Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

176. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 2, 1987

SUBJECT

• Gorbachev’s Approach to Arms Control and Disarmament and a U.S. Counter-Strategy

SUMMARY. Since Reykjavik, Gorbachev has been highly critical of the Geneva NST talks. The Soviet leader is concerned about what he sees as our effort to use NST to stress the American arms control agenda: SDI and a possible transition to a defense-dominant world, deep cuts in heavy missiles, and SS–20–GLCM/Pershing II trade-offs. Gorbachev wants to promote his own agenda, and therefore has been trying to bring pressure on us from outside NST, using unilateral initiatives (e.g., his testing moratorium) and direct approaches to President Reagan. In both summits, he encouraged the President to commit himself to certain general principles which would replace the U.S. agenda with a Soviet one. Gorbachev’s approach is highly political, but then Gorbachev is above all a politician—not an arms control negotiator.

We need to rebuff Gorbachev’s efforts to use unilateral initiatives and high-level meetings to impose his own arms control agenda on NST. This requires developing a modest, sustainable position at Geneva that does not include complete elimination of ballistic or all nuclear weapons, and turning aside Soviet calls for additional high-level meetings (other than a Washington summit). END SUMMARY.

Impatience with Arms Control

In recent public statements, Gorbachev has shown a marked impatience with—and perhaps even a contempt for—the Geneva arms control talks. He has disparaged the “tasteless stew” allegedly cooked up in Geneva. He has condemned the complexity and detail of the NST talks and questioned the “need for all sorts of levels, sub-levels and all sorts of calculations.” In an interview with Indian journalists, he referred to the Geneva talks as “spoiled,” but then corrected himself, characterizing them as “not spoiled, but at any rate rendered ineffective.”

Gorbachev’s criticisms grow out of what he sees as intransigent U.S. positions at Geneva; but they are also consistent with a broader pattern of impatience with “traditional” arms control. The Soviet leader appears neither interested in nor informed about the kinds of protracted negotiations that were a major element of Soviet foreign policy under Brezhnev. It is noteworthy, for example, that his January 15 plan² for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons made no reference to SALT. Also striking is the fact that Gorbachev gave a major speech in July in the city of Vladivostok,³ but made no mention of the 1974 Vladivostok Accord. In the conventional field, Gorbachev has disparaged MBFR and wants to move the whole question of conventional arms reductions to the more political CSCE forum.

While disparaging traditional arms control, Gorbachev is attracted to sweeping, 1950s-style disarmament proposals. His seeming obsession with the testing issue and his unilateral moratorium are reminiscent of the Khrushchev era, as is the January 15 plan. This attraction for Khrushchev-rather than Brezhnev-era approaches to disarmament should not be altogether surprising. Gorbachev has criticized many aspects of Brezhnev’s domestic policy and his own domestic style bears similarities to Khrushchev’s free-wheeling populism. Gorbachev’s formative years as a politician were in the 1950s, and it is not inconceivable that he is in part patterning himself, consciously or unconsciously, on Khrushchev.

Reshaping NST from Without

Gorbachev’s impatience with traditional arms control is compounded by a tactical dilemma that he inherited from his predecessors. Ever since the 1979 NATO dual track decision, the Soviets have been frustrated at the West’s ability to use arms control as a means of maintaining public and parliamentary support for new weapons programs.

At Geneva, Gorbachev is afraid of being trapped in a negotiation that forces him to discuss the U.S. rather than the Soviet arms control agenda. In the Defense and Space Talks (DST), the Soviets are involved in a discussion of SDI, even though they previously claimed that the program was illegal and would undermine the basis for any negotiation. In START, they are talking deep cuts, even though they spurned previous U.S. deep-cut proposals. In the INF talks, they are discussing SS–20–GLCM/Pershing II trade-offs, even though they previously had claimed that the NATO deployments had destroyed the basis for negotiation. Moreover, the mere existence of three negotiating forums tends to de-link issues and create pressures for separate agreements, even though the Soviets would prefer a package deal that allows them to hold progress in INF and START hostage to U.S. movement on SDI.

