Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

147. Memorandum From the Chief Negotiator for the Defense and Space Talks (Cooper) to the Head of Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks (Kampelman)¹

Washington, August 14, 1986

SUBJECT

• August 11, 12 Experts Meeting

I have reviewed the NODIS cables from the two-day meeting in Moscow. They only summarize the sessions; hopefully, the interpreters kept notes and will provide a more complete record of the conversations. Perhaps those records will clear up some of my misgivings about the implications of what transpired for our next round—but I’m sure they won’t clear up all of them.

Non-withdrawal Framework

On the first day, Karpov commented that the U.S. appeared to have in mind a shorter period of time than the Soviet-proposed 15–20 year period of an agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. This comment suggested that we had accepted the Soviet “non-withdrawal for n years” framework for an agreement and were only bargaining over the details. Chervov reinforced this suggestion on the second day.

From the cables, it does not appear that we responded in any way to suggest the contrary. In fact, Perle is reported to have reinforced this perspective with his unfortunate formulation that “the U.S. was prepared to set aside—for a specified time period—its right of withdrawal under the ABM Treaty.” He is reported to have suggested this in the context of eliminating the ballistic missile threat, but not in the form of a condition—and that is not the President’s formulation for the first phase anyway. In response to Chervov’s questions on the second day, Nitze is reported to have reinforced Perle’s formulation that, for five years after agreement (the President’s letter says through 1991) “the U.S. would not exercise its right of withdrawal.” Nitze is reported to have then gone on to say that “only after two years of negotiation would there be a reversion to withdrawal on six months notice. He did clarify that the first five years would be under the Treaty without amendment.

New Formulation of the President’s Proposal?

On the second day, Nitze raised a specific question for the Soviets to consider with respect to each of the negotiating groups. (The Soviets said they would address them at the next “experts meeting.”) The DST question was:

—Can we jointly envision an agreement now that places the eventual deployment of defenses, after an interval during which the ABM Treaty remains in effect, in the context of the elimination of both sides’ ballistic missiles and the sharing of the benefits of such defenses? If yes, how long should the interval be during which the ABM Treaty remains in effect without amendment?

The formulation of this question captures the gist of the framework of the President’s proposal as formulated in his letter to Gorbachev,² but goes further to explicitly suggest that the timelines are negotiable. The President’s proposal is limited in time by his statement that the first phase would last “through 1991.” Why are we suggesting that the timetables are negotiable? I thought you agreed those in the President’s letter were already too long—and we now demonstrate that we cannot even hold the line for three weeks, even with Richard in the room.

Transition

Richard Perle has suddenly had great insights on “transition.” I hope OSD will now share with us the thoughtful analysis that they must have done to support his pronouncements that I am sure were not lost on Detinov. He has apparently thought through and has answers for the obvious questions relating to, among others:

• nth country nuclear arsenals;

• the role of forward-based systems;

• requirements for the conventional balance;

• the evolving role of heavy bomber cruise missiles and their associated defenses.

I would also welcome elaboration of the analysis supporting his novel idea that “the sharing of defenses that would accompany elimination of U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles would provide a formidable capability and powerful disincentive for others to keep ballistic missiles.”

Richard is reported to have acknowledged that all implications had not been thought through and then demonstrated this fact by giving the curious assurance that the “U.S. had no fixed notions but would refrain from moving to deployment while negotiating to achieve a cooperative move towards defenses—at each stage of the process both sides would have to be assured that their security was enhanced.” This assurance of a Soviet veto over our decision to deploy is notably different from and in contrast to the President’s proposal which calls for deployment after two years of negotiation and six-months warning if no agreement is reached.

Definitions

It is reported that Karpov also raised a question on the delineation between permitted and prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty. No response to this question is reported. It would have been helpful if someone had reinforced the negotiators’ (in Geneva) position that this is already well understood from the 1971 negotiating record; the Soviets are free to make new proposals, of course, but we consider the definition from the record to be quite adequate.

Space-based weapons of mass destruction

Karpov noted that there might be some common ground with respect to the U.S.-suggested guarantees on preventing offensive (i.e., space-to-earth or space-to-atmospheric) weapons in space and asked for specifics on what we had in mind. The cable does not indicate we responded in any way to clarify that the President’s letter referred to advanced space-based weapons designed to inflict mass destruction on the surface of earth—a much narrower subject then suggested by Karpov. Was there a tactical reason for not responding or were we just not prepared?

Conclusion

As you can see, I have my doubts that this recent meeting served our overall interest. I believe it demonstrates a real lack of preparation and coherence on our part. It gave the Soviets signals inconsistent with the President’s letter and pointed us toward negotiations in Geneva that Washington has not prepared us for—worse, that Washington has sought to direct us away from, claiming the U.S. Government was unprepared to discuss them.

If someone knows what we are trying to do (assuming there is a plan) I hope they tell me soon. We are a month from returning to Geneva. I don’t think I am without creative abilities, but I am not clairvoyant—and from my vantage point, the scene is getting ridiculous.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, PREPARATION FOR 7 DWARVES—II, AUGUST/SEPT 1986. Secret. Cooper sent the memorandum to Linhard under cover of an August 15 handwritten note: “Bob—As you can see from the attached memo, I was not very impressed by the performance of the Seven Dwarfs—Even Richard is reported to have signaled acceptance of the Soviet framework. When last we met, I said I was not too concerned about ‘transition’ for Geneva next round. That has changed. Richard’s conversations have moved the ‘transition’ ball considerably and Detinov will likely probe further on the new items introduced by Richard. Given OSD’s leadership in moving ahead in this area—where they have previously resisted all efforts of enlightenment—perhaps you can prevail upon them to be a bit more forthcoming in the interagency activity so that the US Government can benefit from the wisdom accumulated behind their closed doors. Who knows, even the Seven Dwarfs might find it helpful to have a US Government position to back them up—Or, on the other hand, maybe you prefer ‘winging it.’ Hank” (Ibid.)
2. See Document 138.