Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

136. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation¹

Washington, June 24, 1986, 2346Z

199602/Tosec 110162. Subject: Soviet Ambassador Dubinin’s call on the President; Gorbachev’s letter.

1. (S–Entire text).

2. There follows for your information the text of the memorandum of the President’s conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin on June 23, as well as the text of the letter from Gorbachev to the President that Dubinin delivered.

3. Begin text of memcon:

Date: June 23, 1986

Place: White House Oval Office

Time: 4:55–5:35pm

US Participants

President Reagan

Chief of Staff Reagan

VADM Poindexter

Ambassador Matlock

Deputy Assistant Secretary Simons

D. Zarechnak, Interpreter

Soviet Participants

Ambassador Dubinin

After initial greetings, Ambassador Dubinin began to read prepared notes. He said that when he was in Moscow he spoke with General Secretary Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders, and Gorbachev asked him to convey his greetings and best wishes to the President.

The President thanked the Ambassador, and asked him to transmit his greetings and best wishes in return.

Dubinin indicated that Gorbachev, speaking to him as Ambassador of the USSR, had given him his evaluation of the state of Soviet-American relations and the prospect for their improvement. He had also noted the positive elements in Reagan’s Glassboro speech,² and its tone. Of course, the most decisive thing was practical policy and actions. The sooner the United States stops thinking that it can put the Soviet Union in a difficult situation with respect to arms, technology, economics, etc., the sooner there will be fruitful results and improvement of relations between the two countries. Such an approach is no basis for a bilateral relationship. A good basis for this relationship is to act in accordance with the long-term interests of both countries.

Dubinin continued that Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union is not trying to defeat the United States, but it will also not permit itself to be defeated. Its approach is that relations with the U.S. must be based on equality and equal security. The Soviet Union wishes to improve relations with the United States. It would be dangerous to put these relations to the test.

Dubinin indicated that Gorbachev had asked him to tell the President that he was ready to look at regional issues, but that such discussions must be based on realism. The Soviet Union considers that each country has the right to chart its own course and to decide whether its economic system should be a market system or a socialist system. He is prepared to discuss regional issues on a realistic basis. The Soviet Union is for democratization of international relations.

Dubinin said that Gorbachev noted the constructive approach of the Soviet leadership with respect to dialogue with the U.S., including dialogue at the highest level, but stressed the great significance of a possible summit. The possibility of such a meeting has attracted so much attention in the world that preparations for it and its successful conclusion are more important than they were for the Geneva summit.

Dubinin indicated that Gorbachev had asked him to transmit a letter which he signed on June 19. The main idea of the letter was that the Soviet Union approaches things constructively and is seeking to find solutions to problems between us. Gorbachev was impressed by the idea the President conveyed to Dobrynin in May, namely that practical possible agreements lay between the optimum requirements of one side or the other. Therefore, this search was something which both sides had in common. In light of this common understanding, Gorbachev proposed that concrete areas be found for practical agreements in time for the summit.

Dubinin continued that the Soviet Union has moved, and is ready for a reduction in arms. In the area of space the Soviets had taken some steps and are ready for practical work. His purpose was not to identify specific elements at this time, but areas where we should concentrate our efforts. Gorbachev positively noted the President’s assessment of the latest Soviet proposal on strategic offensive nuclear arms, which was conveyed through secretary Shultz and Dubinin. The Soviet delegation in Geneva is awaiting a concrete reply and a discussion of the Soviet proposal with the U.S. delegation.

Dubinin indicated that with regard to medium-range missiles, Gorbachev was ready to consider a partial solution. The Soviet side may have some specific thoughts on this score, and if the U.S. side has some as well, the Soviet side is ready for serious work on this. Gorbachev is convinced that a mutually satisfactory solution can be found.

Dubinin then touched upon the issue of nuclear testing. Gorbachev understood the reasons behind the fact that President Reagan was not ready to cease nuclear tests. He, therefore, had weighed carefully what the President had conveyed through Ambassador Dobrynin. In his letter, Gorbachev states that he, too, thinks that there should be talks between experts on all aspects of this issue. Such talks could touch upon questions of verification and the obligation to determine the conditions and ways of attaining a complete prohibition of nuclear tests. Such a meeting which the President had also spoken of, should take place as soon as possible, perhaps at the beginning of July.

Dubinin continued that Gorbachev thinks that the U.S. and USSR have certain common elements of an approach to the important issues, and that it would be possible to cooperate, including at the summit, on such issues as improvement of nuclear power plant safety, peaceful uses of space, and other bilateral issues. Gorbachev has some thoughts on how to proceed in preparing this work. The Soviet side is proposing to work together without wasting time and using the fora and channels which already exist, such as the respective embassies. The Foreign Ministers of the two countries could then analyze the results of this work, and make final decisions with regard to the summit.

