Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

323. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 12, 1988

SUBJECT

• Verifying Road-Mobile ICBMs in START

Issue

Whether to modify the U.S. guidance on verification provisions for road-mobile ICBMs in START.

Background

On May 25, prior to the Moscow summit, you issued guidance on the U.S. approach to mobile missile verification.² On the basis of this guidance, we presented the main points of the approach to the Soviets in Moscow, and they agreed on a package of “common elements” at the summit.

Subsequent to the summit, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of ACDA expressed concern about our position. Pending the opportunity to meet and discuss their concerns, we held up tabling treaty language on this area in Geneva. In the interim, the Soviets have tabled in Geneva their version of treaty text formalizing the “common elements” as agreed at the summit.

Discussion

The current U.S. guidance on road-mobile ICBM verification provisions includes the following main elements.

1. All deployed road-mobile ICBMs would normally be located in relatively small (i.e., 25 km2) Restricted Deployment Areas (RDAs). These RDAs would include the shelters in which such missiles are stored on a day-to-day basis, and it is here that the deployed road-mobile ICBMs would stay unless they are being used for training or flight testing, or undergoing maintenance.

2. There would be a limit on the percentage (e.g. 20–30%) of deployed road-mobile ICBMs that could be outside these Restricted Deployment Areas for training, testing and maintenance at any one time. There would be notification requirements associated with all movements away from the RDAs.

4. There could be exercise dispersals of the entire force, without geographic restriction, but these would be limited in frequency and duration. There could also be operational dispersals (intended to ensure survivability in a crisis). Operational dispersals would not be limited in number or in duration, but both sides acknowledge that they would be rare.

The Soviet approach as tabled in Geneva differs in certain ways.

1. While they agree that all deployed road-mobile ICBMs would normally be located in relatively small Restricted Deployment Areas (RDAs), they would add the concept of a larger Deployment Area (DA) which would contain some number of RDAs, a Maintenance Base, and some surrounding area.

2. The Soviets also agree that there should be a limit on the number of mobile ICBMs that could be outside the smaller Restricted Deployment Areas at any one time, but they would make this a much higher limit (50%) than we would prefer. They also agree to notification requirements associated with all such movements, except they would exempt up to 3 launchers per small RDA as long as they stayed within the larger Deployment Area.

3. While agreeing on the idea of exercise dispersals, the Soviets would limit exercise dispersals to no more than 50% of the entire force. We want the right to use our entire force in an exercise dispersal.

Based on the concerns expressed by Judge Webster and ACDA Director Burns, and considering the proposals tabled by the Soviets, two slight modifications to your current guidance have been suggested:

1. that we accept the idea of a larger Deployment Area surrounding the small Restricted Deployment Areas, as proposed by the Soviet Union; and,

2. that we confine exercise dispersals geographically to the larger Deployment Areas.

All agencies except the Joint Chiefs of Staff support these modifications. Supporters argue that the larger Deployment Area concept marginally improves overall verification and provides additional protection for U.S. future road-mobile basing options.

The JCS oppose the modifications arguing that the restriction on exercise dispersals blocks our ability to train with our forces in the same manner as we would have to use them in combat and could restrict U.S. options in designing and operating future road-mobile systems. The formal views of the JCS on this subject are at Tab B.³

I think that, overall, the modifications proposed are an improvement to the U.S. position. I recommend that you authorize these modifications. In implementing the modifications, we can make the Deployment Areas large enough to meet most of the legitimate concern expressed by the JCS.

To implement this recommendation, if you approve, I would issue the memorandum to agencies at Tab A⁴ which lays this out in greater detail.

Recommendation

OK	No
		That you approve modifying the U.S. guidance on verifying road-mobile ICBMs as set forth above.5

1. Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, ACSG, Sept 13, 1988 (4). Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Brooks and Linhard. Copied to Bush and Duberstein. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.
2. Apparent reference to Document 305, dated May 27.
3. Not attached.
4. Not attached.
5. Reagan initialed his approval.