Gorbachev knows it would be foolish to walk out of the talks and thus repeat the mistake of December 1983. But he does not want to remain trapped in a set of talks that the United States is using as a “cover” for programs such as SDI. To get off the horns of this dilemma, he needs to bring pressure on us from outside the NST negotiating forum, not only to wring particular concessions from us, but also to publicize his version of what NST should be about. He wants to stress that NST should curtail SDI, not legitimize it; that it should eliminate INF from Europe, not legitimize the NATO deployments; and that deep cuts in offensive weapons should contribute to the “new” Soviet plan for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and not fulfill the “old” U.S. demand that the Soviets make unilateral cuts in their heavy missiles.

Gorbachev has followed two approaches in his efforts to bring pressure on us from outside the negotiations. First, he has launched highly publicized disarmament spectaculars such as his January 15 plan and his testing moratorium. Second, he has tried to appeal directly to President Reagan to encourage him to affirm a new arms control “mandate” that focuses more on the Soviet than the U.S. arms control agenda. His call for a summit on testing, if possible to be held in Hiroshima, was the most blatant and propagandistic instance of Gorbachev attempting to use summitry to sidestep the NST negotiations.

The Importance of High-level Contact

Although Gorbachev has argued that he and the President need to intervene in the negotiations to “speed them up,” the Soviet leader does not appear to have regarded either summit as an opportunity to “split the difference” or to compromise on particular issues on which the negotiators are deadlocked at Geneva. Gorbachev’s behavior at both summits was in fact rather different from that of Brezhnev at the Moscow 1972 or the Vladivostok 1974 summits.

Gorbachev did not come to Reykjavik prepared to build on what appeared to be the promising results of the Washington expert talks. Rather, he used the meeting to introduce, without warning, a sweeping new package that bore only a tangential relationship to what the Soviets had on the table in Geneva. When the President countered with the contents of his July 25 letter,⁴ Gorbachev strayed even further from NST, and in effect tried to get the U.S. to sign on to his January 15 plan.

At both meetings, Gorbachev tried to use direct contact with the President not to eliminate differences which we hoped had already been narrowed, but rather to make sweeping end runs around the NST discussions. At Geneva, Gorbachev attached great significance to the President’s signing a joint communique acknowledging that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Soviet officials then tried to portray this statement as a new, high-level “mandate” calling for new approaches to arms control and world security, and above all for an abandonment of SDI, which to his mind implies an effort to “win” a nuclear war.

Subsequently, Gorbachev portrayed his utopian January 15 plan as a response to the Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva “mandate.” At Reykjavik, Gorbachev again tried to bypass Geneva and to impose his own agenda—complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, a ban on testing, and a “package” approach that re-links issues previously delinked—on the arms control process.

Why Gorbachev Doesn’t Want an Agreement Now

Gorbachev probably feels that he has made some progress with his unilateral proposals and his one-on-one meetings with the President. He has, for example, succeeded in making testing a major element of the U.S.-Soviet arms control agenda—co-equal, in a sense, to the three topics under discussion at Geneva.

But Gorbachev has not been able to force us to make the far-reaching concessions that he has claimed are necessary for an arms control agreement. He therefore must decide between waiting us out for a time, or making major concessions of his own. For now he probably believes that he can afford to wait. Although he has had a number of setbacks in the last year (e.g., Chernobyl), he believes that his own position has strengthened. Soviet GNP growth for 1986 is headed for 3½ percent, substantially better than in recent years. Equally important, the political situation now looks more favorable from a Soviet perspective. Shevardnadze has said that the November 1986 U.S. elections were a referendum on SDI. While such remarks are self-serving, the Soviet leaders may believe that political and budgetary pressures will force a slowdown in SDI.

Moreover, while the incentives for moving toward arms control are modest, the costs of not concluding an agreement are small. Most new Soviet programs would go forward, albeit at a slower rate, and large savings would not result. An agreement to forgo SDI deployments for a decade would have negligible benefits for the Soviets, since they would still have to conduct a research program and hedge against the possibility—which we would insist remain open—that we would go forward with a deployed system after 10 years.

