137. Electronic Message From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to Rodney McDaniel and Robert Pearson of the National Security Council Staff1
SUBJECT
- Wrap-up of today’s events
Admiral,
Have accomplished visits to Adelman, Nitze, Rowny and Crowe on the Basic Sage Papers. All sessions went well—especially Adelman and Crowe. Will see Bill Casey in the morning on Friday.2 Will provide a more detailed debrief after that. Quick look report is as follows:
Adelman —No show stopper. Would like to offer an alternative approach involving the banning of testing against targets on Earth. Doesn’t think the Soviets will bite on the current formulation but supportive.
Nitze—Feels that earlier formulation more correct. Pressed me hard for a more precise definition of testing etc. Told him “watch this space.” Not happy with current version.
Rowny—More concerned that he not get cut out than in substance. Wants to work START & INF alternatives. No show stopper.
Crowe—Spent about 1 hour with him. Need to give you a full debrief. Feels that approach too conservative. Is supportive of effort—no problem. Intends to review JCS position on testing to get the “historical” position changed. Good session.
Will see Casey at 09:00 tomorrow.
On the Dubinin gambit, feel that we should take our time to ensure that we fully understand what has gone down here. No reason to rush. I have only had the benefit of Ron’s initial brief—but it fits into a pattern of Soviet actions (i.e., separate approaches to all our allies). They may have seriously miscalculated if trying to drive a partisan wedge in U.S. politics. If this is the case, the President needs to decide who he wants to paint as the bad guys since this will rouse Joe Six-Pack if he should choose to use it and we play it carefully. Recommend taking no action until additional information being collected is available tomorrow.
[Page 548]Finally, the Soviets (Starodubov) have called on General Ellis (our SCC Commissioner) to hold a special session on the SCC beginning on 22 July to discuss the US SALT II decision, its implementation, and the future of the SCC. I see this as a real opportunity for us—and certainly as something that we can’t turn down anyway. This could be a mechanism for showing that we are interested in a legit interim restraint regime and ready to bargain for it. We should expect OSD to lobby hard early for a quick turn down. Will provide a plan to address this which integrates it into our overall strategy by the weekend. Soviets do have a master plan—we must be careful.
Really finally, State has now proposed in writing3 the setting up of a Kennedy group to handle the nuclear testing experts discussions—and that we accept and schedule the meeting beginning on 21 July. I intend to block this until we can do more thinking about who should lead the group and when we should begin. As to timing, the Soviet moratorium is scheduled to end on August 6. I would rather start this discussion on August 10th or so—so that the talks don’t start in the few weeks “left to solve the moratorium” but rather the moratorium ends with us able to point to the opening of new discussions on testing.