Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

162. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 12, 1986, 10 a.m.–1:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• US Side

  • The President
  • Secretary Shultz
  • Mr. Parris
  • Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• Soviet Side

  • The General Secretary
  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • Mr. Uspenskiy
  • Mr. Paleschenky (Interpreter)

Gorbachev opened the discussion with a quip: the Bible said that first had come the first day, then the second, etc. The two leaders were now on their second day; there was still a long way before the seventh. The President said that the two should be resting. Gorbachev agreed, as it was Sunday.

Gorbachev suggested that the session begin with a review of the progress achieved by the two groups which had met throughout the night before on arms control and non-arms control issues. After Gorbachev declined the opportunity to speak first, the President gave his assessment.

The President said that, with a few exceptions, he was disappointed with what had been achieved by the arms control group. With respect to START, the President understood that the sides were able to come to substantial agreement—with give and take on both sides. Of course, there had been substantial work in this area, which had developed a sizeable amount of common ground. It was the President’s understanding that the working group had been able to agree on a formulation for the outlines of a 50% reduction of strategic arsenals that should move the negotiations substantially ahead. Both sides should be proud of this achievement.

On INF, the President understood that the sides had discussed a number of issues, including SRINF, the duration of an interim agreement, and verification, and that they had come to the conclusion that these issues could be handled in negotiations. But the group had not been able to solve the issue of reductions of LRINF missiles in Asia. The last issue had been discussed at great length. The question was now fairly simple, not technical at all. We had made clear since the time of our initial zero-zero proposal—a proposal to eliminate all of the class of LRINF missiles, worldwide—that we required a global agreement. This was thus not a new issue for us. It was an issue that we could no longer ignore if we were to make progress. The President said he could not and would not accept a situation in which sizeable reductions in Europe, even to zero, were not matched by proportional reductions in Asia. The Soviets knew the reasons for this—the mobility of the SS–20 and the impact such a shift in the balance of SS–20’s to Asia would have on our Asian allies. These were not new arguments. However, they were real concerns to the President. Our allies in both Europe and Asia fully supported this position. Our allies in both Europe and Asia fully supported this position, in fact they insisted upon it for their own security.

The President reminded Gorbachev that, in his most recent letter, Gorbachev had written that, with regard to Soviet systems in Asia, “a mutually acceptable formula can be found and I am ready to propose one, provided there is a certainty that a willingness can be found to resolve the issue of medium range missiles in Europe does exist.”² This issue, the President continued, must be dealt with on a global basis. The President had felt he and Gorbachev had agreed to pursue an interim, global agreement. They had agreed on an interim INF agreement, with equal ceilings on U.S. and Soviet LRINF warheads on each side of Europe, and an equal ceiling on U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles worldwide. We could accept the Soviet idea of 100 in Europe, if other elements could be worked out. The Soviets had proposed 100 warheads on each side in Europe. If agreement were reached on other aspects of an interim agreement, we would have no problem with that number.

The U.S. had long called for proportional reductions in Asia. If we reduced to 100 warheads in Europe, and reduced Asian systems in the same proportion, the Asian ceiling would come out to something like 63. 100 in Europe/100 in Asia was acceptable. In the right context, we could accept 100 in Europe and 100 in Asia. The President suggested he and Gorbachev settle now on 100/100 and instruct our negotiators to work out details.

Gorbachev interrupted briefly to clarify that the President’s proposal was for 100 LRINF warheads each for the U.S. and Soviet Union in Europe and an additional 100 for the Soviet Union in Asia. The President explained that the U.S., under its proposal, would also have the right to deploy an additional 100 warheads on a global basis. In response to a question, the President confirmed that those 100 would be based on U.S. territory.

