172. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1

10396. Subject: START—Preliminary analysis of Soviet November 7 START Proposals.

1. This is NST/START-VI-028. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: The November 7 Soviet START proposals largely confirm our understanding of the agreements reached at Reykjavik on reductions in strategic offensive arms. The one exception appears to be SLCMs where the Soviet proposals to limit deployments outside the aggregates are based on their previous proposals of June 11 and do not distinguish between conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed SLCMs. The Soviet November 7 proposals do not contain sublimits in the warhead aggregate as they have previously proposed. However, they do codify their Reykjavik commitment to reduce significantly heavy missiles by establishing a sublimit (apparently on launchers) on these systems at 50-percent of their current deployment level. While confirming the counting rule agreed at Reykjavik on gravity bombs and SRAMs, the Soviets also proposed a rule for counting ALCMs. This rule would count ALCMs on heavy bombers based on a bomber’s capability to carry ALCMs, i.e., the number of “weapons stations”, not actual loadings or maximum potential. The new Soviet proposal on modernization appears to be more liberal than previously proposed constraints. It would permit new and modernized types up until the end of 1991. New kinds of systems would be banned during both stages of reductions, and new and modernized types would be prohibited after 1991. The Soviet’s linkage of strategic offensive arms reductions to the strengthening of the ABM treaty is as strong as ever, but their new proposal now also links the START negotiations to the commencement of talks on the cessation of nuclear testing and an INF agreement. On the other hand, the Soviet proposal appears to allow for greater independence between the negotiation of reductions in the first five-year stage and the second five-year stage than they had been signaling since we tabled our new proposals in Defense and Space on October 28. End summary.

3. This cable provides the START Negotiating Group’s analysis of the Soviet November 7 proposals on strategic offensive arms. It is based [Page 769] on the text of the proposals handed over to the U.S. at Friday’s joint plenary and additional information gleaned from the START Negotiating Group meeting on November 11. We have not had the opportunity to fully explore all aspects of the November 7 proposals in the limited time before the end of Round VI and this should thus be considered a preliminary analysis.

4. The Soviet November 7 proposals, as well as the document on “key provisions” handed over by the Soviets in Vienna, which records their interpretation of what was agreed at Reykjavik, have now confirmed our understanding of most of the major elements of a START agreement agreed to in Iceland. These include equal levels of 1600 SNDVs and 6000 warheads and the counting rule for gravity bombs and SRAMs. Although the “key provisions” document confirms the language on SLCMs agreed to in Reykjavik, the specific Soviet proposals made on November 7 do not distinguish between nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed SLCMs.

5. Absence of sublimits: Although sublimits were not agreed to at Reykjavik, the Soviet proposal is notable for the absence of sublimits in the warhead aggregate, which they had previously offered in both their 30 and 50-percent reduction proposals. Their proposal instead explicitly provides that each side will have full freedom to determine the proportions of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers in their force structure with the exception of a sublimit on heavy missiles.

6. Heavy missile sublimit: The November 7 proposals give substance to the Soviet Union’s commitment made in Reykjavik to reduce significantly their number of heavy missiles. The Soviet proposal would establish a sublimit on heavy missiles (apparently launchers) at a level representing a 50-percent reduction in the current force. Fifty percent of the Soviet SS-18 force represents approximately 1.2 mkg. in throw-weight. Our preliminary estimates are that, without any other sublimits, the resulting Soviet force under the 1600 SNDV and 6000 warhead limits would have on the order of 3 mkg of throw-weight in 1991. In the longer term, the throw-weight level of the Soviet force will depend on the effect of modernization. The new Soviet proposals would now permit both new types of ballistic missiles, and the modernization of existing types, through 1991.

7. Verification: The Soviet proposals largely incorporate in the START context the language on verification agreed to in Reykjavik in conjunction with limitations on INF systems. However, while the Soviet proposal provides for agreed dismantlement and destruction procedures, it makes no mention of on-site inspection in this context as was contained in the Reykjavik language. The reason for this exclusion is not clear. In applying the other verification language to START, the Soviet proposal does make clear for the first time that on-site inspection [Page 770] would be relevant to the monitoring of remaining ballistic missiles, aircraft and related facilities.

