175. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1

11159. Subject: Need for START and INF draft treaties

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. We strongly recommend that Washington complete work on a draft INF treaty for tabling during the next NST round in Geneva and a draft START treaty.

3. There are several reasons for this recommendation. First, tabling these treaties would give the U.S. the high ground in the Geneva talks. As the Soviets have revealed again, in their approach to the special NST meeting this week and in their high-level barnstorming around Europe, their primary objective is to portray SDI as the sole obstacle to nuclear arms reductions and the U.S. as retreating from the results of Reykjavik. Tabling draft INF and START treaties in Geneva would provide convincing evidence that it is the U.S., not the Soviet Union, which is attempting to translate the results of Reykjavik into actual [Page 777] accords. Washington should also bear in mind that the Soviets may try to preempt us by early tabling of their own draft, perhaps a single document covering all three areas designed to tighten linkage.

4. Second, as administration spokesmen have now said publicly, we are running out of time. These treaties, if they are to be sound, durable and ratifiable—and effective in helping to avoid future disputes over compliance—must be carefully negotiated in Geneva. This will take time, especially to work out the modalities for effective verification. It is hard to imagine, for example, that the draft INF treaty under preparation, especially given its multiple verification annexes, could take any less than a year to negotiate in Geneva even if the Soviets engaged actively. The longer we wait to table our verification proposals, the more we will play into the customary Soviet tactic of trying to delay discussion of verification until the end and dealing with verification measures only in vague generalities. The longer we wait to table our treaties, given the new public commentary on the timing question, the less we will be seen as negotiating credibly.

5. Finally, we need to pin the Soviets down. Since the opening of NST in March 1985, the Soviets have zigged and zagged and, as the December 2–5 meeting just illustrated, may now be trying either to slip away from some of their Reykjavik commitments or to sell them twice. A draft treaty would be a highly useful negotiating tool in explaining precisely what the U.S. envisages in an agreement and in pressuring the Soviets to move from abstract principles to concrete provisions.

6. The Soviets are the demandeur in the D&S area, and only if they move toward accepting the framework proposed by the President at Reykjavik do we see any value in tabling a D&S treaty. It will, however, be useful to table a draft START treaty before a draft D&S treaty, thus, reinforcing the U.S. position that a D&S agreement shall not enter into force before the entry into force of a START agreement. By this same logic, if there is to be any hope of achieving a D&S agreement by 1988 reflecting the President’s concept of the offense-defense relationship, the U.S. needs to get a draft START agreement on the table by the spring of 1987.

Kampelman
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N860011–0350. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.