146. Memorandum for the Record1
SUBJECT
- Informal Conversations with Soviet Arms Control Experts Team
1. During consultations with arms control experts in Moscow on 11–12 August 1986, I held several informal conversations which are summarized below.
2. Karpov.
a. Karpov was friendly and forthcoming. He greeted me warmly at the opening of the talks. I sat to his immediate right at the Soviet official luncheon on 11 August. After exchanging pleasantries Karpov said the Soviets were sorry they had to fall back in START from the 50 per cent reductions goal to 30 per cent in order to accommodate the United States. I said his statement was a rationalization since we always were and still are committed to a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive forces. Karpov asked how we could claim this when [Page 601] we were proposing an agreement to accommodate a force of 15,000–20,000 “Zaryade” (nuclear weapons). I told him I didn’t know what he was talking about. He said that we were trying to create loopholes in a new START agreement, one of which would permit us to deploy 3,000 to 4,000 SLCMs and not have them counted in any way.
b. I told Karpov we were ready to place limits on nuclear SLCMs, but I consider the Soviet SLCM proposal seriously flawed. Asked why, I said that for openers the Soviets had said nothing about how a SLCM limit could be verified.
c. Karpov said the Soviets insist there must be some sublimit on SLCMs. I repeated that we were willing to limit nuclear SLCMs in one way or another but that the next step was for the Soviets to clarify how the limits would be verified. I reminded him of his talk with Senator Glenn who said he and many other senators would oppose any agreement which could not be verified. I asked Karpov if it would help if I talked to Generals Chervov and Detinov about SLCMs. He said, yes it would be useful, and that I should talk to both.
3. Chervov.
a. I sat next to Chervov at the US luncheon on August 12 and raised the question of SLCMs. At this point Perle sat down next to Chervov on the other side. Chervov immediately switched to a discussion with Perle about the offense-defense relationship. He asked Perle what the US expected the USSR to do if we went ahead with SDI deployments and the Soviets did not. Perle answered that what the Soviets did was their choice, but that strategic defenses were certainly nothing new to the Soviet Union. Chervov asked how we expected the development he described at the dacha to contribute to stability. Perle said that the simple reduction, and certainly the elimination, of ballistic missiles would strengthen strategic stability. As for other arms control aspects of SDI deployment, Perle said that I was better equipped to answer. I said that one of the principal US objectives is to seek a stable relationship at every step of the way in moving towards an offense-defense mix. I said this could be worked out during the two-year period following a decision, if it were made in or after 1991, that going along the path leading to the deployment of SDI was a good idea.
b. Chervov turned back to Perle and said that the US and USSR have different security needs and therefore require different weapons systems. Perle said he recognized this full well and that so long as there was an overall balance, the two sides did not need to mirror image one another. But a good place to start, Perle said, would be to drastically reduce ICBMs. Better yet, he said, we should agree on a schedule to eliminate ICBMs entirely.
c. Chervov asked Perle what he had meant earlier during his peroration when he referred to a modest deployment of SDI. Perle [Page 602] explained that when ballistic missiles were reduced or eliminated, all either side would need was a modest defense to hedge against the possibility of a rapid breakout or as a defense against the small nuclear forces of third countries. At this point Detinov, who had been kibbitzing, said he wanted to talk to me.
4. Detinov.
a. Detinov immediately raised SLCMs. He parrotted Karpov’s theme that we were trying to create loopholes for building up to a level of 15,000 to 20,000 nuclear charges, and that one major loophole is for SLCMs. I told Detinov we were in no way trying to create any loopholes and that we were perfectly willing to limit nuclear SLCMs. Detinov asked how we proposed to verify such limits. I said we were expecting the Soviets to answer that question since they were the ones who had made the proposal.
b. Detinov asked if the US would agree to a sublimit on SLCMs. I said that I didn’t understand in what context he meant his question, but if he was asking if the US was willing to limit nuclear SLCMs to a specific number we were certainly willing to do so.
c. Detinov shifted to SRAMs and bombs. “Were we willing to limit them, too?” I said, “yes,” but certainly not by counting a SRAM or bomb carried by a heavy bomber as the equivalent of an SS–18 warhead. He asked me how I proposed to limit SRAMs and bombs. I said we needed to talk this one out; we might be able to limit them indirectly by limiting the number of heavy bombers. But, I said, there could be no progress at all, in my opinion, if there was any freedom to mix SRAMs and bombs and other nuclear weapons being limited. Time ran out. As he was leaving Detinov said he was looking forward to returning to the subject of SLCMs, SRAMs, and bombs when we meet in late August or early September in Washington.
5. Tarasenko.
I had several brief conversations with Tarasenko, who sat opposite me during the meetings. I told him he looked familiar. He reminded me that we had crossed paths in 1974 when I had been sent during a break in SALT II to negotiate TTBT and PNET in Moscow. He said he now was a special assistant to Shevardnadze. When I complimented him for attaining such a responsible position at such a young age, he told me he was over 50. I told him truthfully that he didn’t look a day over 40.
6. Obukhov.
I had several short, non-substantive conversations with Obukhov. As we were leaving the luncheon on August 12, Obukhov said he was sorry we had not found time to talk substance. I said I too was sorry [Page 603] about this since the first time I had heard the idea of an interim INF agreement was from him during the summit last November in Geneva.
- Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 4, 1986 July–Aug. Secret. Drafted by Rowny. Rowny sent the memorandum to Nitze under cover of an August 14 handwritten note: “Paul, Here’s a copy of my MFR. After you’ve had a chance to read it I’d like to talk to you. Ed.” (Ibid.)↩