Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

305. Editorial Note

On May 27, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 307, “Review of United States Arms Reduction Positions in Preparation for the Moscow Summit.” The NSDD set the following U.S. goals for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks for the May 29–June 2 summit: “We will continue to advocate a legally binding sublimit of 3300 ICBM RVs and will discuss how to record the current Soviet intentions with regard to their program”; “We will provide the Soviets details of our proposed verification scheme for mobile ICBMs based upon the decision reflected in guidance issued on my behalf by the National Security Council staff on May 24, 1988. Based on Soviet receptiveness to this verification approach, I will make the decision in Moscow whether to discuss specific numerical limits on mobile ICBMs and, if so, what limits to propose”; “If warranted by Soviet movement in other areas, I am prepared to agree to allow testing and modernization of silo-based heavy ICBMs subject to appropriate restrictions on the modernization of such missiles (but not on other ICBM modernization) and subject to the United States having an equal right to heavy ICBMs.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Council, National Security Directive Decisions, NSDD 250) The guidance of May 24 was not found.

“Building upon the Reykjavik formula for heavy bombers carrying gravity bombs or SRAMs,” the NSDD went on to say, “we will seek to resolve additional issues concerning air-breathing weapons in a single, integrated package as follows:—While continuing to prefer a counting rule of 10 ALCMs per bomber, if the Soviets accept our approach to counting rules, we can accept an outcome which meets the following criteria:” (1) “For the U.S., a counting rule of no more than 10 ALCMs per B–52;—For existing Soviet bombers, a counting rule of no less than 6 ALCMs per BEAR-H and no less than 8 ALCMs per Blackjack”; (2) “Provisions for agreeing on counting rules for future bomber types”; (3) “No sublimit on ALCMs or bomber weapons;—No restrictions on conventionally-armed cruise missiles; (4) “1000 km range cut-off for counting nuclear-armed ALCM (acceptable only if the Soviets agree to the remaining elements of our proposal);” (5) “Acceptance of the U.S. position on bomber and bomber weapon distinguishability and verification;” (6) “No constraints on ALCM inventory;” and (7) “Acceptance of the limited right to convert ALCM bombers to non-ALCM bombers and non-ALCM bombers to conventional bombers set forth in the U.S. draft of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.” (Ibid.)

On sea-launched cruise missiles, the NSDD stated that “if the Soviets appear interested in moving from their current position to a declaratory approach, we will base such an approach on reciprocal non-binding declarations of acquisition plans for all nuclear-armed SLCMs regardless of their range. If such a scheme were agreed to, the United States would declare it has no plans to acquire more than 1500 nuclear-armed SLCMs.” The NSDD also stated that “We will continue the expanded data exchange begun in Geneva,” and ordered the priorities: “—First priority. Resolving issues relating to the joint summit statement/separate START statement as required.—Second priority. Seeking Soviet agreement to the ALCM position set forth above.—Third priority. Setting forth additional details of the U.S. approach to mobile ICBM verification.—Fourth priority. Continuing the expanded data exchange.” (Ibid.)

In a section on Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Non-compliance and the ABM Treaty Review, the NSDD stated that U.S. officials would reaffirm their “long-standing concern with Soviet failure to comply with and to correct Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty,” and “make it clear that we will not sign any strategic arms agreements, either in START or in Defense and Space, while the issue of the illegal Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar remains unresolved, and that we consider the only appropriate resolution to be dismantlement or destruction of the radar.” (Ibid.)

President Reagan arrived in Moscow on May 29 and delivered remarks alongside Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at the opening ceremony of the summit. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1988, volume I, pp. 673–674) In a one-on-one meeting that afternoon in St. Catherine’s Hall of the Kremlin, Reagan and Gorbachev discussed previous meetings, human rights, and religion. (Memorandum of Conversation, May 29; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988) The memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 156.

In an evening meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the Guest House of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Secretary of State George Shultz “observed that both sides had hoped there would be a START agreement to sign by the summit. But they also agreed that they wanted a good treaty, not a fast one. Concluding an agreement would take a lot of long, hard work; but it could be done. But more important than the progress which had been made on a START treaty was the fact that the summit had focused attention on the changes which had taken place in U.S.-Soviet relations since the Geneva summit.” In response, “Shevardnadze noted that, even though it had not proved possible to complete a START agreement, much basic work had been done as a result of the Reykjavik, Geneva, and Washington summits. There was a good foundation to build on. There was greater experience than in the past on such issues as verification, and implementation of the INF agreement would provide ‘unique’ additional opportunities.” Shultz and Shevardnadze agreed that “there were two main areas of START where progress was possible: how to count nuclear ALCM’s and mobile ICBM verification.” (Memorandum of Conversation, May 29; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988) The memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 157.