Dubinin said that in his letter, Gorbachev indicated that he was for movement, for active preparations, and for a drastic turn in U.S.-Soviet relations.

At this point Dubinin handed Gorbachev’s letter to the President, together with an unofficial Soviet translation.

President Reagan thanked the Ambassador and indicated that he was glad to hear that the General Secretary was looking forward to the summit. The President had never given up belief in a summit in the US, as was agreed in Geneva. He recalled that when he had talked with the General Secretary in Geneva, the President had indicated that before we could talk about weapons, and what was fair, we needed to remove the distrust which existed between the two countries. This needed to be done more than in words, it needed to be done with deeds. He had indicated that the US did not seek to acquire an advantage over the USSR, but that the record showed that there were reasons for US mistrust. After the Second World War, in which the US and the USSR were allies, the US disarmed. During that war, the US did not acquire one foot of foreign territory. At the same time, after the end of the war, the US was the only country in the world with nuclear weapons. It could have dictated its will to the world, but it did not do so. Instead, it proposed that all weapons be turned over to an international board, so that no country could threaten any other one. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, embarked on a program of massive rearmament which was offensive in nature, and which could not be justified by the need for defense.

President Reagan continued that General Secretary Gorbachev had not said this, but previous Soviet leaders had reiterated many times that the goal of Marxism and Leninism was the achievement of a one-world communist state. Could the US ignore this and think that it was not a possible target? General Secretary Gorbachev had not made such a statement and was the first Soviet leader to Reagan’s knowledge who proposed to decrease the number of nuclear weapons and to completely eliminate them. The President welcomed this and was willing to join in this effort, since he had had this same goal for many years, but not through something like the SALT treaty, which simply regulated an arms increase, but real negotiations to reduce the number of such weapons.

The President said that in order to achieve these aims there would need to be deeds to show that both sides wished to eliminate the distrust which exists between them, and which makes each feel on guard against the other.

The President emphasized that the US side was very grateful for the steps taken by the Soviet government to allow reunification of families through emigration. The Soviets had not seen the US give this a lot of publicity, or make public demands or take credit for it. It very much appreciates the Soviet actions.

The President indicated that he wished to conclude the meeting with the following thought, since he had already taken up a great deal of the Ambassador’s time. He realized that with the new Soviet administration, June had been too early a date to have set for the summit. Now the US side was faced with a difficulty due to elections in which members of the U.S. side would be involved. The US would very much appreciate it if the General Secretary or the Ambassador would propose a date after the early November elections for the summit. Then the two sides could get together to work on issues to decrease the mistrust between the two sides.

Dubinin thanked the President for his frank and candid remarks, especially for discussing those things which he had discussed in private with Gorbachev. The President was aware of the position of the Soviet Union on these issues, since Gorbachev had indicated them, so Dubinin did not wish to dwell on this. He did wish to stress and stress again that the Soviet Union wants to live in peace with the US, and that it had no intentions with regard to the United States or other countries or regions except those of peaceful coexistence, peace and cooperation. The two countries fully shared a common goal of reducing arms. The President would see from Gorbachev’s letter that the two sides are close to very significant agreements, and such agreements could be realized in time for a possible summit. The Soviet side was proposing to begin preparatory work immediately. Then the Foreign Ministers might meet in September to evaluate the results of the work. This could take place immediately preceding the UN General Assembly. It was very important to prepare thoroughly for the summit, and the US and USSR could really set an example and start the work of real disarmament.

Dubinin concluded by saying that the USSR was approaching this in a constructive and optimistic fashion, and that it was ready to get down to work.

4. Begin text of Gorbachev letter, in informal Soviet translation:

Dear Mr. President,

In your letter of May 23, 1986³ you note that a full six months have been lost, which could have been used for resolving important problems in the relations between the USSR and U.S. In principle it is difficult not to agree with that. Indeed, the months which have passed since our meeting have turned out to be a kind of a period of missed opportunities.

Speaking frankly, without diplomatic contrivances we are disappointed by the developments after Geneva, and we have serious grounds for that. Last November it was our assumption that through the efforts of both sides—joint or, if you will, simultaneous—the shift of our relations to a more stable, solid basis would be practically implemented. In other words the period after Geneva was supposed to become a time for intensive work to prepare the next, higher stage of Soviet-American relations.

This, however, did not happen. The reason is not that the real opportunities for such a shift were lacking. It is that the American side did not join the constructive efforts made by the Soviet Union, and even resisted them.

