128. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1

962. Subject: (U) START—Tower-Karpov Post-Plenary Conversation, January 29, 1986.

1. This is NST/START Memcon IV-M–008. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Meeting Date: January 29, 1986

Time: 12:40–2:40 P.M.

Place: U.S. ACDA Building, Geneva

3. Participants:

U.S. USSR
Ambassador Tower Ambassador Karpov
Dr. W. H. Hopkins (INT) Mr. A. Bratchikov (INT)

4. Subject summary: Soviet condolences on Challenger tragedy;2 Karpov’s assessment of status of negotiations; lengthy review of Gorbachev’s January 15 program;3 the “principle of ability to reach the territory of the other side” evolved as a result of the Soviet September 30/October 1 proposals for deep reductions; Soviets insist that potential areas of “convergence” and common ground are as recorded in the January 8 joint statement;4 according to Soviets, the U.S. proposal has only “superficial resemblances” to the Soviet proposals; Ambassador Tower’s personal assessment in para 41 of this cable. End subject summary.

5. Highlights: Karpov presented a lengthy commentary on the current status of the START negotiations, commenting on the intransigence of the U.S. position on SDI and noting that such an approach does not contribute to progress in other areas. He said that today’s START plenary statement reflected similar negativism and that the U.S. lacks interest in the security considerations of the Soviet side as evidenced by the U.S. side ignoring significant numbers of U.S. forces which will remain after reductions. He claimed the Soviet September 30 proposal was equitable in the context of new conditions, i.e., through application of the principle of a weapon’s ability to reach the territory [Page 506] of the other side. Karpov said that new conditions, including locations of deployed systems and the range of those systems, now assume greater importance and observed that Soviet medium-range systems constitute no threat to U.S. territory. Tower challenged that assertion and emphasized the existence of the separate INF forum mandated with discussion of non-central strategic systems. He noted that the U.S. side had never agreed to definitions of systems based on the principle of a weapon’s ability to reach the territory of the other side and challenged the realism in equating carrier-based systems and ICBMs. Tower asked Karpov to identify areas of common ground and suggested establishing working groups in those areas. Karpov expressed the fear that in working groups there would only be a repetition of U.S. positions stated elsewhere in the negotiations. The search for areas of seemingly common ground should not eclipse the search for real solutions to the major issues at these negotiations; thus far the Soviet Union had observed no possibility of resolving those major issues in the START framework or elsewhere.

6. The two ambassadors debated the past record of defining strategic systems and Karpov noted that SLBMs had been included in earlier agreements precisely because of their ability to reach the territory of the other side; he said there are new conditions now that demand consideration of geographic placement of weapons. Tower observed that the Soviet proposal would have the United States give up certain conventional capabilities since it includes conventional systems. Tower asked Karpov several times to identify areas of convergence, whereupon Karpov said that areas of convergence are recorded in the January 8, 1985, joint statement. He continued, before anything else there must be agreement on those basic principles. Tower, after a lengthy discussion over the role of carrier-based aircraft, noted that in this forum it is appropriate to discuss weapons specifically and uniquely designed for nuclear roles. Karpov noted that in his plenary statement he had pointed out areas of “superficial coincidence” in the positions of the sides; upon analysis, however, the respective approaches of the sides are different. Karpov noted the Soviet Union welcomes any convergence in positions but emphasized that there are profound differences in the sides’ positions. See Ambassador Tower’s personal assessment in para 41. End highlights.

7. Tower thanked Karpov again for his expression of sympathy on behalf of the Soviet government on the occasion of the Challenger tragedy. He noted that there had been 24 successful shuttle launches and that this was the first time astronauts had been lost in flight; in addition, there had been the tragedy with the Apollo crew on the launch pad. Karpov observed that the exploration of space has its risks, and he agreed with Tower that despite this tragedy, the main lesson to be learned is how to ensure future safety in space.

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8. Karpov said he wished to continue with the discussion which the two had just had following the U.S. plenary statement, as well as to give the Soviet side’s evaluation of the status of the fourth round of the negotiations so far. He said he understood the U.S. side needs time to study and formulate its opinion about Gorbachev’s January 15 proposals. He explained that during the present round there have been a joint plenary meeting, two space and defense plenaries, two START plenaries, an INF plenary and unofficial meetings between Glitman and Obukhov—enough meetings to allow for a preliminary evaluation of how things currently stand at the negotiations. Karpov said he did not want to engage Tower in discussions of the topics of the space and INF groups, since he appreciated the fact that Tower does not like to talk about those subjects. Nevertheless, he said, to fill in the picture it would be necessary for him to refer to what has been going on in those groups.