8. SLCMs: The “key provisions” document handed over by the Soviets in Vienna includes the language on nuclear-armed SLCMs that was agreed in Iceland. It states that a mutually acceptable solution will be found to limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. This language is of significance to us in that it explicitly avoided the mention of any constraints on long-range, conventionally-armed SLCMs which will make up the vast majority of our planned long-range SLCM deployments. The Soviet proposals of November 7, however, do not distinguish between nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed SLCMs. Post-plenary conversations on November 11 made clear that this is not an oversight. SLCMs to be limited are defined only by a range threshold. Soviet delegates argued that their proposal is consistent with Reykjavik and Vienna because it is impossible to differentiate between nuclear and conventionally-armed SLCMs and that, consequently, limiting all such systems is the only means of satisfactorily constraining long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. The specific Soviet proposals are based on their June 11 SLCM proposals with the exception that a maximum loading counting rule has now been provided. In addition, the Soviet proposals formalize the offer, first made on September 24, to limit SLCMs outside of the central SNDV and weapon aggregates.

9. The Soviet proposals appear to be formulated in a manner consistent with our estimates of their plans for long-range (defined as over 600 km. in range) SLCM deployments, i.e., deployments of only nuclear-armed variants on a limited number of types of dedicated submarine platforms. Banning long-range SLCM deployments on surface ships, and utilizing a maximum loading counting rule, however, would significantly impact on planned U.S. programs which emphasize limited long-range SLCM deployments on a wide variety of multi-mission platforms, including both surface ships and submarines. Roughly two-thirds of U.S. long-range SLCM deployments are planned for surface ships. Without further clarification of the Soviet proposal, including knowledge of the number of long-range SLCMs that would be permitted, it is difficult to assess the total impact of the maximum capability counting rule. However, this rule would effectively capture all long-range SLCMs, both nuclear and conventional. Also, depending on both the number of long-range SLCMs permitted and how maximum capability is determined, the possibility exists that this counting rule would significantly overcount actual U.S. SLCM deployments in view of the fact that the SSNs on which we plan to deploy long-range SLCMs are multi-purpose platforms and will carry a variety of weapons in addition to SLCMs. This counting rule could thus indirectly limit the number of U.S. long-range SLCM platforms to a level well below [Page 771] that planned, a problem not unlike that we face with regard to ALCM counting.

10. The Soviet proposal provides for a limit on long-range SLCMs to “an agreed level for each side.” Interestingly absent from the Soviet formulation is the word “equal” perhaps implying that different levels could be negotiated. Informally, several Soviet delegates stated that the agreed level would be the same for both sides, although they did not preclude other options. The Soviet proposal apparently does not provide for a separate limit on the total number of SLCM submarines other than that which would derive from the interaction of the counting rule and the agreed total SLCM limit. The criteria for determining the maximum loadings of submarines would be the subject of negotiation.

11. ALCM/ballistic missile RV counting rules: The Soviet proposal states that for a heavy bomber carrying long-range cruise missiles, the number of cruise missiles shall be counted for which that bomber “has been equipped.” One Soviet delegate in post-plenary conversations stated that this rule refers to the number of “weapon stations” on a bomber, not to the actual weapons load or to a bomber’s maximum potential capability. Missing from the November 7 formulation was the concept of a bomber type rule. When questioned on this, Soviet delegates stated that the November 7 language is simply shorthand, and that their previous position which did refer to types of bombers has not changed. Similarly, the November 7 formulation on counting ballistic missile RVs apparently represents no change from the previous Soviet position even though simulated releases are not specifically mentioned.

