173. Memorandum From Edward Ifft of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs (Holmes)1

SUBJECT

  • Thoughts on NST Round VI

In view of the fact that you have just received the Delegation’s End-of-Round Assessment2 and the analysis of the Soviets’ November 7 START proposal,3 both of which were prepared by Jerry Stacy and myself, this memo can be rather brief and taken as a supplement to these other documents.

Progress in Round VI

Although there was understandable disappointment after Reykjavik and a very gloomy report from Vienna, in fact, considerable progress was made in START during the past two months (although [Page 774] perhaps our Delegation should not claim all of the credit for this!). Agreement on the 1600 and 6000 aggregates, removal of the FBS issue from START, resolution of the issue of gravity bombs and SRAMs and some progress on the thorny SLCM problem are remarkable achievements on issues that had plagued us since 1982. That said, the rest of this memo will deal with remaining problems.

Linkage

The Delegation continues to fight bravely for a separate START agreement with no linkage to the ABM Treaty. While we would obviously welcome such an agreement, it is clear that a truly separate START agreement is not (and never has been) in the cards. My interpretation of the state of play is that we are clearly well into the long-predicted “grand bargain.” The “reverse linkage” between defense and offense created by the October 28 D&S proposal makes this even clearer. While INF perhaps can be spared this linkage, we should stop wasting our energy on advocating a “separate” START agreement—continuing to do so might actually confuse matters. There is no possibility of deep reductions in START without some resolution of the D&S problems, but this need not be a cause for despair. There is, however, a major new linkage threat to the 50-percent reductions we seek. This is the linkage between these reductions and the second five-year reductions. I believe a solution can be found to the ABM Treaty issue, but if 50-percent reductions become contingent upon 100-percent reductions (at least in ballistic missiles), the whole enterprise may well collapse. Because the issues involved in the ten-year reductions are so profound, and involve problems not just with the Soviets, but with the Allies, we must not let these interfere with the 50-percent reductions which are now within reach. The strategy for achieving this, sent in by all three Negotiating Groups (NST–VI–009, Geneva 10019, October 31, 1986),4 is a good beginning to dealing with the problem. Fortunately, the Soviets said, in their November 7 proposal, that the details of the later reductions need not be agreed until the end of 1991, after 50-percent reductions will have been negotiated and completed.

The Second Five Years

We must get our thinking clear on this before returning to Geneva. The division of jurisdiction between START and D&S is a good place to start. While it would be attractive for START to keep the issue in D&S, I doubt that this is possible. Probably a host of difficult questions that trouble us in Geneva are already being worked on in the Depart[Page 775]ment. Chief among these would be the distinction between offensive and defensive ballistic missiles (and the ready conversion of one into the other) and the problem of third country ballistic missiles. A more fundamental problem is the fact that the Soviets will not agree to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles while bombers and cruise missiles run almost free. We have no guidance on what happens to these systems during the second five years. An enormous build up to 1600 heavy bombers and 6000 ALCMs would not be acceptable to either the Soviets or public opinion. The Soviets have essentially said that they will bring FBS back into START if our current position for 1996 stands, which would be a disaster. We certainly cannot accept the Soviet version of 1996, but we need to consider what sort of compromise down the road for the 1992–1996 period might make sense. It should almost certainly consist of further deep reductions in ballistic missiles (but not to zero), along with reductions in bombers and cruise missiles below the 1991 limits.

Sublimits

The Soviets have resisted weapons sublimits since Reykjavik, but their case is weak. We should hold firm on sublimits on ballistic missile warheads and ICBM warheads. The 1650 sublimit, however, should be reexamined. The Soviet offer to reduce heavy ICBMs by half (and therefore heavy ICBM warheads by half) opens up some opportunities. If we accept the offer, it would go a long way toward meeting our demands for both throw-weight reductions and codification of these reductions. Our interest regarding mobile ICBMs would still be protected. If they are banned by the final agreement, no further change in our position would be required. If we decide to allow some deployment of mobile ICBMs, we could introduce a new sublimit on such systems, in addition to insisting upon effective verification provisions related to mobiles. As far as the problem of fixed ICBMs with more than six warheads is concerned, I believe this problem is essentially now taken care of by the agreed ratio of 6000 warheads to 1600 SNDVs, which encourages both sides to deploy lower fractionation systems. Thus, all the concerns represented by the 1650 sublimit would be taken care of and it could be dropped.

Treaty and Basic Elements

Our instructions, and most of the discussions in Geneva, talk about treaties. We probably need to revive the dormant draft START Treaty and use it as a vehicle to resolve a number of issues that have been dangling for years. However, if we intend to sign a document at a Summit in either Washington or Moscow in 1987, it will not be a Treaty but some kind of Basic Elements. The documents exchanged at Reykjavik, and the Soviet draft tabled in Vienna, are of this character. [Page 776] However, the subject of Basic Elements has been curiously absent from NST discussions since the Soviets seemed to lose interest in their “model” last summer. The form of the document we seek to sign in 1987 and the role of the NST Delegation (as distinct from the Experts or other channels) in negotiating it, should be clarified.

  1. Source: Department of State, Lot 06D436, Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Subject Files, 1983–2005, Box 9, NST/START Round VI Oct. 86. Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Hawes, Burns, Holmes, Reddy, and Suchan. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
  2. See Document 171.
  3. See Document 172.
  4. Telegram 10019 from Geneva, October 31, is in Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N860010–0384.