216. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1
11335. Subject: START: Lehman-Vorontsov/Obukhov conversation, October 23, 1987.
1. This is NST/START Memcon VIII-M-145. Secret—Entire Text.
2. Meeting date: October 23, 1987. Place: Foreign Ministers meeting, Moscow
[Page 928]3. Participants:
| U.S. | USSR |
| Ambassador Lehman | Ambassador Vorontsov |
| Ambassador Obukhov |
4. Summary: Vorontsov went out of his way, at the conclusion of the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting on October 23, to say to Lehman that the U.S. has been “given what it asked for” on sublimits. When asked a direct question, he seemed to agree that this meant acceptance of the U.S.-proposed ballistic missile warhead and ICBM warhead sublimits of 4800 and 3300. Obukhov is supposed to make things clear in Geneva. End Summary.
5. As Ambassadors Lehman and Obukhov were leaving the room following Secretary Shultz’s final meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on October 232 in Moscow, Lehman asked Obukhov if he could explain General Secretary Gorbachev’s proposal on sublimits (septel). Obukhov said that it would be best to discuss this matter in Geneva. Lehman said that he hoped the Soviet side would introduce the proposal quickly in Geneva, because Lehman was not certain that he understood the proposal. Obukhov said that he and Lehman could discuss sublimits in detail as soon as they return to Geneva.3
6. At this point Lehman overheard Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov say “excuse me, I have to talk to this gentleman.” Vorontsov pushed several of his Soviet colleagues aside, and said to Lehman “you owe me for this one. I have arranged for you to get your sublimits. I just wanted you to know that our discussion of sublimits was not in vain. You have received what you wanted on sublimits.”
7. Lehman responded that the proposal was not clear to him. While the numbers proposed by the Soviet side seemed similar to U.S. proposals, the Soviet side’s structure seems to go down a path that strays from the direction both sides seem headed down in Geneva. Vorontsov replied, “no Ron, we have given you what you asked for.” Lehman asked Vorontsov “are you saying that you agree to our proposal of a sublimit of 4800 on total ballistic missile warheads and under that a [Page 929] sublimit of 3300 on ICBMs and on ICBMs only”? Vorontsov responded “yes, you have what you want.”
8. At this point Lehman grabbed Obukhov, who had been standing aside and pulled him into the conversation. Lehman asked Vorontsov whether the Soviet side will make this clear in Geneva. Will Ambassador Obukhov be given precise guidance that the Soviet side is prepared to agree to the 4800 and 3300 sublimits? Vorontsov said, “of course, we will be precise.” Vorontsov then moved on to join Shevardnadze. Obukhov exchanged some pleasantries with Lehman and said that he would see Lehman in Geneva.
9. Comment: The full intent of the Soviet presentation on sublimits is not clear. An announcement in TASS recounting the proposal could be read as being consistent with the U.S. approach of one way freedom-to-mix. Nevertheless, General Secretary Gorbachev’s presentation implies the approach of separate limits on each leg of the triad along the lines of the Soviet Union’s force structure. That would, of course, be unacceptable. Although Vorontsov’s comment is intriguing, he is not an expert and may not understand the Soviet proposal. Vorontsov is also manipulative and may have made his comments as a negotiating tactic. The bottom line remains: the Soviet proposal means that their desired force structure after 50-percent reductions is consistent with the U.S. proposal. We could not live with their proposal if it means separate sublimits, but they could live with our proposal as it is presently structured. End comment.
10. Moscow minimize considered.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870879–0425. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.↩
- Shultz and Shevardnadze’s concluding session took place in the Guest House of the Soviet Foreign Ministry from 5:10 to 6:20 p.m. The memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 85.↩
- In telegram 11766 from NST Geneva, November 5, Lehman reported on a luncheon of November 3, where “Obukhov described the recent Soviet sublimit proposal as being a ‘concession’ designed to meet U.S. concerns.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870913–0587)↩