29. National Security Decision Directive 441
U.S. APPROACH TO START NEGOTIATIONS—III
This Decision Directive supplements NSDD–332 and NSDD–36.3 It provides additional guidance on the U.S. approach to START.
Indirect Limits on Throw-weight
The following additional indirect limits on throw-weight are approved for inclusion in the U.S. position for proposal in the first phase of negotiations:
—A limit on the combined total number of deployed heavy and medium ICBMs. At the level of 850 total deployed ballistic missiles, this would result in a limit on the total number of deployed heavy and medium ICBMs of 210.
—A sub-limit on the number of heavy missiles permitted. This proposal would limit the Soviets to proportionally no more heavy missiles in their force structure at reduced levels than exists today. At the level of 850 total deployed ballistic missiles, this would result in a limit of 110 deployed heavy missiles.
—A ban on new heavy missiles.
A ban on all heavy missiles is approved for inclusion in the U.S. position for proposal in the second phase of negotiations.
Other Collateral Constraints
The following additional collateral constraints are also approved for inclusion in the U.S. position for proposal in the first phase of negotiations:
—A limit on the weight of reentry vehicles (RVs) on new missile systems of approximately 200 kilograms.
—A limit on the number of RVs that can be tested or deployed on classes of missiles to 10 RVs on ICBMs and 14 RVs on SLBMs. The [Page 98] U.S. START Delegation is authorized to “grandfather” the number of RVs associated with the SS–18.
—Agreed rules governing the phasing of reductions to establish equal intermediate ceilings at agreed intervals.
Constraining ICBM Force Reconstitution
The U.S. START Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that we intend in the negotiations to deal with the problems posed by non-deployed missiles. The Delegation should point out that non-deployed missiles have the potential to augment the strategic capability provided by deployed missiles. Pending further guidance, the Delegation can use discretion to discuss the problems noted above (e.g., reconstitution, refire, rapid reload, and breakout). However, the Delegation should not discuss specific proposals for resolving these problems, or take actions which could prejudice U.S. options for dealing with these problems, without specific additional guidance.
Additional Work
The START Interdepartmental Group will provide for NSC review by July 23 its recommendations with respect to constraining Soviet ICBM force reconstitution and addressing the problems posed by non-deployed missiles.
- Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 078, NSDD 0044 [START Negotiations III]. Clark sent the decision directive to Bush, Haig, Weinberger, Stockman, Casey, Jones, Rostow, and Rowny under cover of a July 13 memorandum: “The President has decided upon additional guidance on the U.S. approach to the START negotiations as incorporated in the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD–44). In view of the special sensitivity of the details of the negotiating approach, it is directed that the NSDD–44 document be held by addressees. It is further directed that no copies are to be made, and that a record of authorized personnel who are provided access to the document be maintained by the office of each addressee.”↩
- See Document 19.↩
- See Document 24.↩