263. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1
669. Subject: START: The first two weeks of Round IX.
1. Secret—entire text.
2. The first two weeks of Round IX of START have produced few surprises. The atmosphere has been good and both sides have taken as their first priority making changes to the JDT which flow from the summit joint statement. The Soviet team appears stronger than before with 11 advisers (up from 5 in Round VIII), of whom 5 are declared military. Roslyakov returns after a stint in INF. He should be a constructive addition although he has not participated in any working groups thus far. Both Obukhov and his new deputy, General Lebedev, will probably devote the majority of their time to START. Lebedev works for Chervov and has INF and SCC experience. He has accompanied Masterkov to several 2-on-2 meetings and has made a good impression on his U.S. interlocutors thus far.
3. Both sides are searching for the best procedures to use to cope with the mammoth task before us. The three working groups have all slipped smoothly into their usual mode of operations. This is a civilized and meticulous procedure, but cannot possibly result in a treaty in four months. Obukhov has proposed a second track, consisting of a smaller, higher level group which would deal with “major issues,” while the working groups continue to hammer out the detailed treaty language. While Read and Dean are somewhat suspicious of this idea, we have in fact been having a larger number of 1-on-1 and 2-on-2 [Page 1172] discussions. Obukhov also liked the INF “steering group” and thinks we should use the idea in START. One other Soviet idea is special “experts’ groups” (with experts from capitals as in INF) to deal with specific major issues. Naturally, their prime example is SLCM verification, but they have also noted mobiles and heavy bomber armament as candidates. At my suggestion, we have agreed to have an ad hoc meeting or two on SLCM verification to see how it goes. We do not see a need for additional experts on our side at this time.
4. Thus far, the U.S. side has tabled far more proposals in the working groups, while the Soviets have been more active in proposing new ideas regarding procedures. The one major new Soviet proposal—for a sublimit of 1100 warheads on heavy bombers—is a major step backward. It was almost certainly a hasty addition to counter the fact that we did not drop our 3000–3300 and 1650 sublimits as they had hoped. We plan to begin the process of dropping the 1650 in a 1-on-1 meeting January 27. We will try to get rid of the 1100 and improve chances of getting the ICBM warhead sublimit at the same time, but without painting ourselves into a corner.
5. I believe we have a reasonable chance of getting a sublimit on ICBM warheads. However, the new features of our ALCM position—the 1500 km and 6 ALCMs per heavy bomber—have run into strong opposition as expected. It is interesting that Lebedev informally mentioned a range of 1000 km—a figure I have believed for some time would be a reasonable outcome both sides could accept.
6. There is the impression in some circles (not including State, of course) that the Soviets benefitted from the frantic finish in INF and enjoyed it so much that they will try to repeat it in START. Neither of these is true. Obukhov told me that the INF endgame was a one-time event that could not be repeated (Geneva 594).2 I believe both sides want a treaty, but one that is negotiated in as orderly a fashion as possible. As I see it, to accomplish this, we must be both lucky and good on three fronts:
A. We must rapidly fill in the remaining gaps in the U.S. position. This means tabling the remaining protocols and getting the Soviets to do the same. It also means making up our minds on the long-standing gaps in the treaty itself (non-deployed missiles, ASBMs, ICCMs, submarine tunnels, etc.). Deadlines need to be established and enforced for these decisions. At this end, I am pushing for the delegation to become more active in recommending solutions to Washington.
[Page 1173]B. Each of the Shultz-Shevardnadze meetings will need to make a major advance in one or more major issues. Agreement in advance with the Soviets on the focus for each meeting would be highly desirable.
C. The delegations here will have to develop a more efficient procedure for reaching agreement on language. I suppose this will eventually have to involve one or two people from each side simply hammering it out—ad referendum of course. Read made a pitch to Masterkov January 26 for a more rapid and real time resolution of language differences in the working groups which should help move things in this direction.
7. The statements of both Obukhov and Roslyakov at the end of last round that the Soviets no longer seek a separate D&S agreement have been borne out. This is supported by the joint statement which, of course, finessed the tough D&S details, the protocol tabled by the Soviets January 15, the fact that their D&S working group has almost withered away (one member and three advisors), and the fact that, in my first encounter with Obukhov and Roslyakov this round, they showed no interest in discussing D&S matters, in sharp contrast to their usual approach.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880619-0382. Secret; Priority; Stadis.↩
- In telegram 594 from NST Geneva, January 22, the Delegation reported on a January 20 lunch meeting between Obukhov, Roslyakov, and Ifft. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880614-0565)↩