9. Karpov said that in the Space Group the Soviet side hears that the SDI is untouchable, and that there can be no negotiation on limiting or changing it. He said Tower must understand that such an approach, one which rejects the search for a mutually acceptable solution to the question of preventing an arms race in space, does not expedite negotiations in the other groups which are concerned with related areas of preventing any further arms race. Such intransigence is not a method to help progress in the other groups. When assessing the current status on the space issue, it is difficult to believe that the U.S. side does not understand the importance of getting a mutually acceptable solution there, so as to facilitate radical reductions of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Soviet side must conclude that this U.S. approach is a conscious, deliberate attempt by the Space Group to close the door to any deep reduction of nuclear weapons.

10. Karpov said that as he had listened to today’s start plenary, where the most frequently used word seemed to be something like “unacceptable,” he could not help but compare the content of that statement to what is said in the Space Group. That comparison had caused him to reach the conclusion he had expressed at the plenary table. He continued that in the Space Group, the U.S. was closing off the road to solution of the issues discussed there, and in the START group the U.S. side had also come out against equitable reductions of nuclear arms when viewed from the point of view of the security concerns of the other side. He noted that concern for the other side’s security is precisely expressed in the principle of the ability of a weapon to reach the territory of the other side. He asked how the U.S., in proposing reductions of nuclear systems only in the categories of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, and at the same time ignoring the fact that it has 1400 effective nuclear delivery vehicles capable of reach[Page 508]ing Soviet territory, would demonstrate consideration of equality and show respect for the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. He said that although the U.S. formally talks about equality in terms of weapons remaining after reduction, in essence the U.S. proposal ignores the Soviet Union’s security interests and, in reality, it does not guarantee equality in terms of Soviet security interests.

11. Karpov said there was no need to expound further on the lack of balance in the U.S. proposal. It ignored significant numbers of U.S. forces, despite suggesting the implementation of reductions of both U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons. He said that contrary to the U.S. contention that the Soviet September 30 proposal is not equitable, such is not the case; reductions proposed therein are equitable under the new conditions which would be created if the U.S. and USSR reached agreement on deep reductions on nuclear arms.

12. Karpov noted that since 1969 when negotiations began on limiting strategic offensive weapons, the direction has been from lesser to greater limitations. First, for example, limitations had been placed on land-based ICBMs and SLBMs and aviation systems had not been included; later, the SALT II agreement included limitations on strategic aviation. The ceilings for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers were originally lower than those finally agreed on. However, earlier arms agreements had not foreseen the destruction of 50 percent of the sides’ arsenals, as the USSR was now proposing. Under those conditions, the residual nuclear weapons which can reach the territory of the other side, whether having a longer range and being deployed on one’s own territory, or having a lesser range but being deployed closer to the territory of the other side, now assume a different dimension. They cannot be ignored while proposed reductions are being formulated and developed. If the USSR were to propose that each of the sides retain 1250 deployed strategic weapons, while preserving the right to keep 1400–1500 nuclear delivery vehicles deployed close to Soviet territory, then an asymmetry would result in the strategic potential of the sides and erode Soviet security interests.

13. Karpov said that Soviet proposals which take into consideration possible asymmetries due to the deployment of U.S. INF systems close to Soviet borders cannot be termed “inequitable.” To assert that the Soviet Union has many systems of comparable range that are not covered by limitations has nothing to do with the essence of the discussion, since the matter under discussion is the potential capability of one side in terms of the security interests of the other side. He said a bilateral agreement is what is being discussed, and it should be evaluated by the yardstick of mutual security. Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces pose no threat to the United States.

14. Karpov continued, the Soviet Union has put forward a far-reaching program for complete nuclear disarmament by the year 2000. [Page 509] A most important facet of that program is its first stage, which corresponds to implementing 50 percent reductions of relevant Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons. He said the Soviet Union, in the first stage of this program, is prepared to agree on the total elimination of both sides’ intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. The Soviet Union desires that this solution be implemented in the next 5–8 years, together with other measures for the reduction of Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons. In this connection the Soviet Union seeks only the following guarantees: (1) the U.S. not give intermediate-range nuclear missiles to other countries, and (2) England and France agree not to build up their nuclear arsenals, and that Britain, France and China also proceed with reductions of their respective nuclear arms.

