Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva¹

Washington, May 2, 1986, 2322Z

138815. Subject: (S) instructions for US/Soviet nuclear and space arms talks. Ref: (A) State 012556;² (B) State 54772;³ (C) State 55895;⁴ (D) 85 State 288127.⁵

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Following is guidance for US delegation for the fifth round of negotiations with the USSR on nuclear and space arms, beginning May 1986. Guidance for previous rounds (Reftels) remains in effect, except as modified below. Specific guidance for each of the three negotiating groups is being provided septel.

3. Principal objectives for Round V include:

—Maintaining focus and priority on executing the mandate agreed at the last summit to pursue areas of common ground—50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear arms, appropriately applied and an interim INF agreement;

—Seeking elimination of Soviet linkages and preconditions, including their linkage of progress in START to an unacceptable ban on so-called “space-strike” arms; their inclusion of US non-strategic forces under limits on US strategic forces, and limits on UK/French modernization and US cooperation with allies as preconditions for an INF agreement;

—Focusing the discussions on the substance of US proposals;

—Achieving progress on verification concurrent with progress on reductions; and,

—Emphasizing the problems for the arms control process created by continuing Soviet non-compliance.

4. Importance of Geneva process: the delegation should again make clear to the Soviets (as in para 5 of reftel D) that the confidential Geneva talks are the appropriate forum for making progress on bilateral arms control issues.

5. While again noting the agreement in the joint statement that, “during the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification will be agreed upon”, the delegation should continue to emphasize the importance to the future of arms control of compliance with existing arms control agreements, the need for the Soviets to correct non-compliant behavior, and US intent to take appropriate and proportionate responses in the absence of such corrective action.

6. Delegation should continue to resist strongly Soviet attempts to link progress in the three negotiating groups. In this regard, US del should also resist any Soviet attempts to erode the separate status and roles of the three negotiating groups, making clear that each group is fully competent both to explore policy issues and to commit governments on subjects within its areas of responsibility.

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870011-0780. Secret; Exdis. Drafted in the White House; cleared by Timbie, Mahley, Nosenzo, and in S/S and S/S-O; approved by Adelman. Sent Immediate.
2. See footnote 3, Document 126.
3. In telegram 54772 to NST Geneva, February 22, the Department transmitted instructions for a response to Gorbachev’s proposals of January 14. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860139-0610)
4. In telegram 55895 to NST Geneva, February 23, the Department transmitted its preference that experts’ talks on Risk Reduction Centers be held in Moscow or Washington. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860431-0685)
5. In telegram 288127 to NST Geneva, September 19, 1985, the Department transmitted overall guidance for Round III of Negotiations with the USSR on Nuclear and Space Arms. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860048-1039)