What Our Response Should Be

Faced with this situation, we need to adopt a strategy that, without foreclosing the possibility of an arms control agreement, shifts blame to the Soviets for the failure to make progress at Geneva. To accomplish these goals, we must first work to stress the centrality of the Geneva forum, even as Gorbachev strives to circumvent it. We should concentrate our efforts on developing a modest, sustainable arms control position that can be aired at Geneva this spring and, if rejected by the Soviets, left on the table for months and perhaps years. In formulating this position, we should stress our goal of enhanced strategic stability. Politically, we should work to maximize alliance cohesion while putting the Soviets on the defensive. (The elements of such a position are outlined in S/P’s memo to you of December 8; a copy is attached.)

Second, we should resist Soviet overtures, should they begin again, for summit meetings to “cut through the impasse” at Geneva. Based on the experience of the last two summits, we can conclude that Gorbachev would not use such a meeting to make key concessions on deadlocked issues, but rather as a platform to promote his own interpretation of the NST mandate as a way of putting pressure on us. To fend off Gorbachev’s pressures for additional high-level interventions, we should hold the Soviets to their pledge, made at Geneva in 1985, to come to Washington for a summit dealing with all the issues, irrespective of prospects for an arms control agreement.

Attachment

Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz⁵

Washington, December 8, 1986

SUBJECT

• Planning Ahead in NST

SUMMARY. We don’t know whether the Soviets’ unconstructive NST behavior since Reykjavik is only a temporary pressure tactic or an indication that they have now essentially written off the possibility of agreement during this Administration. In these circumstances, we should adopt an NST negotiating posture that tests Soviet willingness to conclude an agreement meeting our requirements and, at the same time, puts us in a more advantageous, less vulnerable position to promote alliance interests and strengthen domestic support for U.S. defense programs in the event that no agreement is reached in the next two years.

Specifically, while continuing to press for deep and stabilizing reductions in offensive arms and to protect a vigorous program of SDI experimentation, we should:

—pull back from the requirement that all ballistic missiles be eliminated in 10 years as a condition for a 10-year ABM non-withdrawal pledge;

—offer to negotiate a boundary between permitted and prohibited ABM activities, being prepared eventually to accept a limit somewhat less permissive than the “broad” interpretation; and

—drop our proposed ban on mobile ICBMs. END SUMMARY

Recent Soviet NST behavior. Soviet post-Reykjavik behavior has been worse than might have been expected. Not only have they done the predictable thing of blaming the President’s commitment to SDI for the failure to achieve agreement; they also treaded water in Vienna, hardened positions in Geneva, reinstated troublesome linkages, and insisted that there be no turning back from the alleged agreement to ban all strategic nuclear arms by 1996 (knowing full well that such insistence would guarantee a stalemate).

We cannot be sure whether the Soviets are interested in reaching agreement on terms acceptable to us and are simply trying to induce U.S. flexibility through pressure tactics or, alternatively, whether they have now concluded that an agreement meeting their requirements (especially on SDI) is unlikely and are therefore trying to use NST to attempt to undermine support for U.S. defense programs and sow discord among our allies.

Between these two alternatives is the possibility that the Soviet leadership has simply not made up its mind—that it is waiting to see the impact of certain developments (e.g., fallout from the Iran affair, Democratic control of the Senate, the Soviet anti-SDI propaganda campaign) before determining whether its interests are better served with an agreement or without one.

Regaining the initiative. Over the past year, we have primarily been in a reactive posture in NST. With the Soviets showing eagerness and regularly altering their positions, this has worked to our advantage. But the time may have come when our interests would be best served by taking the initiative.

—We can no longer count on the Soviets to take the lead. In addition to the possibility that they are in a “wait and see” mode, Gorbachev may be feeling pressure to hold back from those who believe he has already made more than enough concessions.

—By the late spring or summer of 1987, key defense programs—especially SDI—may come under strong attack from the Democratic Congress. We should move while our negotiating leverage is largely intact.