15. Karpov asked that the United States, and Tower personally, once more weigh what has been said and what will be said by the U.S., and that it examine the comments of the Soviet side as to where and how the two countries can proceed toward achieving mutually acceptable solutions. The Soviet Union is prepared for businesslike discussions of any and all aspects of its program and on all stages of that program, particularly the first stage which involves the two nuclear powers. Such discussions should lead to practical solutions for the elimination of nuclear arms; in this respect, the Soviet Union and the United States should set an example for all countries.

16. Karpov apologized for taking so much time in giving what he said was a very detailed exegesis of the status of the negotiations. However, he wanted to be sure that the U.S. understood how the Soviet side perceived this round so far, and what bothered the Soviet side.

17. Tower said that Karpov knew that the U.S. side agreed to the main objective stated in the three-phase Soviet program, namely, to achieve a non-nuclear world. He noted, however, that it would be inappropriate at present in this forum to discuss the out-year aspects of the Soviet program. He noted that Karpov himself had said that the Soviet proposals of September 30 and October 1 were embodied in the first phase of the program, and that this first stage must be the focus of discussion in this forum.

18. Tower pointed out that it would be inappropriate to discuss the negotiations concerning non-central strategic systems here. He noted that the example cited by Karpov in his remarks after delivery of the U.S. plenary statement reinforced the U.S. argument. Specifically, in the interim agreement, ICBMs had been defined as land-based ballistic missiles with a range of 5500 km. That was the distance between the northwest portion of the USSR and the northeast portion of the U.S., and thus the criterion was based on an absolute range value. Nevertheless, there was never agreement about the specific principle of a weapon’s ability to reach the territory of the other side. Conse[Page 510]quently, it is not realistic to equate and to aggregate systems that can be carried on carrier-based aircraft—particularly when that carrier might be located, for example, in Norfolk, VA or on the west coast—with ICBMs, which are very accurate and have short flight times. These are the most threatening weapons because of their almost 100 percent alert rate and the fact that they can be launched at any time without marshalling large forces that might be detected.

19. On a different topic, Tower said that the November 21 statement5 indicated that there is agreement between the two nations’ leaders concerning certain areas of common ground or convergence. He noted that the U.S. side here had attempted to identify areas of convergence and said that he hoped the Soviet side would identify those areas which it considered to represent common ground; it would be useful to know whether or not those areas were the same.

20. Tower said that the U.S. side is prepared to agree to set up working groups to focus on areas of convergence and areas of common ground that could be developed. It would then be possible to see what progress could be made on specific points in the two sides’ proposals.

21. Karpov responded to Tower’s remarks by addressing the last issue first. He agreed that it is important to identify areas of convergence even if they do not fully coincide and also to develop common ground. Were such work to be conducted, it would have to be done so “actively”, but he wondered how much the current positions of the sides would allow for any truly active work. He wondered further whether these working groups might not simply be fora for repetition of the very same positions that are stated at D&S, INF and START plenaries and post-plenaries. He wondered what guarantees there might be that the positions of U.S. representatives at the working groups would be any more realistic than the positions presented by the U.S. side at official meetings, and whether U.S. representatives at working groups would be more willing to consider the security interests of the Soviet side.

22. Karpov said he thought talk about areas of convergence should not eclipse consideration of the important issues which relate to the search for solutions that correspond to the principle of equality and equal security. Such a search would be consistent with the objectives of the negotiations and close off the possibility for continuing the arms race on Earth, and would, in fact, contribute to the termination of the arms race.

23. Karpov said that if the sides agree, e.g., in the strategic group, that both sides will be prepared to work out a solution that would [Page 511] shut off all channels of the arms race—not just some of them, thereby leaving others open for its continuation—and if the sides could agree to scale down nuclear arms and not allow for the possibility of their continued buildup in other areas, then perhaps it might be possible to agree to establishing working groups in order to look for solutions. So far, however, he said, he saw no possibility for such an advance in the START group or in any of the other groups. He said this, he noted, on the basis of what the Soviet side knows about the U.S. position thus far. Frankly, he said, creating illusions where they have no place is far worse than healthy skepticism. The latter is something good if it contributes to the objective of working out mutually acceptable solutions.

