129. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1
1796. Subject: (U) NST—Summary report of third joint plenary meeting of Round IV, February 24, 1986.
1. This is NST-IV-016. Secret—Entire text.
2. Begin summary. Ambassador Kampelman presented the formal U.S. response to the Soviet program at a joint plenary meeting February 24;2 Ambassador Glitman presented the INF part of the response at an INF negotiating group meeting immediately following (Septel). Emphasizing that the elimination of nuclear weapons had long been an objective of the United States, Kampelman said certain conditions must first be fulfilled, among them the correction of conventional and other force imbalances, the establishment of effective verification regimes, and the achievement of full compliance with treaty obligations. Kampelman said the United States must view the Soviet program in light of, Inter Alia, the commitments undertaken at the summit. In this regard, the United States continued to advocate the pursuit of common ground, as the November 21 joint statement committed both sides to do, by taking the first steps involved in appropriately implementing the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear forces of both sides, and in promptly negotiating an INF agreement.
[Page 516]3. Regarding the three areas of negotiation, Kampelman said that Ambassador Glitman would present a major new U.S. proposal in the INF Negotiating Group meeting immediately following the joint plenary. Kampelman expressed U.S. disappointment that the Soviet proposal had not altered its approach in START, in particular the continued linkage of a ban on “space-strike arms” to reductions in offensive nuclear systems, and the continued inclusion of non-central U.S. nuclear systems in the strategic category, even though they could not be compared with Soviet strategic systems. In the defense and space area, Kampelman said the United States regretted the continued Soviet demand for a ban on “space-strike arms”, which was an attempt to block SDI. He said the United States’ rejection of this proposal remained firm. Kampelman also presented arguments to demonstrate why the Soviet proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapons did not remove the rationale for effective defenses. He concluded by welcoming the stated Soviet position on verification and noted that the United States would be proposing specific verification procedures tailored to specific weaponry limits, and reminded the Soviet side that political trust in verification and compliance must be restored.
4. Karpov replied by reading from a prepared text. Purporting to be giving a “first-look” assessment of the U.S. response, he said it appeared to be a repetition of the U.S. proposal of November 1. Kampelman noted his surprise that Karpov had apparently prepared his “first-look” assessment before having a first look. End summary.
U.S. Statement
5. Kampelman reported that he had been instructed by the President to provide a formal U.S. response to the Soviet proposal. He said that the response had been prepared in keeping with the joint statement of November 21, in an attempt to find and expand areas of common ground, and in light of extensive consultations with U.S. allies. Emphasizing that the elimination of nuclear weapons had long been an objective of the United States, Kampelman said that objective must be pursued in fashion consistent with the overall U.S. requirements for security and stability. Moreover, certain conditions must be fulfilled: conventional and other force imbalances must be corrected, future agreements must have effective verification regimes, and there must be full compliance with treaty obligations. In general, Kampelman said, the two sides must not, in the search for this objective, miss opportunities for more immediate and attainable goals. He added that there were elements of the Soviet proposal dealing with subsequent steps with which the United States could not agree at this time.
6. Kampelman said that these factors increased the importance of the joint statement of November 21, which focused on the realistic, [Page 517] near-term prospects for agreement and committed the two sides to pursue areas of common ground. The United States continued to advocate agreement on first steps through the implementation of the principle of a 50 percent reduction in the nuclear forces of both sides appropriately applied, and the prompt negotiation of an INF accord. When these reductions were achieved, and additional reductions were under discussion, the U.S. could envision subsequent steps involving the other nuclear powers in a balanced and stable movement to zero nuclear weapons.
7. With respect to the three negotiating groups, Kampelman said, Ambassador Glitman would respond to the Soviet proposal on INF in the meeting of the INF negotiating group which would immediately follow this joint plenary. At that time Glitman would introduce a major new U.S. proposal. In the START area, the United States was disappointed by the failure of the Soviet Union to substantively change its START position after the presentation of the U.S. proposal in early November; the Soviet approach was inconsistent with the summit agreement to accelerate the negotiations and find common ground. Kampelman noted that the Soviet position retained unacceptable linkage between reductions in offensive nuclear systems and a ban on so-called “space-strike arms” and also continued to include non-central U.S. nuclear systems in the category of strategic systems, even though they could not be compared with Soviet strategic systems. This condition was also unacceptable.