On defense and space, the President felt he and Gorbachev recognized the basic differences in the two sides’ approaches. For his part, the President recognized that Gorbachev at this point was not prepared to agree with him; but the President was not prepared to move from the course that he believed correct. Recognizing this, the President proposed that he and Gorbachev instruct their negotiators to focus on what the President felt to be three critical issues. Of the three, the U.S. believed that only the first two deserved immediate attention, but recognized Soviet concerns about the third and included it to respond to those concerns. The questions were:

—First, how could activities with respect to the investigation of strategic defenses be synchronized with our shared goals of eliminating ballistic missiles?

—Second, what should the conditions and timeframe be for increased reliance on strategic defenses?

—Third, until these conditions are met, what common understanding might be reached on activities under the ABM Treaty on advanced strategic defenses?

At a minimum, the President asked, could the two sides not agree to instruct our negotiators to address these three questions in the hope of using them to move our positions closer together?

Moving to the question of nuclear testing, the President said that here, too, he had been disappointed with the outcome of the previous evening’s efforts. He could only hope that that outcome had reflected a simple lack of imagination on the part of one or the other side’s representatives.

The President noted that there was agreement in principle on the fact of immediate negotiations, on the agenda, on the order of subjects, and on the ultimate outcome. The President understood, however, that the sides could not get agreement because of an argument on how these negotiations should be characterized. He proposed that the two sides simply record that they agreed to immediate negotiations on testing issues. We were prepared to note that the ultimate objective, which we believed could be reached in association with the elimination of all nuclear weapons, was the cessation of all testing.

We both agreed that the first order of business should be the resolution of the remaining verification issues associated with existing treaties. With this agreement, it was possible to get started and characterize the negotiations in a way which met both sides’ needs. But we had to agree on agenda and priority. Was it not possible for the two leaders to instruct their ministers to sort out the language quickly and record this agreement in suitable fashion.

In response to a question by Gorbachev as to what language the U.S. proposed with respect to testing, the President read from a paper prepared by the U.S. arms control working group the night before.

“The U.S. and Soviet Union will begin negotiations on nuclear testing. The agenda for these negotiations will first be to resolve remaining verification issues associated with existing treaties. With this resolved, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. will immediately proceed, in parallel with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, to address further step-by-step limitations on testing, leading ultimately to the elimination of nuclear testing.”

Gorbachev indicated that the U.S. position was not clear to him.

Turning to the work of the second working group, which had addressed non-arms control matters, the President said that its participants had done a fine job. Their breakthrough on nuclear fusion was particularly commendable.

Gorbachev asked to give an initial reaction to the President’s presentation, and to ask a few questions regarding the points the President had covered.

Referring to the President’s expression of disappointment with the results of the arms control working group, despite the fact that it had labored for ten hours, Gorbachev said he had also been very disappointed. The Soviets felt the proposals they had brought to Reykjavik had been highly constructive in spirit—and not just in philosophical terms. They had made real concessions to the U.S. in a number of negotiations and had sought to establish conditions for reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. But they had found that, instead of seeking as they had to give an impulse to the discussions, the U.S. was trying to drag things backward.

As Gorbachev had said previously, the Geneva negotiations prior to the current meeting had reached an impasse. New approaches were needed, as were political will and an ability to think in broad terms, to escape this dead-end. The Soviets had crafted their proposals with this in mind. They had expected the same from the Americans.

It was possible to record some areas of agreement, e.g., with respect to strategic systems. Both sides had agreed to reduce by 50% all components in this category, both as to warheads and delivery vehicles.

[Omitted here is a discussion not related to START.]

Prefacing his remarks on the ABM Treaty, Gorbachev recalled that the two sides had agreed in principle to reduce strategic forces by 50%. Agreement had also been reached on eliminating LRINF from Europe; on freezing and subsequently starting up negotiations on shorter range INF; and on 100 Soviet warheads in Asia, with the U.S. to have the right to the same number on its territory. These were unprecedented steps. They required responsible further steps in the implementation phase. This raised the question of verification, an issue which now became acute. The U.S. would find that the Soviets would be more vigorous than the U.S. in insisting on stringent verification requirements as the two countries entered the stage of effective disarmament. If it proved impossible to agree on such provisions, it would be impossible to reduce strategic and intermediate range weapons.