24. Karpov next addressed Tower’s remarks about ICBM “range.” He said that Tower was incorrect in asserting that absolute distance had been a criterion for ICBMs. The 5500 km figure had been established precisely by measuring the distance between specific points in the USSR and the U.S. Military specialists had performed such a measurement on a globe to determine the shortest distance between the two points in the respective countries and the 5500 km figure expresses that distance precisely. He said that in light of this fact, Tower’s arguments had not changed his mind, and that he was standing his ground in this respect. Furthermore, Karpov said, apart from ICBMs, SLBMs had also been included and considered “strategic,” although their range was only 2500–3000 km. SLBMs had been included precisely because they were capable of reaching the territory of the other side, despite the fact that their range was less than 5500 km.

25. Therefore, said Karpov, he would continue to maintain that the principle of the ability of a system to reach the territory of the other side lay at the heart of agreement as early as the first stage of SALT I. He noted, however, that not all systems that were capable of reaching the territory of the other side had been included in that agreement. It had been decided that since drastic reductions were not envisioned at that time, that probably other systems could be dealt with later, one step at a time. Such a decision had been made at that time, and it had been agreed by the sides.

26. Karpov said that now, however, the situation is different. The present problem is to ensure the security of both sides and prevent an arms race. This is to be done under conditions of deep reductions of the nuclear weapons of both sides. Therefore, as compared to past situations, the current situation demands a more radical and practical approach, one which takes into account not only ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, but also other systems which, due to their geographic deployment, are capable of reaching the territory of the other side. These considerations provide some of the basis for the proposal on such systems, if there is to be radical reductions of nuclear arsenals.

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27. Tower said it seemed that the Soviet Union was suggesting that in order to get radical reductions, the U.S. must give up a portion of its conventional capabilities; this was due to the fact that the Soviet proposal includes U.S. systems whose primary function is conventional, not nuclear. If the Soviet proposals were implemented, the U.S. would be at a big disadvantage. Tower remarked that obviously there was at present no convergence on this point, and he again asked Karpov to identify in the START context those areas where the USSR sees common ground.

28. Karpov said that only a few minutes had elapsed since he had pointed out that it is first necessary to get agreement on a few basic principles, call them “points of departure.” This would open the path to achieving a mutually acceptable agreement. Specifically, those points are the objectives of the current negotiations, and they are stated in the January 8 joint statement—namely, agreement on no arms race in space, terminating it on Earth, reducing nuclear weapons, and enhancing strategic stability.

29. Karpov said all the above needs to be accomplished, as recorded in the joint statement as the common view of the two sides. The task at hand now is how to resolve all of this through these negotiations. The Soviet Union has come up with proposals for the entire range of problems, and they are consistent with the objectives stated in the January 8 document. They also take into account the realities of the military balance between the USSR and the U.S. Moreover, the Soviet proposals make it possible to approach other measures contained in the Soviet program, in particular, with reference to other nuclear powers. The program presented by the Soviet Union has a time frame, and the USSR is prepared to agree about all of this with the U.S. as soon as possible and on as wide a range of questions as possible.

30. Karpov continued that the USSR wants agreement on the first stage of its proposed program as soon as possible. The Soviet Union is prepared to get agreement this year so as to begin its implementation next year, or even this year for that matter. If the two sides agreed, it would be possible to transform this approach into genuine, concrete agreement. However, a “bookkeeper’s approach” to areas of convergence is not fruitful. What is needed is real effort, including work to establish genuine points of convergence, and it is not possible to do that only through the efforts of one side. The efforts of both sides are required, but in terms of converting these negotiations into realistic agreement, U.S. efforts are lacking.

31. Saying that he had perhaps not understood the interpreter properly, Tower asked if Karpov were saying that it was necessary to agree in principle to the three-phase Gorbachev plan before proceeding in other areas. Karpov sought to clarify that point, saying there was [Page 513] common ground recorded in the January 8 joint statement. The common objectives and the subject of the current negotiations are clearly set forth there. Those common objectives and subjects are precisely the areas which should be translated into specific agreement. Karpov said that was all he meant to say by his previous remarks.

32. Karpov said he did not understand what Tower meant when he implied that the Soviet Union wants the U.S. to abandon some of its conventional capabilities. He said if Tower could be more specific in this respect, he could clarify things for Tower. However, at present, he simply did not understand at all what the U.S. had in mind here.

33. Tower responded that in this forum there should only be discussion of systems which are designed specifically and uniquely for a nuclear role. He said carrier-based aircraft, e.g., are not primarily intended for nuclear land attack. Further, given what Karpov had said earlier about “range” in geographic location of weapons, Tower wondered why the Soviet Union was not willing to include SS–20s in reductions.

