Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

119. Notes of a Conversation¹

Geneva, November 19, 1985

SUMMARY RECORD

President Reagan:

—When we last met (this morning),² we agreed you (Gorbachev) would have the floor when we returned.

Gorbachev:

—I would like to respond to your remarks of this morning. During our preparations, we talked more than once prior to this meeting about what we should devote time to—whether we should focus on the causes of tension or focus more on solutions, keeping in mind that both sides have said a lot about causes.

—Today, too, if we were to try to make a list of our mutual objections we would not be able to make headway towards normalization, trust, respect and understanding—and most importantly, to give some impetus to the Geneva process which is at a crucial stage.

—I think that it is reasonable, therefore, that we avoid a big debate over your remarks. But, as I told you in our one-on-one, the Soviet leadership is free of any primitive approach. It is not as you feel that all (our policy) is based on some global plan for supremacy by the Soviet Union, the building of an Empire.

—We have discussed this many times. Your side has raised regional issues, but in doing so, you mentioned our “expansion” in Afghanistan, Angola—even Yemen.

—We can agree hotbeds of conflict do cause problems in our relationship—but we can not agree with your view of their cause—because you feel USSR “expansionism” is responsible.

—This is either a disillusion or deliberate distortion.

—If U.S. policy is developed based on this view, it will be hard to find a way out.

—An assessment of our policy in the Third World based on such a misconception can only lead to undermining international security.

—I’d like to give you our fundamental view on developing countries:

—First of all, we have no monopolies in developing countries using their resources and manpower. We seek no commercial concessions. We rely on our own resources 100%. Therefore, we have no selfish interest in the third world. We need no bases or platforms there.

—Secondly, if you were to look at the developing world in unbiased way, it is the product of a long-term objective process which began after WW II involving liberation wars trying to add political freedom and to permit countries to use their resources and manpower as they see fit. This is the root of what is happening.

—You overemphasize the power of the Soviet Union. We are a pragmatic and realistic people. We are categorically opposed to impose solutions from outside. However, we are against counterrevolution, and support the struggle for liberation because we want free rights. Some wanted to crush the revolutions in the US, in France, and in the USSR.

—The idea that a small number of people (like the USSR) could turn the world into tension is unreal.

—In India, Algeria, and Korea there are millions of people.

—In Afghanistan and Ethiopia, you feel that we stirred the pot, but we first heard of the revolution in Afghanistan on the radio.

—We traditionally had good relations with Haile Selassie in Ethiopia.

—It is wrong to ascribe to us plotting—no this is not right. All we ascribe to is freedom. We support freedom—and make no secret of it.

—We have no secret plans for world domination—this is unrealistic. Regional problems are due to the struggle evolving over many stages. Some time you support one side or the other. We can also play a role—and in some areas, already do.

—We support a settlement of Afghanistan, a political settlement under the UN, if you help us. You accuse us of deploying troops but you work against us. You want our troops there, the longer the better.

—We are prepared for a package involving a non-aligned Afghanistan, with guarantees of no outside interference, Soviet troops withdrawn and refugees returned. There are possibilities for a political reconciliation.

—We are ready to promote this package if you are ready. Afghanistan is also ready to work, but wants the cooperation of all groups.

—I think we can reach a political settlement. Once again, we have no plan for using this to gain access to a warm water port, to the Persian Gulf, or to infringe on U.S. interests—no such plan exists.

—We could use this situation to improve the overall relationship—pursuing the cooperation of conflicting sides with our support—but not interfearing.

—This is an area to us to explore.

—You have said the USSR builds and the U.S. lag behind. You say that we are committed to an arms race. The characteristics of the future situation will depend on today and tomorrow—this is the central issue.

—You said that while the U.S. was showing restraint, the Soviet Union was building military potential. But 20 years ago, there was no balance in the strategic area. The U.S. had more than four times the number of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, plus nuclear Forward Based Systems. Maybe that was acceptable to the U.S., but it was not parity nor stable.

—You now trying to assure that no agreements are violated—but 20 years ago you had four times Soviet power. Soviet leadership had to offset your advantage, so that it would not be possible for you to manipulate us.

—But since 1960, the U.S. has increased its warheads, its nuclear charges three times, and even now is greater than the USSR.

—The negotiations began as we approached parity. We are not trying not to lag behind, or to get ahead. We can’t have unequal security, even if the imbalance is in our benefit, because this is not the basis for strategic stability.

—The IISS and JCS reports show that parity exists. The forces are different, but they support different strategies.

—We need to reduce parity to lower levels. We are moving toward each other. Neither side can be superior to the other. We are all for equal security at lower levels of forces.