With respect to the ABM Treaty, Gorbachev expressed his conviction that nothing should be allowed to “shake” the ABM regime or confidence in an ABM Treaty of unlimited duration as deep reductions began to be implemented in strategic weapons. Gorbachev felt the President could agree to this proposition. As Gorbachev had said the day before, but would repeat, once one decided to reduce nuclear arms, one had to be certain that one side could not act behind the back of the other. So it was necessary to strengthen the ABM regime. The Soviet proposal for a ten year commitment not to withdraw from the Treaty would be a step forward toward strengthening the ABM regime.

In preparing their position, the Soviets had taken into account the President’s attachment to the SDI program. Thus, under the ten-year pledge, SDI-related research in laboratories would not be banned. This was not a strict limitation on SDI. The Soviets knew where the program stood. The U.S. had scored breakthroughs in one or two areas. Moscow knew which they were. But ten years would enable the two sides to solve the problems of reducing nuclear weapons, and so was necessary. The type of arrangement he was proposing, Gorbachev reiterated, would pose neither political, practical nor technical impediments to the President’s program.

The President replied that the U.S. had no intention of violating the ABM Treaty. It had never done so, even though, as the Soviets knew, it believed the Soviet Union had itself done more than was permitted by the Treaty.

With respect the SDI, the President recalled that he had made a pledge to the American people that SDI would contribute to disarmament and peace, and not be an offensive weapon. He could not retreat from that pledge. The U.S. had proposed a binding Treaty which would provide for the sharing of research which demonstrated a potential for defensive applications. This would facilitate the elimination of nuclear weapons. The President repeated that he could not retreat from his pledge. We would share the fruits of our research—and out of our own self-interest. If everyone had access to the relevant technology, it would be a threat to no one. The President did not see why SDI could not be made a part of the ABM Treaty. He was dedicated to the establishment of mutual defenses against nuclear weapons. Reaffirming once more that he could not retreat, the President noted that Secretary Shultz wished to make a point.

The Secretary observed that both the President and General Secretary had spoken in terms of eliminating nuclear weapons. In what Gorbachev had said a moment before, the Secretary thought he had heard something a little different. He wanted to be sure he had heard correctly. Gorbachev had seemed to link his 10 year no-withdrawal pledge to the length of time necessary to eliminate nuclear weapons. Was that in fact the link that the General Secretary had in mind? Would the schedule be linked to what he would be doing on START and INF, so that, at the end of the ten years of which Gorbachev had spoken there would be no ballistic missiles, to set aside other nuclear weapons?

Gorbachev reaffirmed that this was the case. The proposal he had made last January had called for 50% reductions in strategic forces and elimination of INF in the first phase of a process aimed at eliminating all nuclear weapons. Subsequent stages would involve further reductions, including reductions by third countries. But major reductions by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. would take place in this period, and so the ten year period Gorbachev had mentioned was of decisive importance. He was not retreating from, but reinforcing, the proposals he had made earlier. If one were serious about reducing nuclear weapons, therefore, there was a need to reinforce the ABM regime. Gorbachev could not agree to anything which would weaken the ABM Treaty. His goal was to strengthen the Treaty, not revise it as the U.S. had proposed. There was no logic to such an approach. Were the Soviet Union to accept it, the world would conclude it was doing so purely out of egotistical self-interest. Gorbachev would be unable to go before the Soviet people or the world with such a proposal. That was why the 10-year commitment he was seeking was necessary if there were to be major reductions in offensive forces.

Research was a different matter. The Soviets had taken into account the President’s concerns. They knew he was bound by the pledge he had made to his own people and to the world. Research would continue, and this would show that SDI was alive. But such work should not go beyond the framework of laboratory research. There could be testing, even mock-up in laboratories. And such efforts would ensure against the appearance of a nuclear madman of the type the President had often mentioned.