8. In the defense and space area, Kampelman said that the United States regretted first and foremost the Soviet Union’s failure to alter its ban on the development, testing and deployment of so-called “space-strike arms.” The proposal was clearly an attempt to block the treaty-compliant SDI, and the U.S. rejection of the ban remained firm. Additionally, the United States regretted the continued linking of the ban to a radical reduction in offensive arms. Kampelman noted that the Soviet January 16 proposal, in asking whether it would not be more sensible to abolish offensive nuclear weapons than to develop defenses, had implied a Soviet recognition that defenses could play an effective role as long as some offensive nuclear weapons existed. He said that effective defenses would diminish the military utility of nuclear weapons and facilitate further reductions. Moreover, when nuclear weapons levels approached zero, defenses could provide insurance against cheating, breakout, or the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states.
9. Noting that the United States was pleased that the Soviet Union recognized that verification of agreements was critical, Kampelman said the United States would be proposing specific verification procedures tailored to the specific weaponry limits we sought. He stated [Page 518] that, in this context, it was essential that political trust in verification and compliance be restored through demonstrated changes in Soviet testing practices which impeded verification, and through the correction of other forms of Soviet non-compliance with existing agreements.
Soviet Statement
10. Karpov read from a prepared statement which emphasized that on January 8 and November 21, 1985, leaders of the two countries had elaborated objectives for the negotiations, i.e. to reach effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability. In November, the two leaders had provided reference points for the negotiations by declaring that a nuclear war must never be fought and that neither of the two nations would seek military superiority.
11. Concerning today’s U.S. response to the Soviet proposal, Karpov said the Soviets would carefully examine it and assess its value from the standpoint of its consistency with agreed objectives. Appearing to briefly depart from his prepared text, Karpov said that even “a first look” at the U.S. response revealed that the U.S. continued to evade the task of preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth. He said he had heard nothing which constituted a constructive element in the U.S. position.
12. Karpov then returned to his prepared text to assert that the U.S. response appeared to be a repetition of the November 1, 1985 proposal. While reserving their final conclusion until after Ambassador Glitman’s presentation, Karpov continued, the Soviets had already given their assessment of the November 1 proposal. They had done this at the summit, at the end of Round III, and on several occasions during Round IV. Moreover, the Soviet delegation had also presented concrete measures for the implementation of the Gorbachev proposal. Karpov concluded by reaffirming his delegation’s willingness to work on these measures in a practical manner.
13. Kampelman expressed his appreciation for Karpov’s expression of willingness to examine the U.S. response, but noted for the record that as he looked across the table he could see that Karpov had been reading from a prepared text what he had characterized as a “first look” at the U.S. response. The text had obviously been prepared before the U.S. statement was read. Karpov replied that there was no need to explain to Ambassador Kampelman that it was “not good to peek into an other’s notes.” It was in any case up to him how he prepared his statement, or derived the basis for it. This, he repeated, was his preliminary assessment.
[Page 519]14. Participants:
U.S.: Kampelman, Tower, Glitman, Aldridge, Barry, Bartek, Burns, Cooper, Einhorn, Farr, Gallington, Hanmer, Hansen, Ifft, Kincaid, Korobovsky, Kramer, Kunsman, Lawson, McConnell, Reddy, Riveles, Spahr, Suchan, Van Inwegen, Woodworth, Zimmermann, and D. Arensburger, interpreter
USSR: Abdullayev, Alexandrov, Detinov, Grinin, Ivanov, Kardashev, Karpov, Khamidulin, Khripunov, Khromov, Kryuchkov, Kurlanov, Uznetsov, Lugachev, Masterkov, Medvedyev, Obukhov, Pavlichenko, Pimenov, Prokof’ev, Starodubov, Strel’tsov, Shemyakin, Yefimov, Zaitsev, and Bratchikov, Interpreter
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860443-1024. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to the Mission to NATO and USNMR SHAPE. Sent Priority for information to Moscow.↩
- The Delegation transmitted Kampelman’s statement in telegram 1795 from NST Geneva, February 25. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860443-0123)↩