271. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Crowe) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)1

SUBJECT

  • PFIAB Letter to President Regarding START Treaty (U)

1. (TS) You asked2 for my comments on Anne Armstrong’s recent PFIAB letter to the President3 regarding the proposed START Treaty. The PFIAB assessment provides a sobering preview of the hard, expansive ratification challenge that a START treaty will face. It reinforces my judgment that we cannot afford to cut corners in trying to accelerate work toward a START agreement. Getting the details right is critical. No matter how good the framework of limits and restrictions, unless that framework is supported by an acceptable network of definitions, counting rules, inspection procedures, and so forth, we will not be able to answer to our satisfaction the sorts of fundamental questions that the PFIAB raises. Nor will we be able to answer the critics. You will [Page 1215] recall that one of the most elusive compliance debates on SALT involved the details of the definition of a new type of light ICBM, and how the Soviets exploited that definition in deploying the SS–25. At this point in START, we still lack, within the US Government, an agreed approach to distinguishing existing from future types of ballistic missiles. That is the sort of detail of which there are dozens that must be nailed down satisfactorily as we proceed.

2. (TS) Turning to the general themes that Anne Armstrong raises, clearly the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not yet in a position to pass judgment on the effective verifiability or the certified military sufficiency of a completed START agreement for the simple reason that so many details remain to be worked out. Thus far the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that the framework for approaching START reductions is sound. I am concerned with the resource issues that Anne Armstrong raises. In their 12 May 1987 memorandum to your predecessor,4 on intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that “the American public should be prepared for the fact that a sound INF agreement will not save money. The cost of effective verification, particularly if residual LRINF and/or SRINF are maintained, and of compensatory security measures will be quite considerable. It is strongly recommended that the political leadership begin conveying this message early and clearly.” The potential costs of INF verification pale in comparison with what is under consideration for START.

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have devoted hundreds of hours of discussion and study to START over the past several years. This Administration has made considerable progress toward a sound START agreement. With deliberative, well-conceived answers to the remaining hard questions, that progress can be carried forward. Above all else, we must not cut corners.

William J. Crowe, Jr.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: Reagan Library, System IV Files, 1988 SYS IV RWR INT 40051-40073. Top Secret.
  2. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs memorandum, 11 February 1988, subject as above. [Footnote is in the original text]
  3. See Document 262.
  4. Scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XII, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 1984–1988.