12. Reduction schedule and systems covered: The Soviet proposal calls for the total elimination of strategic offensive arms in two stages over a period of ten years, i.e., by the end of 1996. (Note: The Soviets appear to be using our understanding of the term strategic. The text of their proposal lists strategic offensive arms as ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.) The Soviet proposal does, however, appear to provide for some independence in the negotiation of the two stages of reduction. Under the Soviet proposal, agreement on procedures for, and the timing of, the elimination of the remaining 50-percent of strategic offensive arms on both sides must be reached by 1991, or the end of the first five-year reduction period. In the wake of our October 28 proposals in Defense and Space, the Soviets had been emphasizing here the requirement to agree on what would happen in the second five years before agreeing to 50-percent reductions in the first five years. The formulation of their new proposal could make it easier for us to move the focus back to reaching agreement on 50-percent reductions in the first five years.

13. The new proposal also appears to clarify the Soviet position on the elimination of all strategic nuclear weapons and all nuclear [Page 772] weapons, and the time frame for these steps. Under the proposal, all strategic offensive arms would be eliminated in ten years by 1996. The Soviet proposal also calls for agreement by 1991 on procedures and timing for the elimination of U.S. and Soviet nuclear “operational-tactical” systems but does not specify a precise time frame for their destruction. Systems of even shorter range (e.g., nuclear artillery) are not addressed at all. However, the preambular language to the Soviet proposals does continue to state as a goal Gorbachev’s January 15 proposal for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

14. Modernization: The Soviet proposals on modernization add a few new wrinkles to their prior approach. They call for both sides not to develop, test, or deploy new “kinds” of systems in both stages of reduction and, beginning January 1992, the same prohibitions would apply to new “types” of strategic offensive arms. Qualitative improvement of existing strategic offensive arms would also be prohibited beginning in January 1992. The Soviets have previously referred to ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers as “kinds” of arms. The prohibition on new “kinds” of arms may be meant as a generic limitation to replace previously proposed Soviet bans on ASBMs, MARVs, sea-bed based ballistic missile systems, etc. It may also be aimed at weapons which could have strategic offensive capabilities but be based on other physical principles. In post-plenary conversations November 11, the Soviets basically confirmed this impression and cited ASBMs and the exotic systems banned in SALT II as examples of new “kinds” of systems.

15. The new Soviet proposal, for the first time in NST, gives a firm effective date for their proposed modernization limits. However, the proposal is vague as to what stage of system development serves as the criterion for defining a new type in 1992. Previous Soviet proposals, for example, used a “first tested after” formulation. Thus, while the new Soviet proposals appear to represent a liberalization of their previously tabled modernization constraints, the impact on planned U.S. strategic modernization programs is not totally clear. Both the D–5 and ATB will have been tested by 1992, and, at least in the case of the D–5 operationally deployed by that time. On the other hand, the end of 1991 cutoff date would fall after the expected IOCs of virtually all the new Soviet systems we see on the horizon including the follow-ons to the SS–18, SS–X–24, SS–25, SS–N–23 and SS–N–20.

16. Linkage to nuclear testing: Provisions on nuclear testing were a part of the proposals made by Gorbachev at Reykjavik which he has characterized as a “package.” While the linkage of strategic offensive arms reductions to measures strengthening the ABM Treaty remains clear, the new Soviet proposal imposes a new linkage between START and nuclear testing, stating that the initiation of negotiations on an agreement completely banning nuclear tests is an “indispensable condi[Page 773]tion” for the strategic arms reduction “process”. The exact nature of the linkage, however, is ambiguous in a number of respects. For instance, it is not clear whether the U.S. must agree in principle to a comprehensive test ban or whether negotiations on nuclear testing could begin without preconditions. Nor is it yet totally clear what is meant by the phrase “strategic arms reduction process”, i.e., whether this means that any progress in START is linked, or only that a negotiated START agreement could not enter into force, until this condition is met. In post-plenary conversations several Soviet delegates strongly implied that only the entry into force of a START agreement is linked to the nuclear testing condition.

Minimize considered.

Kampelman
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860863–0801. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.