—Gorbachev has recently gotten much of the credit internationally for shaping the content and pace of NST. Especially at a time when questions will inevitably be raised about the Administration’s ability to act decisively, there would be value, both for the negotiations themselves and for our standing worldwide, in recapturing the initiative in NST.

—The electoral clock is ticking down to 1988. Unless the basic elements of a deal are put in place by the spring of 1987 (only five or six months away), there is little prospect of finalizing and ratifying agreements under this Administration.

—Unless modified relatively soon, certain elements of our current NST position (eliminating all ballistic missiles, protecting the “broad” ABM interpretation, banning mobile ICBMS) could become liabilities in terms of alliance relations and domestic support for U.S. defense programs.

Modifying the U.S. Position. We should consider modifications in our NST position that would not only test Soviet willingness to conclude an agreement acceptable to us, but would also place us in a better position to sustain our alliance and defense interests in case no agreement is reached.

—Elimination of ballistic missiles. Our proposal to phase out ballistic missiles by 1996 has virtually no chance of being accepted by the Soviets. Moreover, it has caused acute concern among our allies. For the time being, we have dealt with allied concerns by saying we would give priority to 50 percent reductions. But as long as we link a 10-year ABM non-withdrawal pledge to a 10-year phase out of ballistic missiles (and as long as the Soviets condition any START agreement on resolution of the SDI issue), 50 percent cuts will not be achievable. Key alliance partners will continue to view the 10-year elimination of ballistic missiles as an integral part of our proposal, and this will remain an irritant in our relations with them.

We should maintain the goal of eliminating ballistic missiles as a stabilizing step in the process of achieving a less-nuclear world. But we can afford to proceed toward that goal more gradually, at a pace with which our allies (and our own military) would be more comfortable. Instead of requiring the elimination of ballistic missiles in 10 years, we should propose either stretching out the 50 percent reductions over a 10-year period or maintaining the five-year schedule for 50 percent reductions and obligating the two sides to pursue negotiations during those five years on follow-on reductions which, if agreed upon, would be carried out in the second five-year period. The 10-year ABM non-withdrawal commitment would be retained under either alternative.

It may be argued that, if we withdraw the 10-year elimination of ballistic missiles, we should either scale back the ABM commitment to five years (to match the 50 percent reduction schedule) or propose new levels of reductions (e.g., 80 percent cuts) to be achieved in 10 years while retaining the 10-year ABM commitment. But both of these approaches would be harmful to the negotiations:

• Shortening the ABM commitment would be seen by the Soviets as backtracking on the central U.S. concession made at Reykjavik. Moreover, as long as the agreement is not too restrictive on permitted SDI activities, we could live with a 10-year non-withdrawal commitment without jeopardizing essential SDI objectives.

• Agreement now on reductions significantly deeper than 50 percent by 1996 is probably not negotiable and, in any event, is not necessary to achieve our stability objectives. Just because the Soviets proposed eliminating nuclear weapons by 1996 doesn’t mean they can accept a low number by then. With the prospect of post-1996 SDI deployments, the Soviets will resist going much below 6000 by 1996. Regarding stability, if the Soviets agree to our proposed sublimits and if we go forward with mobile ICBMs, 50 percent reductions would be sufficient to permit us to deploy survivable strategic forces. Of course, even deeper cuts would be better, but not essential.

—Broad interpretation. There is little likelihood the Soviets will accept the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Moreover, seeking in an agreement to protect all of the SDI activities permitted by the broad interpretation could add significantly to SDI’s difficulties on the Hill, since many there do not accept its legality and believe it impedes agreement with the Soviets. Sam Nunn, in particular, has voiced strong objections to the broad interpretation, and he might well persuade the Congress to impose a ban on U.S. SDI activities inconsistent with the “narrow” interpretation. Indeed, as long as our position on permitted ABM activities is viewed as the cause of the impasse in Geneva, SDI funding levels (even for activities consistent with the narrow interpretation) will be seriously jeopardized.

