Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

30. Memorandum From Robert Linhard and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, July 29, 1982

SUBJECT

• Timing of the Next NSC Meeting on START

On Wednesday, July 28, we recommended that the Friday, July 30, NSC meeting not focus on START as planned. We requested that the topic of START be rescheduled to August 5. That request was approved, and the meeting is currently rescheduled for August 5. The purpose of this memo is to provide the background and rationale surrounding that recommendation.

The specific topic to be discussed is the control of ICBM reconstitution capability and the associated issue of whether we should seek inventory limits on non-deployed (i.e., spare, test, refire) missiles. NSDD–44² directed that the START Interdepartmental Group provide recommendations on this topic to the NSC by July 23. The interagency community has been working on this subject on a fairly constant basis for the last two months. As of last Monday, July 26, while there was still a split between State and OSD/ACDA on how to resolve this issue, the interagency process had produced a reasonably credible paper on this subject. It was on this basis that an NSC meeting on July 30 was scheduled.

Unfortunately, as the week progressed and agencies continued to maneuver for leverage on the main issue, the Interdepartmental Group continued to revise their paper. With each revision, distribution to the NSC and to NSC principals was delayed and the likelihood of key principals being well prepared to discuss this issue diminished. In fact, it reached the point that the JCS would not have had time to formally consider the paper prior to the NSC meeting, had the Friday schedule been maintained. As a result, we requested a one-week slip in the NSC meeting to August 5th to provide adequate time for the paper to be finalized, once and for all, and for the principals to review this rather complex issue prior to discussing it in an NSC meeting.

Subsequently, some in OSD (Ikle) and in ACDA (Timbie) have called to ask, given the current START round is now coming to a close on August 7, why we need to hold an NSC meeting on this topic at all at this time. The NSC staff and the Chairman of the START IG strongly feel that it is important, after the considerable effort made to get this far with this paper, that the NSC consider this issue. If it does not, we risk losing the momentum of the interagency work program. Additionally, a number of other significant issues are, in effect, bottled-up on the interagency START work program agenda behind this subject as we continue to tie up limited staff talent reworking this one topic. We need its timely discussion if only to remove the bottleneck that currently exists.

The central issue in this case is one that is appropriate for senior-level review and likely cannot be resolved at a lower level no matter how much further work is undertaken at this time. It involves a political call as to how much capability to verify a proposed constraint is absolutely required by the President to support our policy of “effective verification.” As Agencies see the views shifting towards or away from their own position, interest in moving or deferring decision waxes and wanes.

At this point, as a minimum, the Interdepartmental Group should provide a suitable issue paper reflecting their work. Once this IG product is complete and is provided, if the NSC principals feel that we are still not at an appropriate point to decide the issues involved, the NSC can consciously choose to defer decision and direct whatever additional effort is needed to move us to the point of being prepared to decide. We can’t afford to reinforce the habit of deferring the consideration of hard issues or of ignoring Presidentially directed suspenses.

Recommendation

That you support our position with respect to the necessity of discussing this issue in an NSC meeting on or about August 5.³

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–102, NSC 00059 RWR 8/09/82. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Sent through Boverie.
2. See Document 29.
3. Clark indicated his approval.