215. Telegram From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan1
Following is my informal memorandum on today’s conversation with Gorbachev:2
PARTICIPANTS
- Mikhail Gorbachev
- Eduard Shevardnadze
- George Shultz
- Frank Carlucci
Attendees, but not participants
- Ambassador Dobrynin
- Marshal Akhromeyev
- Ambassador Dubinin
- Mr. Bessmyrtnykn, Deputy Foreign Minister
- Amb. Nitze
- Amb. Matlock
- Amb. Ridgway
- Mr. Parris, Dept of State (notetaker)
- Mr. Chernayev, aide to Gorbachev
Introduction:
1. Gorbachev asked Shevardnadze and Shultz to clarify where their discussions stood. Both made a factual report. Gorbachev then commented on the improved atmosphere between our two countries is a result of the post-Geneva period. They had made one more step than we had. (It wasn’t clear what he was referring to.) This had generated great expectations. We were now approaching the results stage. If we do not complete an arms control deal there will be political losses for both the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
2. Gorbachev stated his impression that we can soon complete INF. He agreed that the fundamentals should be solved there & then in Moscow rather than in Geneva. In this connection he proposed a joint moratorium on INF deployments effective November 1.
3. Gorbachev considered START the most important question. “Let’s find acceptable solutions.” The basic formula of 50 percent and 10 year non-withdrawal was established at Reykjavik. What has happened since then has been “horse trading.”
4. He (Gorbachev) had been thinking of what else to do. Putting aside the details, there are two big problems:
A) Strict compliance with the ABM Treaty, and
B) Optimal formulation of the triad.
5. On the first he had proposed that both sides not withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years. We then can discuss what can and can’t be put in space. He is awaiting our response.
6. On the second question, the key is to have an optimum correlation between the different elements of the triads of both sides. Accordingly, he is proposing a new formula based on distribution levels of the three elements of the strategic triad. Within a level of 6,000 warheads, the number of warheads on ICBMs would be no more than 3,000 to 3,300. The number for SLBMs would be 1,800 to 2,000. There could be 800 to 900 ALCMs.
7. Such movement could propel us very soon to the “key provision,” he said. The next step would be to reach an agreement. Gorbachev proposed a 12-month “moratorium” on Krasnoyarsk construction. He expects a similar reaction from us on construction at Thule and Flyingdales Radars.
8. Secretary Shultz welcomed his comments on INF and said we would push the negotiations rapidly.
9. On ABM and related questions, the Secretary wanted to clarify what Gorbachev was proposing. He would restate it without implying the President agreed since this was a sensitive issue:
—10 Year withdrawal, and
[Page 924]—Compliance with the ABM treaty, according to the narrow interpretation (that is, as defined in the March 1985 DOD report).
10. Gorbachev responded that he had told the President at Reykjavik that he would help him deal with the SDI problem. He would do this by defining what can and cannot go into space. But all of this would be subject to the 10 year non-withdrawal provision. Research could be conducted under this option. The idea, however, is that weapons should not be in space.
11. Secretary Shultz asked again to clarify, without inferring that he accepted the proposal: 10 year non-withdrawal. Interpretation as traditionally understood. This would be supplemented by activities in space within the confines of certain thresholds. Nothing would allow deployment. Gorbachev added that there would be no testing of weapons in space.
12. Secretary Shultz then turned to how to make the 50-percent cut operative. Progress has been made. He proposed an alternative to Gorbachev’s proposal, recognizing that some limits are a problem. We have agreed on the following:
—6,000 warheads;
—1,600 launchers and bombers;
—1,540 warheads on heavy missles;
—Bomber counting rule; and
—Throwweight reduced by 50 percent (we are still seeking to codify this).
13. We have proposed to limit ICBM warheads to 3,300. In Washington the Soviets made this 3,600 and applied it to all three legs. We feel the biggest distinction is between ballistic missles and air-delivered warheads—ballistic versus non-ballistic. We are willing to drop the sublimit involving ICBMs and SLBMs in exchange for a 4,800 limit on all ballistic missile warheads. Each side would have a mix suited to its own force structure.
14. Regarding mobiles. There is a question of having confidence in verification. We are willing to listen. “If we can find a solution on the entire package, then mobiles can be resolved.”
15. Gorbachev said the U.S. has concerns. “We do too. We do not want you to feel less secure by forcing too many reductions on you. If we force you to reconfigure your forces, you will find a way out.”
16. Secretary Shultz noted that Gorbachev had made the same point in Geneva; that is, one side can’t make the other conform to its idea of force structure. Let’s put a cap on ballistic missiles, but leave the other side to structure its mix as it chooses. We would have packages that make gains toward stability but don’t try to do everything.
17. Gorbachev said we have a basis to work toward “key provisions.” This would be the central theme at the Washington summit. [Page 925] The most important result, he repeated, would be “key provisions.” They would then be used to give instructions to the delegates. When the President came to Moscow next summer, he could sign the treaty. Gorbachev then said, “let me make one point.” Give some thought to it. I recently heard some remarks by Max Kampelman saying that we should come to grips with START. Then we can deal with space. Not so! We have to resolve START and space in the totality of their interrelationships.
18. Secretary Shultz responded that we have shown flexibility on some of the START numbers. Perhaps Geneva can’t do much, but it can lay the groundwork for a fruitful summit. He had several suggestions:
1) Geneva could work on verification, particularly mobiles;
2) Regarding the positions that have been taken. The Geneva negotiators can clarify them; and
3) They should continue to try to eliminate brackets so that a summit would end up with instructions to our negotiators.