The President countered that in fact it would not. What the Hell, he asked, was it that we were defending? The ABM Treaty said that we could not defend ourselves except by means of the 100 ground based systems which we have never deployed. It said our only defense is that, if someone wants to blow us up, the other will retaliate. Such a regime did not give protection; it limited protection. Why the Hell should the world have to live for another ten years under the threat of nuclear weapons if we have decided to eliminate them? The President failed to see the magic of the ABM regime, whose only assurance of safety was the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. It would be better to eliminate missiles so that our populations could sleep in peace. At the same time, the two leaders could give the world a means of protection that would put the nuclear genie back in his bottle. The next generation would reap the benefits when the President and General Secretary were no longer around.

Gorbachev recalled for the President what he described as the long and complicated history of the ABM Treaty. It had not come as a bolt from the blue but after years of discussion by responsible leaders, who ultimately recognized the impossibility of creating an ABM system, and who concluded that, if the attempt were made, it would only fuel the arms race and make it impossible to reduce nuclear arms. No one in the Soviet leadership, nor he personally, could agree to steps which would undercut the Treaty. So on this point it appeared the two leaders would have to report that they had opposite views.

The next item, Gorbachev felt, should be negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. When the Soviets had pulled together their current position, they had worked from U.S. proposals to try to see how the two sides’ approaches coincided. What was their line of thinking? The two leaders should direct their representatives to start negotiations on ending nuclear testing.

The talks would proceed for a certain period of time. During that period, each side could do what it liked, i.e., tests would be permitted. To take into account U.S. concerns, the Soviets were prepared to agree that the agenda for such a first phase could include: test yields, the number of tests, the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties (TTBT/PNET), and verification.

These were all U.S. issues which the Soviets had incorporated into their approach. In contrast, Gorbachev sensed from what the President had said that the U.S. was only considering its own interests. Specifically, U.S. proposals did not adequately deal with the problem of a comprehensive test ban. Gorbachev could not agree to a proposal which reflected only American interests.

The conversation, he continued, had reached a point where it was time for the American side to make a move in the Soviet direction on the ABM Treaty and CTB. There was a need for the flexibility which would demonstrate whether the U.S. was in fact interested in finding mutually acceptable solutions to problems. Gorbachev had heard it said that the President did not like to make concessions. But he also recalled an American expression which seemed apt: “it takes two to tango.” With respect to the major questions of arms control and nuclear disarmament, the two leaders were the only partners in sight. Was the President prepared to dance?

The President in response sought to put the U.S. position on testing in an historical perspective. For three years, during the late fifties, there had been a moratorium on nuclear tests. Then the Soviet Union had broken the moratorium with a series of tests unprecedented in their number and scope. U.S. experts had subsequently determined that the Soviet Union had been preparing for that test series throughout the period of the moratorium. President Kennedy had resumed testing, but because we had made no preparations to test during the moratorium period, we were placed at a severe disadvantage. President Kennedy had vowed we would never again be caught unprepared in this area. But in fact we were still behind. The Soviets had largely completed the modernization of their weapons stockpile before announcing their moratorium.

In any case, a comprehensive test ban would have to follow reductions in nuclear weapons. And there must also be adequate verification. Until now, the Soviets had been unwilling to address this issue seriously. Now that they had done so, the U.S. stood prepared to join them. But, in view of the historical precedents he had mentioned, the President felt Gorbachev would understand why, to quote another Americanism, we were “once burned, twice shy.” Nonetheless, the U.S. had made concessions to Soviet concerns. The President again read the language on testing developed the night before by the U.S. working group, highlighting the statement’s final sentence on a comprehensive test ban as an ultimate goal of negotiations.