—We have engaged in new Geneva negotiations, with all subject taken in their interrelationship. I would like to list all the steps that we have made to start movement and to outline the political concept we have adopted.

—The time has come for us both to muster the political will and realism to make progress and to end efforts to outsmart or overrun other side.

—Even now, due to computer technology, one side could get ahead in space. But we can match any challenge—though you may not think so.

—Why not take the obvious next step? SDI can lead to an arms race in space which is not only defensive but offensive. Space weapons will be harder to verify and will feed suspicions and mistrust.

—Scholars tell us that any shield can be pierced. SDI will not save us, so why is SDI necessary? The only logical rationale is to cope with a weakened (Soviet) retaliatory strike. Weinberger has said that if the USSR had such a defense first, it would be bad. If we go first, you feel it would be bad for the world, feeding mistrust. We can’t believe your rationale.

—You said that a defense was possible. Since it appeared the President is committed, we studied your idea seriously. The answer that we came to is that it will lead to an arms race on earth and in space.

—We will not help you in your plans. We will need to make them impractical, and we will buildup to smash your shield.

—You say that the USSR is already doing this (similar defense). That is not true. The USSR and US are involved in research related to outer space, some joint research, and studying fundamental research for peace without setting a goal of defense. We are not trying to put the research to military use. That goal would be inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. Testing is also inconsistent with the Treaty. This can only exacerbate mistrust.

—The President and his advisors are pressing forward and this can only lead to no reductions, rather a qualitative upgrading of our systems, potentially to counter your defense and an effort on our part to find a response. This response would not be a mirror of your program, but a simpler, more effective system.

—What will happen when you put in your seven levels and we put in ours? It will just destabilize the situation, generate mistrust, and waste resources.

—All of your schemes are based on computers monitoring 1000’s of targets with us in some bunker while the computers are deciding.

—You know, we could have collisions, from meteors.

—If we get dragged into this, not only do we face an arms race and a waste of resources, but also mistrust and no way to negotiate.

—You have concluded SDI is needed to avoid the madman using the bomb. Well for years we have had a level of deterrence. Other states will join us and aid in verification. Your actions are not consistent with US interest.

—If you were to agree, then the USSR and US proposals could be used. If we could agree on avoiding an arms race in space, then as heads of political leadership we could meet on reductions.

—It will be a different process if we leave Geneva without any agreements or, after attempting agreement, we have to rethink the current situation.

President Reagan:

—We are divided by suspicions. Even during the WW II experience, we face this. I could never understand suspicion which blocked the 8th AF from using airfields in the USSR and caused our bombers to return to UK vice landing in USSR. They could have flown their bombing run, refueled and rearmed in the USSR, and returned on another bombing run. This was blocked by your suspicion.

—There is no parity today. Yes, we had nuclear superiority in the past, but even with us having a nuclear monopoly, we tried to reduce weapons. [The President then read a list of U.S. nuclear initiatives starting from June 14, 1946].³

—In 1969, we still had superiority as we entered into the SALT negotiations. However, since the signing of SALT II in 1979 alone, you have added some 3800 warheads. Since that time, we pulled 2400 from Europe unilaterally.

—NATO’s INF deployments were due to your SS–20 deployments. Our NATO allies asked for our help.

—Now today we both sit with MAD, Mutual Assured Destruction. We don’t have as as much as you (nuclear power), but we have sufficient force to deter. However, this is totally uncivilized.

—After WW I, nations met in Geneva and drew up accords to protect civilians. Have we gotten more uncivilized, since now our weapons are trained against civilians.

—SDI is my idea. There has never been a weapon without a defense. I’m talking about a shield. We don’t know if we will get one, we are researching the possibilities now.

—If our research results in such a weapon, and you are doing the same research, it would not do to put this with offense (add to our offensive forces). If a defensive system is found, we would prefer to sit down and get rid of nuclear weapons, and with them, the threat of war.

—With regard to Afghanistan, the man heading the country was delivered by the USSR, not elected. The first one you provided didn’t work so you demoted him. As I suggested in my proposal at the UN,⁴ I think we need a mutual withdrawal of all outside forces, then a coalition of Muslim states to help put in an elected government.

—In Cambodia, we signed a peace treaty with North Vietnam and after we left Vietnam swept across Laos and Cambodia. We are all for elections there.

—In Nicaragua, you have provided war material far in advance of their own defense needs. Additionally, Nicaraguan leaders have stated their commitment to spread revolution to other states. We have been appealing for both the Contras and the government to lay down their arms and talk under Church supervision.

—We laid off when the revolution replaced Somoza. In fact, the OAS asked our help in getting Somoza to step down thus allowing writing, free press, etc. Somoza stepped down, but one faction ousted all others. The Contras are trying to reset goals of the original revolution.

