69. Memorandum From Clayton McManaway of the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz1

Mr. Secretary:

We have the following information on follow-up to the NSC meeting on START:2

—The President will make a statement in the Rose Garden at 1100 today (5 PM our time).3 The latest draft of his statement, based on [Page 248] guidance from the President, is at Tab 1.4 The final will be sent to other Cabinet members this morning in Washington. This is an advance sent Eyes Only to you (in theory, no one in the Department has seen it). I have given Jon and Rick copies and they will be prepared to discuss it with you when you are ready. As you will see, the President has opted for indirect limits on throwweight. If we have comments, we should get them back this morning; the speechwriters are already working on it.

—Congressional leaders, NATO ambassadors and other dignitaries will be present in the Rose Garden. Ken will represent the Department. If the arms control booklet is ready in time, the President will give copies to the Congressional leaders, embargoed.

—Earlier, there was thought that the President would call in and brief the NATO ambassadors. While not entirely clear, it would appear he will not do that. We have received proposed talking points for use by our Ambassadors at NATO posts and Tokyo in briefing host governments on the President’s statement. They have been cleared by the NSC. We are asked to review them and send them on from here ASAP. Tab 2.5

—We are expecting Q’s and A’s but do not have them yet.

—The NSDD on START will be signed this morning Washington time.6 It is not clear that we, or others, will have an opportunity to comment prior to its signing. This could be troublesome, depending on the degree of detail included. However, if it is general in nature and follows the substance of the statement as we have it, we should be okay.

—Rowny is not being given any advance word on the decisions. The NSC has been adamant on this point. His instructions will be prepared during the week. At this point we have no sense of when he would be told to make his presentation.

  1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM, 1979–1989 The Executive Secretariat’s Special Caption Documents, June 1983 #22, Box 2 #88. No classification marking. Not for the System. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “GPS.” Shultz was traveling to Paris to attend the NATO Ministerial Meeting June 9–10.
  2. See Document 68.
  3. During his June 8 remarks from the Rose Garden, Reagan said that the previously-tabled U.S. START position “would have limited each side to no more than 850 deployed ballistic missiles. This measure was never viewed as being as useful or important a constraint as the limit on total ballistic missile warheads. The Scowcroft commission report specifically suggested that it should be reassessed, since it could constrain the evolution we seek towards small, single-warhead ICBM’s. Acting upon the Commission’s recommendation, I have now directed our negotiators to adjust our position on deployed ballistic missiles by relaxing our current proposal for an 850 deployed ballistic missile limit.” (“Remarks Announcing Changes in the United States Position at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks,” June 8, 1983, Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, volume I, pp. 832–833.)
  4. Attached but not printed is telegram 158248/ToSec 60022 to Shultz’s delegation, June 8, which transmitted the penultimate draft of Reagan’s statement.
  5. Attached but not printed is telegram 158247/ToSec 60021 to Shultz’s delegation, June 8, which transmitted a draft cable containing instructions to multiple posts. In telegram 158301 to multiple posts, June 8, the Department instructed addressees to brief host government officials in advance of Reagan’s Rose Garden statement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830324-0761)
  6. The NSDD was in fact not signed until June 14. See Document 71.