34. Karpov tried to explain why carrier-based aircraft should be included in the strategic equation and Tower again pointed out that their primary role was not nuclear land attack but rather fleet defense. Karpov said that an aircraft carrier can have 40 nuclear delivery vehicles, i.e., half of the systems on the carrier are designed to be nuclear capable. He said if one compares kill capability of non-nuclear aircraft weapons with nuclear ones, the comparison is not in favor of the non-nuclear weapons. Therefore, he wondered how it was that Tower could contend that such aviation should not be included in the nuclear balance. He pointed out that some years ago, such aircraft had been under strategic air command. Though, they have now been removed from that command, for many years those planes were considered part of U.S. strategic forces—and no change of name can camouflage their strategic nature.

35. In response to a question from Tower about whether Karpov was contending that carrier-based aircraft are just as threatening as ICBMs, Karpov said he was making no comparisons; rather, he was simply talking about the role of carrier-based aviation in the strategic equation. As for Tower’s statement that ICBMs constitute the main threat, Karpov said that, as always, he would have to disagree. He said that the USSR believes that the greatest threat to its security comes from the suddenness of an attack, e.g., from Pershing II missiles. The U.S., however, does not even want to consider that.

36. Tower said Karpov appeared to be conceding that fast-flying missiles are more threatening than slow-flying aircraft, and therefore, ICBMs are more threatening than bombers. Karpov said he was reminded of the Greek syllogism about the swift-footed Achilles never [Page 514] being able to catch the slow-moving turtle. He did not, however, want to engage in an exercise like that. Tower said he, too, could see they were not going to get anywhere on the present topic. He asked whether the only areas of convergence, then, were those in the January 8 joint statement signed by Shultz and Gromyko.

37. Karpov said that that document should be the point of departure. In it the basic elements which are to be developed and translated into practical agreements are clearly recorded. He noted that in its plenary statement today, the USSR had also indicated other seemingly similar elements identified in the sides’ positions. However, analysis indicates that these superficial resemblances hide deep differences—for example, the apparently similar 6000 nuclear-weapon figure in both positions. If one looks at the respective approaches of the sides, those figures represent very different things. Consequently, it is more appropriate to talk about superficial resemblance than about genuine common ground. He added that when he had talked about the danger of illusions regarding common ground, he had been thinking precisely about the fact that one should not put on blinders. The reality is that these superficial resemblances hide profound differences. The sides must attempt to eliminate those differences. This would facilitate working out solutions corresponding to the tasks and objectives common to the sides and recorded in the joint statement.

38. Tower countered that the coincidence of figures was nothing accidental. The U.S. had acted on Soviet suggestions and attempted to accommodate Soviet concerns. He cited, for example, the fact that the U.S. had moved from its earlier 2500 figure to a figure of 3000 ICBM Rvs in order to move closer to the 3600 figure proposed by the Soviet Union.

39. Karpov said the Soviet Union did not deny that such movement was useful, if it were in the direction of achieving mutually acceptable solutions. Further, he said that when he had referred to the 6000 figure, he had had in mind the fact that the Soviet proposal of 6000 nuclear weapons represented the maximum number of weapons the sides could have, whereas the 6000 figure proposed by the U.S. represents a limitation on only a part of the strategic arsenal, leaving other parts to develop unrestrained. This would lead not to a reduction of the nuclear arsenals, but rather to an increase of the arsenals in other areas. That, he said, is a basic and substantive difference between the respective 6000 figures. That difference should not be obscured by the seeming similarity of the two numbers, for their content is indeed very different.

40. Tower said he thought they had gone as far as they could today. He expressed the hope that they would have an opportunity for an additional informal discussion the following week. He told Karpov he would be in touch with him about it. Karpov said he was always ready to meet and talk about the business of this group—or topics beyond this group—if necessary.

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41. Ambassador Tower’s personal comment: It is my view at this time that the Soviets have no interest in making significant negotiating progress in START during this round. It would appear that their tactic is to stall through this round to put the pressure on the U.S. side to come up with concessions in the fifth round for purposes of producing something for the summit, which they seem to sense there will be growing pressure on the President to do. End comment.

Kampelman
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860324-0547. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE. Round IV of the Nuclear and Space Talks took place January 16–March 4.
  2. Reference is to the Space Shuttle Challenger accident, which occurred on January 28.
  3. See Document 127.
  4. See footnote 3, Document 100.
  5. For the text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, January 1986, pp. 7–11.