—All this is behind the mistrust.

—Yes, we need to eliminate weapons. Any military assessment of Soviet power indicates it is offensive—not defensive. We are ready to agree to switch from offense to defense. SDI will never be used by us to improve our offense.

—We believe these are things we could do to remove mistrust. Our goal is not an arms race. We can return to parity in one of two ways. Either we both reduce, or we can build up and use defense to offset. We do not seek superiority, but will do what is necessary for peace/freedom.

Gorbachev:

—What are we to say to our negotiators?

President Reagan:

—We could give them guidelines that call for 50% reductions leading to parity for all and instruct them to go forward.

Gorbachev:

—What about the objective as announced in January⁵—no arms race in space—what about that goal?

President Reagan:

—I don’t see the defensive shield as arms race in space, rather as a means to eliminate weapons. We are going forward with research.

—Our UN Ambassador Walters was asked by some Chinese, what happens when a man with a spear that can penetrate anything meets a man with a shield that is inpenetrable? He responded that he didn’t know, but that he did know what happens when a man with no shield meets that same opponent who has the spear. Neither of us want to be in situation of having no shield.

—We can have agreement that we all share, or that neither deploy ahead of the other, or with offense still to be protected.

—I would like to propose that we (Reagan & Gorbachev) walk together now.

[At 3:44 pm, the President and the General Secretary left for a short walk.⁶ Others moved to a smaller room and continued the conversation.]

Meeting While Leaders Walk

Shultz:

—Do you wish to talk on guidelines? No need to let the time pass. There are some points of intersection. We could try to narrow it down. President Reagan is doing that. Do you have suggestions?

Shevardnadze:

—The General Secretary has outlined our approach: a ban of space weapons, and an exploration of the gap between our two proposals.

Dobrynin:

—This would provide short, good guidelines.

Shultz:

—We will not stop our research. President Reagan is ready to talk about what we can do if progress is made—and we are ready to talk about this now.

Shevardnadze:

—I can’t understand the purpose of this.

Shultz:

—Our purpose is to move the concept of deterrence into a more stable and humane posture. It will also serve to deal with unstabilization of offensive arms brought about by increasing accuracy and mobility. Those developments bring us to the need for a shield. Stability can be enhanced if it is not a race, but is a cooperative effort. Unilateral actions are not stable. A negotiated transition would be more stable.

Shevardnadze:

—What you are proposing, cooperating in unknown area, is more like science fiction. The General Secretary has said if we can agree on a ban, then on that basis, and on proposals put forth by both, there is a realistic way forward. You have said that what is destabilizing today is offensive forces, but I say it is your SDI. But for this program, we could have serious progress in Geneva. One more point, not mentioned earlier, you have been saying in the context of explaining your SDI program that the USSR has similar research and that we are somewhere ahead of you. This is being asserted by your press and your official spokesman. If that is so, why are we now proposing a ban on a space strike?

Shultz:

—I am confident your research is parallel to ours, and I can tell you why we feel it exists.

Nitze:

—In the area of lasers, there is no doubt.

Shevardnadze:

—If you have invited us to talk to convince us of the utility of SDI, I doubt you can do it. As the General Secretary has said, our arguments are not made of thin air. We have worked this issue with our experts. As a result, we hold deep convictions that the development of space strike arms will usher in new era of the arms race. Any talk of regulating this process by treaty is not realistic. In fact it is most unrealistic. The right decision is not to allow a new cycle of the arms race.

—We may not be informed on your data, but can one say that any guarantee that defense weapons will not be used for offense is no guarantee. Any defensive weapon can be used for offense.

—Let me ask, President Reagan and others have said that after you find out if development is feasible, and before deployment, you will share the benefits of the research. But, the research to get to that point will take many years. Will President Reagan have the same policy and objectives ten to fifteen years from now? In 10–15 years, when your weapons are developed, we will have own objectives. In the process, treaties will be thrown away. How can we be assured we can trust your actions that are 10–15 years in the future?

Shultz:

—[Interrupting] That is a good question. We have proposed an “open laboratories” approach calling for visits back and forth to eliminate surprises. Our scientists could visit each others’ laboratories so they can get a sense of what is taking place.

—Secondly, it is in our interest to maintain such a policy, not a matter of goodwill or trust. It is in our interest to have a cooperative development rather than unilateral defensive deployment. Unilateral action creates instability. It creates concern in the mind of the side not deploying. It is simply not in our interest to create instability, therefore, it is not in our interest to handle the transition differently than President Reagan has proposed.

