265. Letter From the Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Armstrong) to President Reagan1

Dear Mr. President:

In recent weeks your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has focused its attention on the intelligence issues related to the INF treaty and START negotiations. [less than 2 lines not declassified] Board believes the total ban on the intermediate and shorter range missiles and the prohibition on testing such weapons make Soviet cheating more difficult and less likely over time.

In the case of a possible START treaty, however, the Board has serious misgivings. Our concerns center on the Government’s ability to monitor the agreement as well as its effort to assess the strategic impact of such an accord. We believe that the negotiating process may be ahead of our resolving key intelligence uncertainties. If these uncertainties are not lessened markedly, they could permit the Soviets to attain strategically decisive advantages in a post-START world.

There appear to be greater incentives for the Soviets to cheat under a possible START agreement and many more opportunities for them to do so. We are struck, for example, by the problem of accounting for warheads given the “counting rules” outlined in the US/Soviet Joint Summit Statement. Several Soviet missile systems will be counted as carrying fewer warheads than they actually can. In time of crisis or war, the Soviets could, [less than 1 line not declassified] unconstrained by whatever peacetime on-site inspections might have previously occurred, deploy these missiles armed to their full capacity. Combined [Page 1180] with counting rules that underestimate the Air-Launched Cruise Missile capacity of Soviet strategic aircraft, the United States could face nearly half again as many Soviet warheads as permitted under the treaty. These additional warheads could be deployed in times of crisis with little or no prior testing. Such deployments might well provide the Soviets a militarily and politically significant advantage in a world of deep reductions.

[less than 3 lines not declassified]. We are troubled that if mobile missiles are permitted by the START treaty the Soviets could covertly produce them and achieve strategic surprise by deploying missiles beyond the treaty limits in time of crisis or war.

[1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified]

On-site inspections [less than 1 line not declassified] will not tell us confidently of Soviet warhead deployments when we most need to know, nor can they solve issues of clandestine production and deployment. Although the details of the suspect site inspections agreed to in principle in the US/Soviet Joint Summit Statement need to be carefully worked out, there are limits to the compliance gains that can be hoped for from any inspection regime. Notifying the Soviets that a particular installation is a suspect site [less than 2 lines not declassified] also places sensitive U.S. installations at risk by opening them to reciprocal Soviet inspections. In either case, there will be an understandable reluctance on the part of the United States to demand inspections of Soviet suspect sites. We have reservations whether [less than 1 line not declassified] inspectors can confidently be expected to pierce in a timely way a determined Soviet effort to conceal illegal missile production and storage.

Beyond these monitoring issues, there remain [less than 1 line not declassified] questions about the Soviet strategic posture. They lie outside START but could impact directly on the strategic balance. [less than 7 lines not declassified].

Similarly, we worry that Soviet military capabilities that seem less central to the strategic balance today, such as Soviet Anti-Submarine Warfare and Air Defense, may weigh much heavier if nuclear weapons are sharply reduced. Finally, we believe that these specific concerns should be addressed in light of a general assessment of where Soviet strategy is heading. The key question is: from the Soviet perspective, regardless of what other objectives they might have, how does the START treaty advance their military goals?

In our opinion, these [less than 1 line not declassified] uncertainties require immediate and focused review.

The issues raised above fall within the Board’s charter to provide you our best advice on matters of intelligence. By your careful appoint [Page 1181] ments, however, the Board comprises a unique repository of experience in national security affairs. It includes a former Secretary of State, a former Secretary of Defense, and two former National Security Advisors among other former Cabinet members. We hesitate to step beyond our formal mandate. But if the issue warrants, we believe it our obligation to make known to you other concerns which may fall outside the letter of the Board’s governing executive order.

One such concern arises directly from the possible cheating or breakout scenarios mentioned above. We believe detailed analysis by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs is required to determine what the net effect on the strategic balance might be under these scenarios. For different aspects of a START accord, at what level of [less than 1 line not declassified] uncertainty need we assume the Soviets may have gained a militarily significant advantage? At what level of [less than 1 line not declassified] uncertainty do the unknowns become dangerously destabilizing in times of crisis?

A second area of concern is the disposition of the remaining U.S. strategic forces under a START regime of 50 percent reductions. Have the appropriate studies been undertaken to determine what force modernization or restructuring will be required to enhance the survivability and deterrent effect of the remaining forces? Will such forces meet the objectives and criteria set out in National Security Decision Directive 13,2 “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy”? And have these requirements been put up against the budget constraints faced by the Department of Defense for the foreseeable future as well as the enormous political difficulties facing any attempt to restructure or modernize U.S. strategic forces?

Mr. President, we have not raised these concerns to frustrate efforts to reach an agreement. We do so to ensure that whatever shortcomings exist with the proposed treaty be fully understood so that they can be addressed, thereby increasing the soundness of a START accord.

As always, your Board stands ready to assist you in any manner you deem appropriate to address the issues raised in this letter.

Sincerely,

Anne L. Armstrong
Chairman
  1. Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, START PFIAB STUDY NSDD, FEBRUARY 29, 1988. Top Secret. Powell sent the letter to Shultz, Carlucci, Webster, and Crowe, copying Burns, under cover of a February 11 memorandum: “Attached is a copy of a recent PFIAB letter to the President regarding the proposed START Treaty. The letter raises a number of intelligence concerns and a couple non-intelligence, national security, concerns.” (Ibid.)
  2. Scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.