other items he suggested at this time.

This morning’s phone call also raises other problems. It appears that the draft NSDD, circulated for comment on a close-hold basis, may have received rather wide distribution in certain agencies. For example, the call for Rowny’s staff was the result of their obtaining a copy of Ken Adleman’s previous comments⁴ on the draft. If this is the case, it is unfortunate not only because of the precedent it sets but also because of the increased risk that the draft may leak.

In terms of precedent, in the past we have been very careful to hand carry draft NSDDs to selected individuals for their personal comment and not to permit them to have copies of the drafts. Setting a precedent that a wider range of “agencies” will have the opportunity to comment on draft NSDDs prior to their signature may not be useful in the long run.⁵ Especially if, as evidenced in this case, many of the comments generated are not directed at clarifying the decision contained in the NSDD, but at explicitly or implicitly altering it.

The risk of a leak of this draft is also worthy of concern. For example, should the draft that agencies were provided for comment leak, it includes language that fairly clearly sets an ultimate U.S. goal to be direct limits on throwweight at or below current U.S. levels. This may be too stark a presentation of our current position and contains language no longer in the final draft.

Our older procedures provided more protection against leaks since the drafts were never out of NSC control and, once signed, the control procedures for START NSDDs have been tighter than most documents.

RECOMMENDATION

That we do not further revise the draft NSDD based on Amb Rowny’s comments.⁶

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–084, NSDD 0098. Secret. Sent for action.
2. Not found.
3. Not found.
4. Not found.
5. Clark wrote “agree” in the margin to the left of this sentence.
6. Clark indicated his approval of the recommendation and wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “good points! WPC.”