Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

262. Memorandum From the Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Armstrong) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, January 25, 1988

SUBJECT

• PFIAB’s Interest in Intelligence-Related Aspects of the START Treaty

As I promised in our meeting on January 14,² I am providing you a description of the intelligence issues related to a possible START treaty that Board members believe need close examination. PFIAB, of course, stands ready to examine any of these in greater detail to assist the President in pursuing strategic arms reductions with the Soviets.

The Board’s concerns involve two central questions.

1. How do the Soviets expect the implementation of the START treaty to affect their strategic posture?

Will they, for example, seek to capitalize on their already existing asymmetrical advantages in deployed active and passive defenses, especially leadership and civil defense, air defense, and ABM systems? Do they expect that their work on unconventional weapons, such as Chemical-Biological Warfare or directed energy weapons, will pay greater military dividends under the lower levels of offensive arms envisaged by START? Most importantly, from the Soviet perspective, how do they see the treaty advancing their military goals?

2. How will we know the Soviets are adhering to the treaty?

The Board’s concerns about the Intelligence Community’s ability to meet monitoring requirements with the requisite degree of confidence include:

warhead monitoring, in peacetime and in time of crisis or war;

monitoring mobile missiles, should they be permitted under the treaty;

monitoring cruise missiles, both testing and deployments;

detecting clandestine missile production, deployment and storage;

determining what confidence the likely on-site inspections can give us, especially for Soviet wartime force levels.

In addition, the Board is concerned that current plans for manpower and other resources for the Intelligence Community will fall far short of what is needed for these key monitoring issues.

The Board also believes many lessons are still to be learned from our experience with the on-site inspection regime under the INF treaty. Such lessons are likely to highlight U.S. limitations (especially in personnel) in conducting on-site inspections as well as making explicit what can and cannot be confidently verified.

1. Source: Reagan Library, System IV Files, 1988 SYS IV RWR INT 40026-40050. Top Secret. Sent to Powell under cover of a January 25 handwritten note in which Armstrong wrote: “Dear Colin, I’ll call you early next week to get your thoughts re where we go from here. Best—Anne P.S. Just heard that Shultz had to cancel our meeting (on Embassy Security)—so my report to you will be delayed!” (Ibid.)
2. No minutes of this meeting were found.