Gorbachev indicated that the U.S. language was not acceptable to the Soviet side. In their own package, the Soviets had proposed that representatives be instructed to start negotiations on “banning nuclear testing.” In an initial phase, these talks could deal with other issues. But the final goal must be to achieve a CTB on both military and civilian tests. Shevardnadze interjected that the ultimate goal should be stated first. In response to the President’s remark that the U.S. language covered the concern Gorbachev had expressed, Gorbachev complained that the U.S. formulation suggested that it did not want to state directly the subject and goal of the negotiations. Instead, it appeared the U.S. wanted the talks to drag on forever. Under the U.S. formula, talks could go well beyond the ten years during which it would be necessary to find a solution to the problem of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union would not help provide the U.S. a free hand to test as much and as long as it wanted. Shevardnadze remarked that acceptance of the U.S. formulation would call into question the ultimate goal of reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons.

The President said that perhaps there was some difficulty in the translation, but it appeared to him that the U.S. language met Soviet concerns. ( Gorbachev quipped that Zarechnak could tell the President that we were indeed talking about totally different things.) The President asked Gorbachev if the U.S. formulation would be more acceptable if the final sentence were moved to the front of the paragraph.

Gorbachev replied that it would not. Perhaps, he suggested, Shultz and Shevardnadze should be tasked with working out a formula. The problem, he said, was that the U.S. was saying that there could be talks—talks identified as having the “ultimate objective” of a CTB—but focused primarily on other things. Work on a CTB would start only at a later stage. But we should make it clear that we had already “started” work in that area. What was needed were clear-cut formulae without side-tracks. What the Soviets were proposing, Gorbachev recapitulated, was talks on a CTB, during which testing could continue, and in the first stage of which ancillary issues such as verification could be dealt with. In a second stage of the same talks, there would be movement toward a complete ban on nuclear tests. As a lawyer, Gorbachev felt confident that such an arrangement would allow no room for side-tracking.

[Omitted here is a discussion not related to START.]

The Secretary observed that it appeared there was the beginning of a joint statement on strategic weapons. (Gorbachev nodded.) On the basis of the two leaders’ discussion, it should also be possible to formulate a similar statement on INF. (Gorbachev again nodded.) On Space/ABM/SDI, there had been no agreement, but the two sides had identified and characterized their areas of disagreement. These appeared not to deal with the question of whether or not to adhere to the ABM Treaty, since the U.S. was adhering, but rather over the period involved.

Gorbachev commented that, in the context of what had been agreed to on strategic and intermediate range offensive arms, a statement on adherence to the ABM Treaty would be necessary. That was obvious.

Shevardnadze asked if the approach outlined in the President’s letter to the question of the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty remained valid. The Secretary reminded Shevardnadze that the President had called for a two-stage approach. That was still on the table. Gorbachev asked if that meant the U.S. did not accept a ten year period.

The Secretary suggested three points to describe where the two sides were. They could be cast in terms of the leaders’ having instructed their negotiators to explore the following areas to bridge existing differences. The Secretary then read the three questions the President had read in his opening presentation.

When the Secretary reached the second point, on a “cooperative transition to advanced strategic defenses”, Gorbachev interrupted to point out that the Soviets did not recognize the concept. It was the U.S. which intended to deploy SDI. The Soviets would not make such an arrangement possible. Their concept was different. The Secretary continued to read the three points, noting that the final point was designed to respond to Soviet concerns.

The President, the Secretary continued, had made clear he would not give up SDI. Gorbachev had said he recognized that to be the President’s position, and that the Soviets had made an effort to accommodate it. Gorbachev nodded, adding with a laugh that some even felt he was trying to encourage development of SDI so as to increase the U.S. defense burden. Thus, as it turned out, he was on the President’s side, and the President had not even known it.

The President noted that, as the oldest person in the room, he was the only one who could remember how, after World War I, poison gas had been outlawed. But people kept their gas masks. And it was a good thing, because poison gas came back. The same could happen with nuclear weapons: if, after their elimination, someone were to bring them back, we would need something to deal with that.