I am saying this not for the sake of polemics which would substitute a businesslike discussion, but in order to set the record straight. The fact remains that it is precisely the Soviet Union who, following the joint commitments undertaken at the Geneva meeting, has prepared and introduced the proposals which, should they be taken up by the other side, would ensure a weighty material content of agreements on the main directions which you and I, Mr. President, have chartered. They constitute a sufficiently comprehensive system of possible solutions on the main aspects of the problem of security. I am speaking about space, strategic offensive, nuclear medium-range, nuclear operational—tactical, chemical and conventional weapons. At the same time we have worked out a new a broad spectrum of measures to strengthen verification and enhance confidence-building measures.

Unfortunately, so far our initiatives have not generated a real reciprocal movement on the part of the U.S. Yet, in fact, each of those proposals contains as an integral element an opening for cooperation with the United States.

The American side has responded by unwillingness to give thought to the essence of our ideas, unpreparedness to get down to their specific discussion or, at best, by calls to return to its proposals introduced even before the November summit. The latter looks strange, to say the least, if one is to take into account that you and I agreed in Geneva to accelerate the process of negotiations, that is, to move forward, not backward.

Judging by your latest letters, you, too, recognize the importance of the atmosphere shaping up around Soviet-American relations. Understandably, the political climate is determined not only by the public utterances on either side, though this factor cannot be discounted completely, but, mainly, by the practical actions. In this connection it must be stated out-right that many American actions, for example, the attack against Libya, renunciation of compliance with the 1972 Interim Agreement and the SALT-II treaty, were of an extremely negative, dangerous nature. This, naturally, has a direct bearing on the evaluation of the intentions of the U.S. on the international arena and cannot but affect our perception of the attitude of the American leadership to the conduct of affairs with the Soviet Union. Clearly, such a line of action of the U.S. does not make things more definite also in so far as a new summit meeting is concerned, our attitude to which, as I have already told you, is in principle positive.

Nothing should be left unsaid on this subject, however. We are deeply convinced—and we sincerely say that—that with no confidence that actual agreements will be reached there would be no point in holding such a meeting. A sterile meeting would only mislead the public opinion, would have the opposite effect.

Preparing and holding a productive meeting between the leaders of two countries is, naturally, a mutual endeavor. You and I should be equally interested in a positive outcome. Accordingly, an equal degree of readiness to make a tangible contribution to ensuring a positive outcome should also be manifested. In the language of the political practice, that means the willingness and ability to reach mutually beneficial compromises.

I admit, the thought appeals to me, which you expressed in the conversation with Anatoly F. Dobrynin to the effect that the practical possibilities of agreements can lie somewhere between the optimum requirements of both sides. Certainly, it would be, nevertheless, good to resolve the vital problems at one stroke, radically. The critical moment we are going through requires that. But since so far in practice it doesn’t work out that way, let us begin by taking the path of searching for solutions leading to that.

Should the search show that pragmatic agreements are within the realm of our possibilities, then the necessary efforts could be exerted to make them a positive core of our meeting.

In our view, there are several areas where, given mutual willingness, forward movement could be achieved, which could take the shape of agreements at the summit. Given the work which we continue to conduct to create a basis for such agreements, I would like to suggest that now attention be focused on the following:

First: Space and strategic offensive weapons. The Soviet side, as you know, introduced in Geneva the other day a compromise version of a possible agreement on this subject. As a key element we propose to come to agreement on strengthening the regime of the ABM treaty, among other things, by adopting the obligation not to use for a certain agreed period of time the right to withdraw from the treaty. A more solid degree of strategic stability and confidence resulting from such a step could be enhanced by agreement to ban “offensive weapons” in space, that is, weapons capable of striking targets in the earth’s atmosphere or on the surface of the earth, and to prohibit anti-satellite systems, including the liquidation of the existing ones. We would be also prepared to clarify on a mutual basis the boundaries of the activities in the ABM field permitted and prohibited under the treaty.

A forward movement on these problems would undoubtedly permit to resolve as a practical matter the problem of a substantial reduction in strategic offensive arms. On this subject we have outlined two versions of agreements, so to speak, for the American side to pick and choose. One—involving the inclusion of the American medium-range nuclear systems capable of reaching the territory of the USSR among the weapons to be reduced, the other—without the inclusion of such systems.

I have noted with satisfaction your assessment of the new Soviet proposals as “undoubtedly serious”, which will be “intensively and carefully studied” in Washington, which was transmitted to me by Secretary George Shultz through Ambassador Yuriy Dubinin. I see in that an encouraging sign and expect that you will instruct your delegation in Geneva to get down to a businesslike and specific discussion. Our representatives have all the necessary instructions for that.