19. Gorbachev saw weaknesses in Shultz’s suggestion. He had not mentioned space. If this is set aside then movement in other matters makes no sense. “Why have you avoided discussion on space, particularly our latest proposals?” Let me also say, he added, that I sense an effort to reject our ideas. The key provisions must be developed in time for the summit. Your purpose seems to be vague, and negates the Soviet effort. Some of your people have to work on the key provisions or it won’t make sense. If not, we will have to postpone all this until your administration is out of office.
20. Secretary Shultz responded by reviewing possible scenarios for the summit (1, 2, 5 day trips) and discussing venues. Gorbachev went back to the theme of combining START and D&S, arguing for a push to complete work by next spring.
21. Secretary Shultz asked Carlucci for his comments. Carlucci said that he found linkage totally unacceptable. Gorbachev had described an ABM treaty interpretation that was inconsistent with the President’s goals for SDI. As long as this type of linkage was maintained, he saw little chance for progress. “You are on a course that will constrain SDI and that is unacceptable.” After a somewhat stunned pause, Gorbachev responded, “well, is it all a wasted effort?”
22. Secretary Shultz said that, if he felt that way, perhaps the INF agreement could be signed by the negotiators. You want an agreement on SDI and space. That is the essense of your position. Frank has described the President’s view. You know it as well. Is it possible to find a formulation that gives you the assurances you want on predictability while allowing the President to maintain the thrust of the research program underway?
[Page 926]23. Gorbachev said he was coming back to the agenda not because he didn’t want to visit the U.S. He did. But, we have to decide. We can’t have a meeting without movement. “I want some movement in America.” I hope that in the next month some conclusive proposals can be prepared in Geneva. Perhaps a summit could be held late in December. Such a meeting is necessary, but we must think in terms of results. “I am not maneuvering. I have both a human and a political interest, but the latter is more important.” That is why I’m insisting on “key provisions” for START and space. I believe we have an accumulation of quantitative assets that makes a qualitative result possible.
24. I would not exclude the possibility, he went on, that there are certain questions only the President and I can resolve. But, “key provisions” is a worthwhile approach. Any program of further contacts presupposes such an approach.
25. Secretary Shultz responded that it wasn’t the format of Gorbachev’s suggestions that made us cautious. It was the content. In terms of timing, if we go past early December a visit becomes difficult.
26. Gorbachev responded that many things had become clearer and he needed to do some thinking. The Secretary and Frank Carlucci had only to report to one man, but he had to report “to many.” We should report and he would report.
27. The Secretary noted that it would be good if the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and U.S. could meet in a normal way for a full round of discussions. Gorbachev agreed but, unfortunately, a lot of expectations had been aroused.
28. The Secretary said we had had quite a discussion on strategic and space issues. But he did not see an immediate prospect for an agreement on space. It was his understanding that under the circumstances the General Secretary would not feel comfortable establishing a time for the visit. In the meantime, he will continue working these areas.
29. Gorbachev agreed, with the added comment that he intended to write the President a letter on all of this. He also noted that he needed to keep the process moving. INF was a distinct possibility. It represented great contributions by Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. It will also provide a good experience base for START.
30. Secretary Shultz asked, how then should we sign the INF agreement? Gorbachev replied that we still have time to weigh everything, and explore ways toward a compromise on the main problem. We should be able to do this by fall or the end of the year. “I will write to the President. I still think there is time to work this out and then we could have a substantial agenda for a visit to Washington.”
31. Secretary Shultz said, “I hope you are right, but I doubt it.” Gorbachev responded, if you, Carlucci and Nitze get your heads together, “I will work with the President.” It can happen.
[Page 927]32. Secretary Shultz warned that Gorbachev needed to weigh carefully what he meant by saying that everything depends on SDI, because this could well forego further developments as far as this administration is concerned.
33. Shevardnadze responded, “if there is nothing to say about space then tell me.” Secretary Shultz said this was not the case and carefully laid out for Shevardnadze the agreed-upon American position: seven-year non-withdrawal until 1994.
34. Gorbachev concluded that everything was now clear. He would consider it and evaluate it. “Our exchanges on START and space are not over and I will write the President. I still have a month and a half, and I have a desire to come over to the U.S.”
NB: The above summarizes a four-and-a-half hour conversation, but omits Gorbachev’s polemics on a State Department publication which he produced and complained about.3 His diatribe on this subject took approximately one-half hour. Neither Shultz nor I had seen the publication.
Regards.
- Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, The President (09/10/1987–10/31/1987). Top Secret; Sensitive; Immediate. Sent for information to the White House. Carlucci was aboard an aircraft. Shultz departed the United States on October 15 to visit Jerusalem (October 16–17), Jidda (October 17), Jerusalem (October 17–19), Cairo (October 19), London (October 19–20), and Helsinki (October 20–21), before arriving in Moscow. He and Carlucci met three times with Shevardnadze on October 22 and then again the morning and evening of October 23, in between meeting with Gorbachev. The memoranda of conversation for those meetings are printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 80–85. On October 23, Shultz flew to Belgium to brief NATO foreign ministers. He returned to Washington the next day.↩
- The formal memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986 to January 1989, Document 84.↩
- Reference is to Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1987).↩