Gorbachev commented that the preceding conversation had convinced him of the veracity of reports that the President did not like to make concessions. The President clearly did not want to give any concessions on the question of the ABM Treaty—its duration and strength, or on the cessation of nuclear testing.

The President replied that he felt we had agreed on testing.

Shevardnadze asked if it would be possible to consider the period during which there would be no withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. It might be possible to reach agreement on this point. Gorbachev reiterated that a much more rigid adherence to the ABM Treaty, for a specific period of time—say, ten years—would be necessary to create the confidence necessary to proceed with deep cuts in offensive systems. Returning to the Secretary’s earlier point, he underscored that the ten year period would coincide with the most significant reductions on the offensive side. Shevardnadze pointed out that there was a question of principle: if the two sides could not agree on a period for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, it would be impossible to agree on reductions. Gorbachev added that the Soviets had proposed a package, and that individual elements of their proposals must be regarded as a package.

The President expressed the view that there should be no such linkage. The U.S., for its part, believed the Soviet Union already to be in violation of the ABM Treaty. The U.S. had not even built systems provided for in the Treaty.

Gorbachev interrupted to note that, on the first two questions (START and INF) it would be possible to say there were common points. On the second (ABM and testing), there had been a meaningful exchange of views, but no common points.

With that, the meeting could end. It had not been in vain. But it had not produced the results that had been expected in the Soviet Union, and that Gorbachev personally had expected. Probably the same could be said for the United States. One had to realistic. In political life one had to follow reality. The reality today was that it was possible to reach agreements on some major, interrelated questions. But because there was a lack of clarity, the connection had been disrupted. So the two sides remained where they had been before Reykjavik.

Gorbachev said the President would now report to Congress. Gorbachev would make his report to the Politburo and the Supreme Soviet. The process would not stop. Relations would continue. For his part, Gorbachev was sorry he and the President had failed to provide a new impulse for arms control and disarmament. This was unfortunate, and Gorbachev regretted it.

The President said he did, too. He had thought we had agreements on 50% reductions, on INF, on considering what to do about the ABM Treaty, and on reducing nuclear testing. Was this not so? Were the two leaders truly to depart with nothing?

Gorbachev said that that was the case. He suggested the two devote a few minutes to humanitarian and regional questions, which, he pointed out, had been discussed by the second (non-arms control) working group. The President agreed, and the two briefly reviewed papers prepared by the working group the night before.

[Omitted here is a discussion not related to START.]

Shevardnadze asked if he and the Secretary were to remain “unemployed,” or if the leaders had any instructions for them.

The Secretary said he had tried to formulate some language on INF and space, recognizing that there had been agreement on the one hand, and a lack of agreement on the other. After being invited by Gorbachev to proceed, the Secretary read the following passage:

“The President and General Secretary discussed issues involving the ABM Treaty, advanced strategic defense, the relationship to . . .? of offensive ballistic missiles intensively and at length. They will instruct their Geneva negotiators to use the record of these conversations to benefit their work.”

Gorbachev said the statement was unacceptable, and asked that the passage on INF be read. The Secretary read the following passage:

.........................

Gorbachev said that that was clear. He suggested that, if the President had no objections, the two Foreign Ministers might see what they could come up with while the two leaders took a brief break. Gorbachev didn’t mind waiting an hour or two.

Shevardnadze remarked that it should be possible to come up with agreed language on nuclear testing. That would leave the question of the duration of a non-withdrawal pledge with respect to the ABM Treaty.

Gorbachev said that that had been covered in the discussion. A withdrawal pledge was necessary to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty so as to justify the risk of reduction strategic and intermediate range offensive weapons.

Gorbachev proposed that, if the President agreed, the two of them meet again at 3:00 pm. The President agreed, and escorted Gorbachev from the room, ending the session.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Reyk Meeting—Geneva Materials, Oct 12–13 1986 (3). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at Hofdi House. All ellipses are in the original text. The full memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 306.
2. The full text of Gorbachev’s September 15 letter to Reagan is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 280.