Second: Medium-range missiles in Europe. Though we have agreed in Geneva, among other things, to conduct a search around the idea of an interim agreement, the American side has never departed from its old “zero option”, the lop-sidedness of which is obvious to everybody. Some later procedural additions to that American position do not change things, of course. Nevertheless, I am convinced that we are able to find a mutually acceptable version. The best of them would certainly be agreement on the complete elimination of the medium-range missiles of the USSR and U.S. in the European zone, reinforced by the appropriate obligations not to circumvent it, both on your and on our part. But, I repeat, we are also prepared for partial measures. I think, there is merit in starting exploring them without delay. If the American side, too, has concrete considerations on this score, it would be good for our representatives to exchange ideas on this subject.

Third: Cessation of nuclear tests. You, Mr. President, have spoken frankly enough about the motives the American side is guided by in continuing to conduct underground nuclear explosions. And yet, I place the question of restraint in that area in the category of political rather than military decisions.

This issue attracts universal attention in the world. Taking unilateral actions in this area and inviting the United States to come along, we by no means are seeking “to drive the other side into the corner”. We would like Washington to have a correct perception of this policy of ours.

I have carefully thought over again the considerations outlined by both sides, including the recent ones, concerning the talks of experts in the field of nuclear explosions. I am also inclined to think that such discussions, conducted without any preconditions, should touch upon the entire range of questions—both the questions of verification and the obligation to define the conditions and ways leading to complete renunciation of nuclear weapon tests.

Taking into account a certain convergence of attitudes we suggest that such talks, which you also spoke about, start in the nearest future, say, in early July. The level and place for these bilateral discussions, I presume, could be worked out soon through diplomatic channels.

All in all, it would certainly make sense for both of our sides to show a realistic approach to this set of questions, which touch upon the nerve centers of security of both the USSR and U.S.

There are, we think, possibilities for joint work, including in the context of the summit, also on such problems as the strengthening of the safety regime for nuclear power plants, cooperation in the peaceful use and exploration of outer space as well as in a number of areas of concrete bilateral contacts. It is our understanding that the American side is also interested in such cooperation.

Thus, Mr. President, the Soviet side does not slacken its efforts directed not only at the normalization of our relations and strengthening of international security, but also at a practical preparation, by deeds, of the summit meeting. I hope that you will view in this light also the considerations about the substance of the issues stated in this letter.

Now, a few words about how our further work could be organized. First of all the already existing FORA and channels, including the contacts of our embassies in Washington and Moscow, should be made more active. We attach, as I already have said, great significance to the intensification of efforts of the Soviet and American delegations at the Geneva negotiations on space and nuclear weapons.

Along with those traditional FORA it would be useful as a practical matter to conduct several working meetings at the level of experts, who could consider in a purely businesslike manner a number of problems of importance for the development of our bilateral dialogue. For example, in this format the possibilities could be discussed of bringing closer together the positions of the USSR and U.S. on conventional forces and armaments, on confidence-building measures in Europe, some points of contact could be additionally explored in the positions of the sides on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. We think it is necessary to have a comprehensive exchange of views—in conceptual as well as practical terms—on the whole on the issues of a peaceful settlement in the regions torn by conflicts. Soviet-American bilateral relations could be the subject of special consideration at a similar level.

Such a blueprint of the preparatory work, if it suits you in principle, could be set in motion already in the near future (if necessary its details could be discussed at the ambassadorial or deputy minister level.) The results of such work could be then jointly analyzed by our foreign ministers, who could at the same time pick out several questions for a more in-depth consideration at their level. As a result, it could be finally determined how things are shaping up as far as the summit is concerned.

In conclusion, I would like to say: in the complex dynamics of the contemporary international life, ideal moments, indeed, as you write, are hard to find. But to create moments enriched by our mutual constructive efforts, leading up to important results is well in our power. In fact, this is the key to the implementation of that decisive turn in the relations between the USSR and U.S., about which I spoke to you at the beginning of my letter.

End Text of letter

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N860006-0461. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to Moscow. Drafted by Evans; cleared in S/S and S/S-O; approved by Parris. On June 24, Shultz was traveling from Bandar Seri Begawan to Manila to attend an ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting.
2. See Reagan’s “Remarks at the High School Commencement Exercises in Glassboro, New Jersey,” June 19, Public Papers: Reagan, 1986, vol. I, pp. 806–811.
3. Reagan’s May 23 letter to Gorbachev is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 235.