—Third, our two sides are finally discussing reductions. This has been a long time coming. Our agenda, agreed here in Geneva, put both offense and defense on the table. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev both have said they aspire to go to zero. The more you get down to zero, the more a defensive shield is an insurance policy vice a device to let offensive forces strike without risk. So if we stay on this path, and get others to join, we will change the nature of the situation.

Shevardnadze:

—If you would permit, I would like to respond and ask a question. We are now discussing deep cuts in offensive strategic weapons, cutting all by 50% as we look for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. If we are serious in following this path, and others join us in this, why do we need the shield? What is it for, since we will not only eliminate the weapons but also take measures to ensure none retain them?

Shultz:

—Good point, verification is needed.

McFarlane:

—Your question is reasonable. Treaties are broken. However, the history of actions by democrats provides a basis for judgment. Recent evidence demonstrates that, even if we have no treaties but only agreements, we have continued to observe them beyond expiration when we had no reason to do so. This should provide some basis for confidence.

—Did you intend to propose a question about the period of time while we are under ABM Treaty?

Korenynko:

—Another point, this may seem strange but I do think it applies here.

—President Reagan began his explanation of mistrust by asserting that US pilots died because the USSR did not allow US planes to land—but this is inconsistent with the truth. The truth is that, as soon as sufficient territory was liberated to get within range for planes, a huge Soviet air base at Poltava was opened in 1944. They used this airfield as much as needed.

—I personally was a citizen defending that air base, and was injured. Many died there. I know the US general in charge. Everyone knows about that.

—Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has said that Stalin and FDR did not have misconceptions on this.

—What kind of information is being given to President Reagan? Who does this, and what do they inform him of?

Shultz:

—If President Reagan is wrong, I will tell him.

—Let us turn to different subjects.

—Three important things were said today. Two by the General Secretary, and one by Shevardnadze.

—You said we should be working on a way of expressing the results of our meeting since we found many areas of agreement. That’s true.

—This afternoon, the General Secretary spoke of Afghanistan, noting that a political settlement is highly desirable. We agree.

—The way the General Secretary made his comments is new to me. Maybe something can be worked out.

—We agreed beyond so-called expert talks and that at the foreign minister level we should continue to have meetings on our agenda, and on processes that we should consider.

—I put this down as a plus. Then I added something else said this morning. The General Secretary laid out an outline for a desirable process for our two countries involving meetings at varied levels, down to citizens. We agree this is desirable.

—This brings me to the question of how to report results of our meeting to our countries and publics at large.

—I gave Dobrynin a statement that we agreed on drawn from your previous document. I added a paragraph that refers to areas of agreement as listed on the following pages:

—we already have some items agreed, like NPT language.

—If you want to work on this. Fine. I propose we use the meeting at 9 p.m. this evening for this purpose.

Dobrynin:

—But what is following page?

Shultz:

—That depends on what is agreed upon. I showed Dobrynin in Washington only one page. This is a way to prepare to add on to this as appropriate and tell the public we met—did not agree on all but made some progress—and here’s what we agreed.

Shevardnadze:

—Not really clear what kind of issues would follow.

Dobrynin:

—In addition to guidelines, what should be there?

Shultz:

—What we can agree:

—NPT

—Cultural agreement

—No PAC

—Regional talks and FM impetus to them

—Arms control—not only guidelines

—Try to find things we agreed.

Shevardnadze:

—Today the General Secretary has mentioned a political mechanism that should function.

Shultz:

—We agree and have said we endorsed this.

—It is reflected in this approach.

Shevardnadze:

—We have mentioned this because the mechanism has components: the Summit; foreign minister’s meetings; Geneva negotiations; political consultations on regional matters; negotiations on Civil Air, etc.

Shultz:

—Also people exchanges.

—We had all of this in mind.

Shevardnadze:

—We should record the facts of this meeting to give political impetus to this meeting.

—What we need is serious and sound documentation.

—Ridgeway and Sokelou will meet tonight.

[1654 PM. At this point the President and Secretary General returned and the meeting ended.]⁷

1. Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Geneva Summit Records Nov 19–21, 1985 [2 of 4]. Secret; Sensitive.
2. Memoranda of conversation for Reagan and Gorbachev’s private and plenary morning meetings are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union March 1985–October 1986, Documents 150 and 151.
3. Not found
4. Reference is to Reagan’s address to the 40th session of the UN General Assembly on October 24. See Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book II, pp. 1285–1290.
5. See footnote 3, Document 100.
6. The memorandum of conversation for Reagan and Gorbachev’s private meeting in the Pool House of the Maison Fleur d’Eau is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union March 1985–October 1986, Document 153.
7. The memorandum of conversation for Reagan and Gorbachev’s dinner at the Soviet Mission is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union March 1985–October 1986, Document 155.