266. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1
1579. Subject: Official informal.
Max/Don—The following is the draft MEMCON of Max’s lunch with Obukhov. The MEMCON is based on my notes from Max’s briefing. Begin text.
1. This is NST-IX-M-004. Secret—entire text.
2. Meeting Date: February 5, 1988
Time: 1315–1515 hours
Place: Pearl du Lac Restaurant, Geneva, Switzerland
3. Participants:
| U.S. | USSR |
| Ambassador Kampelman | Ambassador Obukhov |
4. Begin summary: The discussion focused primarily on START issues. Each major issue was covered with Amb. Obukhov repeating familiar Soviet positions. Obukhov indicated that the Soviets would provide a “new paper” in the near future which would cover at least verification issues. While he indicated that the Soviets would be willing to compromise on some issues, he did not provide any new Soviet proposals. Amb. Kampelman explained the U.S. positions on the key START issues. Obukhov also asked questions regarding progress in INF ratification which Kampelman answered by explaining the U.S. process. Obukhov claimed that the lack of progress on defense and space issues was caused by the U.S. approach. Kampelman responded that the way to make progress was to work on a joint draft text. End summary.
5. Begin subject summary: INF ratification; Defense and Space; START: heavy ICBMs, sublimits, mobile ICBMs, ALCMs; START Treaty structure; possible verification paper; Moscow ministerial; SLCM issue; closing remarks. End subject summary.
INF Ratification
6. During a warm and friendly luncheon conversation Obukhov probed on the progress of the INF Treaty ratification process. He asked questions regarding Mr. Pearl’s testimony and the length of time the Senate will take to provide its advice and consent. In response Kampelman explained the U.S. ratification process noting that the Senate will [Page 1183] question members of both current and past administrations along with other individuals who have expertise on the issues.
Defense and Space
7. Obukhov claimed that “nothing was coming out of the space group.” He opined that no advantages could be gained from U.S. claims that the Soviets had agreed to the U.S. approach on key issues during the summit when in fact the Soviet side had not agreed. He said that the approach was “offensive” to the Soviet side. Kampelman emphasized that working on a joint draft text would be the best way to clarify and resolve D&S issues. While Obukhov would not commit to work on a JDT text, he did not totally rule out the possibility. Kampelman emphasized that working on a JDT would be the best way to clarify and resolve D&S issues. He also stressed that the United States would continue to have an SDI program.
START
8. Turning to START issues, discussion of which was the major focus of the conversation, Kampelman noted that the sides must do more than argue about procedures—experienced people must “work the issues.” He said all the work can not be done in a “steering committee.”
Working groups must discuss the issues and resolve problems. Obukhov agreed but said all work must be ad referendum to the “steering committee.”
—Heavy ICBMs—
9. Obukhov said the Soviets would not agree to zero heavy missiles or U.S. attempts to achieve a zero heavy ICBM outcome indirectly. Kampelman noted that the U.S. could not be sanguine as the Soviets developed new generations of heavy ICBMs.
—Sublimits—
10. Obukhov stated that the new 1100 ALCM sublimit was important to the Soviet side and presented his rationale for the number. Kampelman explained why the U.S. side opposed the sublimit. He then explained the U.S. requirement for the 3000 ICBM warhead sublimit, noting that Marshal Akhromeyev had indicated that the Soviet Union did not plan to deploy more than 3000 ICBM warheads. Kampelman asked why the Soviets would not agree to the sublimit. Obukhov acknowledged the U.S. 3000 ICBM warhead sublimit position, and then stated that the Soviets must have the 1100 ALCM sublimit since the United States would have a large advantage without it in light of the heavy bomber counting rule.
[Page 1184]—Mobile ICBMs—
11. Obukhov said he could not understand why the U.S. side maintained its position to ban mobile ICBMs since the United States had mobile ICBM development programs. He said the Soviets would provide a scheme to verify mobiles which he hoped could be agreed upon quickly. Kampelman indicated that the Soviet statement on verification must be presented and evaluated before judgments could be made. He noted that the United States would have mobiles if the Soviet Union had them, but it would be better to ban them.
—ALCMs—
12. Obukhov indicated a Soviet willingness to compromise on the ALCM range issue, but said the Soviet side could not accept the U.S. range figure. He then ridiculed the U.S. ALCM discounting proposal but did not provide a Soviet proposal.
START Treaty Structure
13. Kampelman made a strong case for removing brackets in the JDT as a way to make progress and create momentum. Obukhov noted that the START Treaty lacks the “innerlogic” that the INF Treaty possessed. He indicated that the Soviets were considering a proposal to restructure the START Treaty. Kampelman stressed that any restructuring proposals must be presented at an early date or the U.S. side would not take them seriously. He suggested that Obukhov speak with Amb. Hanmer on the issue as soon as possible.
Possible Verification Paper
14. Obukhov mentioned that the Soviets had a “new paper.” In response to Kampelman’s questions Obukhov noted that it would certainly cover verification, but would not provide any other details regarding its contents. Kampelman noted that the Soviets should not present the paper just before the ministerial if they wanted a serious U.S. response. Obukhov said the Soviets would provide it as soon as possible.
Moscow Ministerial
15. Obukhov stated that it would be a mistake to let the ministers make all the important decisions. He said the sides should make the minister’s lives easier by settling questions in Geneva. For example, he claimed that he was authorized to settle the ICBM sublimits issue. However, he gave no indication regarding how the Soviets would settle the issue. He hoped the ministers would settle the zero heavy ICBMs problem and the ALCM range and other sublimits issues. Kampelman said that the ministers would take a total inventory of the situation. [Page 1185] He expected that experts groups would work on the issues as had been done during past ministerials.
SLCM Issue
16. Kampelman remarked that it was his personal opinion that there was no solution to the SLCM issue. He thought that unilateral declarations would be the only way to handle the SLCM problem. In response Obukhov claimed that the U.S. side owed the Soviet side a SLCM number.
Closing Remarks
18. Kampelman said that he would probably not be returning to Geneva before the ministerial and hoped to see Obukhov in Moscow during the meeting. End text.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880134-0997. Secret; Immediate.↩