While reaffirming the legality of the broad interpretation of the 1972 Treaty, we should indicate to the Soviets our willingness to negotiate a new boundary between permitted and prohibited ABM activities that would, in effect, supersede the original one. Tactically, we might not wish to move off the broad interpretation right away. Eventually, however, we should be prepared to accept a compromise between the broad and narrow interpretations. Several options are available. One would be to permit the testing of ABM components based on new physical principles that function as sensors but not those that function as kill mechanisms. In recent discussions with RAND analysts, Roald Sagdeev, head of the Soviet Space Research Institute, suggested the idea of basing restrictions on this distinction between sensors and kill mechanisms.

Before discussing any new boundary with the Soviets, we would need to study carefully how various constraint options would affect the SDI program. Currently, State lacks much of the information required to carry out such a study—and OSD is not eager to make it available. We should therefore try to work directly with the SDIO managers to develop an approach that could facilitate an NST agreement without unduly constraining the program.

An important reason for modifying our position would be to improve the prospects for SDI funding on the Hill. Accordingly, before presenting any new position to the Soviets, we should consult with key Congressional figures, explain our plans to negotiate a compromise, and try to secure a commitment from them not to undercut our efforts with damaging funding cuts or legislated restrictions.

Any agreement less permissive than the broad interpretation is likely to involve adjustments in the structure and schedule of the SDI program beyond 1991. Some experiments presumably could not be conducted as cost-effectively as originally planned, and target dates for accomplishing certain research goals would probably have to slip. However, in deciding whether to accept such adjustments, several factors should be considered:

• It is essential that the decision on deploying SDI be taken on scientifically-valid grounds, not that it be taken by any particular date. Indeed, some scientists involved in the program have suggested that proceeding at a more deliberate pace would permit a more thorough and scientifically-valid consideration of alternatives.

• Without an agreement bounding and reducing Soviet ballistic missiles capabilities, the technical challenges facing SDI would be substantially greater.

• Unless we are viewed as reasonably flexible in seeking agreement with the Soviets, the SDI program could be in serious trouble. An agreement would not, of course, stop all Congressional opposition to SDI. But an agreement would, in effect, give a legal seal of approval to all activities it permitted (including those outside the narrow interpretation), and this could make a significant difference in support and funding for SDI.

—Mobile ICBMs. The Soviets will continue to oppose a ban on mobile ICBMs. Moreover, the Administration’s soon-to-be-finalized ICBM report will almost certainly call for mobile basing for both Midgetman and the 50 additional MX. If at the same time we continue in NST to propose a ban on mobile ICBMS, those on the Hill who would welcome a pretext to cut back on our ICBM programs could cite the fact that our own negotiating position would not allow us to proceed with our preferred deployment plans. Congressional supporters of Midgetman, such as Les Aspin, could well hold funding for MX hostage to a withdrawal of our proposed mobile ban.

To avoid adversely affecting our own ICBM modernization plans and to facilitate progress in NST, we should agree to permit mobile ICBMs in START, although we should seek to limit their numbers and insist on rigorous verification measures.

Timing. We should seek USG approval for taking the steps outlined here as early as possible in NST Round VII, which begins in mid-January. We will therefore need to make a major effort internally over the next month or two to develop a modified position on permitted ABM activities. Unless we move early next year to break the current impasse, we could soon find our hands tied by Congressional pressures and the electoral calendar; and prospects for this Administration completing an agreement would then become remote. And if the Soviets are unprepared to accept reasonable compromises, we are better off learning that fact sooner rather than later.

1. Source: Department of State, Memoranda/Correspondence From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron—December 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Van Oudenaren; cleared by Ledsky.
2. See Document 127.
3. Reference is to Gorbachev’s July 28, 1986, speech in Vladivostok, in which he called for a drawdown of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and better relations with Asian nations. (Philip Taubman, “Soviet Announces Decision to Trim Its Afghan Force,” New York Times, July 29, 1986, p. A1)
4. See Document 138.
5. Secret. Drafted by Einhorn.