132. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva (Kampelman) to Secretary of State Shultz1
Last week, shortly after the Fifth Round2 opened, Ambassador Karpov signaled to me what the Soviets will want in the Defense and Space component of an overall Geneva agreement. He told me at lunch that Moscow understands the United States is not ready to accept “a ban on space strike arms” and was suggesting “partial measures” as a way to find a formula for progress. When I pressed him, he acknowledged that even though the total ban would remain part of long-range Soviet policy, the partial measures would be in lieu of that ban for purposes of a Geneva agreement and would satisfy their condition for substantial START reductions (undefined).
Karpov listed three “partial measures”: (1) agreement by both parties not to exercise, for a period of 15–20 years, their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty (Kvitsinskiy, during the Second Round, told me 10 years); (2) agreement on what the ABM Treaty means so as to clarify ambiguities (Karpov, for the first time, stated he agreed with Harold Brown’s statement for the U.S. at the ABM negotiations defining where prohibited activity under the Treaty begins); and (3) a provision reflecting President Reagan’s letter to Gorbachev that we are not and will not be working on offensive weapons under the SDI Program. (They clearly want to limit SDI to ground-based activity and to prohibit space-based components capable of attacking missiles in the boost phase or attacking other space, air, or ground assets.)
It is interesting that an ASAT provision was not included in the above list of Soviet requirements. I also believe that giving me three requirements now does not mean the Soviets will require all three in an end game. Karpov has been arguing that his aim is to obtain assurances, before the Soviets agree on reductions, that the ABM Treaty will continue and will limit U.S. SDI behavior for a substantial period of time.
My instructions permit me to consider Soviet proposals on partial measures “seriously and on their merits.”3 I can also “probe or question” those Soviet initiatives. I am asked, however, “to discourage the Soviet side from believing” that those proposed partial measures are [Page 530] acceptable to us and “should continue to criticize them on their merits.” I can live with that and do not want to change those instructions. I urged Karpov to understand that the best way to proceed is first to fashion a detailed framework of START reductions with Ron so that we together arrive at the kind and extent of those reductions. When these are agreed upon, I can more easily explore Defense and Space solutions designed to meet both of our needs.
* * * *
[less than 3 lines not declassified]
—The USSR could possibly accept SDI if it were implemented “solely” as a “territorial defense system” rather than space based relating to boost phase interception.
—The USSR is still researching “whether mutual deployments of SDI systems could be stabilizing,” but they don’t see how that is possible, given the potential ability of SDI to attack “the other side’s shield.”
—The Soviets may be reconciling themselves to SDI “as long as it stops somewhere short of weapons testing,” with some suggestions this means research should be confined to the laboratory.
—The Soviets are concerned that an all-out technological effort by the United States will inevitably result in an abrogation of the ABM Treaty, which would leave the USSR at a disadvantage. Its negotiating objective, [less than 1 line not declassified] is to avoid this outcome. There will, therefore, not be any substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons so long as they are persuaded abrogation is the likely direction in which the United States is moving.
—At least one senior Soviet official indicated that the USSR might be interested in cooperating with the United States in one or more space projects, not necessarily linked to U.S. concessions on SDI.
[less than 1 line not declassified] we, of course, know that they might be bona fide messages, they might be disinformation, or they might be expressions of personal opinion of either the Soviet informant or the American reporter.
- Source: Department of State, Lot 06D436, Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Subject Files, 1983–2005, Box 9, NST/START Round V. Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Nitze, Ridgway, and Holmes.↩
- Round V of the Nuclear and Space Talks lasted from May 8–June 28.↩
- See Document 131.↩